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This study attempts to analyst
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that hal!e affected and contint
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refQrence to the proliferation '
as eviden~ed by their treaty-m.
The structure of international
be reasonably or adequately d,.
described in the traditional ma
only the jurisdiction of States.
The question of who falls witll
concept of contemporary inte1
bound up with the whole notit
allaw, hence the first part of the investigation
deals with a review of the theoretical issue of
the definition of international law.
The inquiry reveals that absolute sovereignty
and unrestricted liberty of action of the
subjects of the law, is clearly unreasonable and
unacceptable in the circumstances of today.
It is no longer a conditio sine qua non to
qualify as a subject of international law.
Among the problems discussed are the inter·
national legal aspects of Federalism, since the
extent of the treaty·making power of
particularly the component units forming a
federal union, is a subject of urgent and
continuous preoccupation in the conduct of
modern international relations. Also treated is
the question of unrecognized States in
international law - their legal personality and
treaty-making power.
The case of Rhodesia is used as an illustration.
The international legal status of the Holy See
(The Vatican) is considered.
Reasonable attention is given to the discussion
of a very topical and delicate issue of our time
-the legal personality and treaty-making
capacity of National Liberation Movements
(Nations and Peoples fighting to establish an
independent government of their own).
A comparative case study of Bangladesh and
Biafra is used to illustrate the inconsistency in
state practice in connexion with the implementation of the 'principle of equal rights and
self-determination of nations and peoples'.
We believe that the principle forms the legal
cornerstone to justify these struggles.
However, we doubt if its present formulation
by the United Nations Organization is very
realistic and useful. The facts of particular
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Foreword

It gives me much pleasure to write this brief foreword to Dr. Okeke's

work the progress of which I had the privilege of following from time to
time, and with great interest It is a work that cannot fail to provoke
thought, written positively yet with restraint, it makes a balanced
presentation of the various topics that the author deals with, and comes
to conclusions that are defensible even where controversial; and controversy is, after all, to .be welcomed. This is all the more to be commended in that many of these topics are amongst those that are gen.erally regarded as highly sensitive at the present time.
The significance of the book lies in the fact, firstly, that it is the
work of a young jurist from a young country, looking at matters familiar
to the international lawyer in new ways which, if sometimes unorthodox,
are sincerely felt and honestly very persuasively set forth. Secondly,
despite the limitations of the framework of treaty-making capacity
within which the author sets his study, he has succeeded in relatively
brief compass, in ranging widely, and in covering a considerable number of individual subjects. The result is that things are seen from a
novel angle ·t hat brings out points often overlooked or not given their
full weigh~
The e!it of the work is to show that, without any call for iconoclasm or brupt breaks with the past, there is room in the international
legal field or adjustments and fresh insights that international lawyers
will do well to be thinking about In this way it makes a real contribution to better understanding. It is greatly to be hoped that it will be
followed up in due course by further work in a field for which the
author is so evidently well qualified.
The Hague, 1973

G. G. Fitzmaurice
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Preface

Practitioners, scholars · and writers of international law have given this
term countless definitions and interpretations.- Every writer, it seems,
feels compelled to redefine the concept. And I am no exception. For
the coilfusion: resulting from this semantic Tower of Babel impinges
on the practice of international law itself.
How can·one evaluate a phenomenon when ·there is little agreement
about what it is? How may one say that international law is good or
bad or in"between when there are no accepted criteria for determining
degrees of success or failure? Judgement of the perfomiance of international law rests mainly upon the nature of the expectations it arouses;
and these expectations naturally vary with the ~tion one·adopts.
We find .the view that law is a sociological notion from which legal
consequences ·eilsue valid. It (law) should never prevent the normal
functioning of life, be it on the national or on the international plane.
All law consists, and consists necessarily,.in the ·regulation of the action
of those who are ·subject to it, and it is therefore in its very being and
essence quite. incompatible with notions of unrestricted liberty, or
rather, in this, context, of .w hat wotild amount to licence; Those who
are directly involved in the science and practice of this science must of
necessity adhere to the changes that are taking place in society. 'It is not
so much· because, like spectators at a show, we are interested - but
dispassionately so ;... in what is going to happen; - it is rather because,
like players on a field, we are passionately•interested in what is happening now; and are noting it, some of us with approval, some with mixed
feelings, - but none with iD.difference.' 1
In. this connexion we cannot do better than quote the great authority
of Lauterpacht, 1 who writing under the heading of 'The Problem of
Ch~ge in ~ntemational Relations', said:
· 1. Fitzmaurice, G. G., .The future of Publit; IntematioiUll Law and of the
Internati.oiUll Legal System in the Circumstances of· Today, lnstitut de Droit
International, Geneva, July 1973, at p. 11.
2. As quoted in Fitzmaurice above, pp. 12-13.
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'The problem of adjusting the functioning of the law to the perpetual
antimony of change and stability, and of justice and security, is not one
peculiar to international law. It is a general legal phenomenon, common to every political society. It is one of the central problems of legal
philosophy. Experience teaches that in this struggle the element of
change is not always victorious, for the simple reason that stability and .
security are in themselves powerful constituent elements of justice.
There is, as Montesquieu already pointed out, a limit to the possible
sacrifice of security to progress. The same experience teaches that there
is ultimately no more effective challenge to the maintenance of the law
than an immutability impervious to the needs of life and progress. As
Ihering said: "A concrete law, which because it has once existed, claims
absolute and accordingly perpetual existence, is like a child who strikes
his own mother, it derides the idea of law even in invoking it, for the
idea of law is perpetual becoming ..." '
The Second ·World War and its aftermath have precipitated revolutionary changes, firstly, in the political, social and economic fields, and,
secondly, in the scientific and technological fields . .Jt may well be the
tragedy of modem international law that it was undermined by a nine,teenth century conception of state and international relations at the very
moment it was challenged by modem social, international and technological developments. In its attempt to survive the first (political,
social and economic), it failed to cope with the second (scientific and
technological).
The present study attempts to explore the impact of these changes on
the law. Our point of departure is ·Oii the basis of the general conception that contemporary international law can no longer be reasonably
presented within the framework of the classical exposition of international law as the law governing the relations between States, but must
be regarded· as the law guiding and regulating the activities of the
proliferating new actors in international relations. Faced with exigencies
of space, we have chosen to concentrate· the test of our thesis on the
discussion of selected topics which are amongst those that are generally
regarded as highly sensitive and controversial at the present time. 3
The subjects chosen for discussion have been selected as illustrations
of changes in.the political, social, economic, scientific and technological

fields which are of major significance in the development of contemporary international law. An inclusion of a case study on the legal
position of the Provisional Government of South Vietnam would have,
undoubtedly, illustrated another instance of the inaptness of presentday international law to cover the realities of life. We skipped this
because of the original scope intended for this study.
The discussion of the prQblems made clear the rather often constant
inter-play of international law, international politics and ideology. This
became even more so as efforts were made, where appropriate and
possible, to compare the East European approach to international law
with that of their Western counterparts.
We fully realise that any one who attempts to encompass so wide
and controversial a field must take the risk that his knowledge of certain
parts of that field may fall short of reasonable standards of adequacy.
But in the belief that breadth of outlook and boldness%·pproach are
essential ingredients to the positive progress of contem rary international law in the present critical stage of world
airs, we have
preferred to take that risk and to rely upon the indulgence of the reader.
That indulgence we now seek.

TheHague,l973

Chris Okeke

3. For expert and current statements on some of these topics, see, Sir Fitzmaurice's Special Report at the Centenary Session of the Institute of International
Law, Rome, September, 1973. The learned scholar and judge discussed present
trends and attitudes on these matters under the heading 'Challenge and Controversy.' See, Fitzmaurice, op. dt. at pp. 1841. ·
·
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Introduction

'The subjects of law in any legal system
are not necessarily identical in their
nature or in the extent of their rights,
and their nature depends upon the needs
of the community. 1Jrroughout history,
the development of international law has
been influenced by the requirements of
international life, and the progressive
increase in the collective activities of
States has already given rise to instances
of action upon the international plane by
certain entities which are not ~tates.'
ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of
the United Nations Organization, ICJ
Reports,l949, at 178.

International law has .experienced profound transformations in ·the
course of the last century. Among such transformations, none has been
more significant or far-reaching than the fact that international law
has changed from
law of a family of nations based on Western
Christendom into the law of a universal world community. This community has a fundamentally changed composition and distribution of
influence which makes it even more necessary to have a legal system
with sufficiently broad and deep foundations effective enough to command the allegiance of the community.
The present study is an attempt to analyse, in their relative degrees
of importance, the remarkable changes that have. affected and continue
to affect cont~mporary international law with special reference to the
expansion of its subjects as evidenced by their treaty-making capacity.
The notion of 'subjects' of any given law, be it municipal or international law, denotes those entities to which the norms of the legal order
in question apply, and whose conduct this order regulates or licences
by imposing duties or conferring rights. The important point is that any

the
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subject of law must be capable of having certain rights and duties under
the given legal system, any differences in the degree of capacity notwithstanding.
The fact can hardly be denied that among the striking problems arising in the development of contemporary international law, the proliferation of new actors on the international scene must surely take a significant place. Indeed present-day international relations are undergoing
an important process of change both in structure and scope with great
speed.1
Thus, the proposition that international law governs the relationships
between States while still mainly true is very much less exclusively true
than it used to be. Such a position now represents a largely formalistic
view which has little relation to the current content of international .
law, much of which deals in practice with legal relationships that are
by no means exclusively, and are not always primarily, relationships
between states. The structure of international law reflects that of international relations. This being so, international law can no longer be
reasonably or adequately defined or described in the traditional manner
as being solely the law governing the mutual relations, and in particular
delimiting the jurisdiction of States. 2
While States will remain by far the most important subjects of the law
of nations, as long as legal powers and prerogatives are concentrated
1. See, Friedmann, W., The Changing Structure of International Law, 1964;
C. WUfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind, 1958; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, Archon Books, 1968.
2. This view has been widely recognized by a good number of authoritative
writers of international law who have devoted special studies to the matter. Dr.
Knubben, in the most exhaustive work yet published on the subjects of international law, Die Subjekte des Volke"echts (1928), reaches the conclusion that
the traditional view is antiquated and no longer tenable. He defines international
law as 'a law regulating the mutual relations of States and the international relations of other subjects, in particular those of States and of entities other than
States (at p. 527). Professar Spiropoulos. in an important essay published in the
same year and anticipating more recent developments such as an International
Bill of Human. Rights, L'individu en droit international, arrives at the same view.
So did H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, .
1927, pp. 73-79; Politis, N., Les nouvelles tendances du droit international, 1927,
pp. 55-93. Most recently, Professor Jessup upheld the view that generally persons
and bodies other than States - have in many respects acquired a status in inter. national law: See, Jessup, 'RespoDSI"bility of States for Injuries to Individuals', in
Columbia Law Review, 46 (1949), pp. 903-928; 'The Subjects of a Modern Law
of Nations', in Michigan Law Review, 45 (1947), pp. 383-408, and 'Law of International Contractual Agreements', in AJIL, 41 (1947), pp. 378-405. The substance
of these articles is included in Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations, (1948), 2nd ed.

2

in the hands of the nations they are no longer the exclus~ve ~objects ~f
inteqlationallaw. Apart from the United Nations Orgamza~on ~d 1ts
lated agencies there are increasing numbers of functional mter~:tional org~tions, as well as o~er entiti~s ~hich operate on the
international plane. For example, · such orgamzations as the European
Economic Community (EEC), the International Committee: of the. Red
Cross (IcR.c) and many others engage in a multitude of m~mational
actions and transactions that belong to the sphere of ~u~~c, not of
private international law. Of equal significance are the.actiVlties of such
entities as the component units of federal states, belligeren~ organs of
national liberation movements, the Holy See, and unrecogmzed States.
These participate in no small measure in reshaping the structure of
odem international law and international relations. They must now
: recognized as being subjects of international Ia~, for they already
have to varying degree international legal personality. ~o a m~c~ less
clearly defined extent, private corporations are now active partiCipants
in the evolution of public international law.
.
Since it is not practically possible to treat all the_theoreti~ problems
"th hich international law is concerned regarding the problems we
O:estigating, the author has decided to limit himself to only one
of the vital questions of modem in~mational law - ~at of the exp~
sion of the new subjects of international law as eVIdenced by theli'
treaty-making capacity which forms an important theme of the present

::e

study.
d d ··
d
Seen in true perspective, treaty-making has ha a ecunve an constructive impact on the development of international. law.. It has. con·
tributed towards a renewed accentuation of the codification ~f ~ter
nationallaw. Apart 'from being a common· method of. establishing a
relationship or creating rights and duties un~~ intt:rnationallaw, _treaties amongst other things, now form the pnnctpal mstrument of_ mternational law-making. They are in that context the nearest eqwvalent
to municipal legislation. ·
.
.
Consequently, the collectivity of states an~ other sub!ects of mternational law and their combined treaty-making power .18 the ne~est
equivalent to a State legislature - an instrument with which the soCiety
of nations is equipped for the purpos.e of meeting m~y ~f the need~ of
international life. The progressive development of this lDlpo~t field
of international law would have been badly hampered . ~tb:ou~ the
activities and participation of the various growing new entities m mt_ernational relations. All this should make it clear that renewed reflection
upon and reassessment of the impact of the increasing number of sub-

3
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we find place to analyse such aspects of sovereignty as may have a
dire<(t bearing on the ,subject of study. This is based on three considerations: (i) the recognition that the principle of state sovereignty is still a
comer-stone, so to say, on which the whole structure of international
law rests; (ii) that many other principles 'of international law seem to
revolve around this principle; (iii) that the principle of sovereignty can
be used as a good starting-point for the consideration of the legal status
and treaty-making power of subjects of international law other than
States proper.
The second paragraph of chapter three looks into the problems of the
international personality of component units forming a federal union and
their capacity to make binding agreements under international law. The
principal method of legal implementation of important international
decisions is through the treaty. Therefore the extent of the treaty-making
power of a government, and most particularly of the Federal Government
in federal states, is a subject of urgent and continuous preoccupation in
the conduct of international relations. In federal States there is the
requirement of consent by the federal legislative body which, as the
content of international treaties expands, increasingly clashes with the
executive as regards the federal treaty-making power.
We have had recourse to various constitutions of selected federal
States respecting their-power. Our findings led us to the view that the
extreme traditionalist stand, that it is only the collective federal State
as such which is a subject of international law and has treaty-making
capacity, is incorrect. Component members of a federal State, depending on either their expressed constitutional rights or treaty-making
practice that can be evidenced, apparently can and not infrequently do
have quasi-international personality, but it is a limited personality not ~y sovereign or independent.
The third paragraph of chapter four proceeds to the examination of
the status of the Holy See in contemporary international law. Our
analysis will show that some contradiction exists between the theoretical
position of certain legal systems on the issue, and the actual practices of
Sates in their relations with the Holy See.
~ot only is the Holy See a subject of international law, it also enjoys
a Wide range of treaty-making capacity. An appendix is attached to
illustrate this fact.
The fourth paragraph of chapter five will discuss briefly the personality of 'unrecognized States' in international law, using a case study
on Rh~desia as. an illustration; while chapter six of part E will survey
the Umted Nations efforts to codify the principles of international law
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with special reference to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of Nations and Peoples regarded by us as the legal comer-stone
upon which the activities of National Liberation Movements {NLM) are
based.
The six paragraphs of chapter seven, eight and nine are designed to
illustrate the practical application of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of Nations and Peoples. Accordingly, the very dissimilar sland of various selected States on a number of issues of a
relatively similar nature in the cases of Bangladesh and Biafra will be '
considered. Apart from the fact that in these two conflicts, the operation
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of Peoples through
secession was at issue, both of them are prominent amongst those which
have attracted the greatest international interest recently. It does appear
that the drama of Bangladesh ended where that of Biafra began.
The seventh paragraph of chapter eleven deals with the question of
International Organizations as subjects of international law and the basis
of their treaty-making capacity. Part eleven will be mainly concerned
with a brief analysis of Non-Governmental Organizations {Noos) and
Private Corporations as subjects of International law.
Chapter twelve of our study on the impact of ·t he proliferation of actors
(States, International Organizations and other entities) in international
relations on international law will serve as a reappraisal and conclusion
of our examination.
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Part A

1. The subject of international law:
theoretical examination

1.

GENERAL DOCTRINE

The subjects of a legal system as that term is used in general jurisprudence, are the persons or entities to whom the law attributes rights and
du~es. 1 Consequently, if it is asked, 'Who is the subject of a certain
legal order?', this means: 'to whom do the norms of this legal order
apply, whose conduct does this order regulate or license by imposing
duties or conferring rights?" However, this question itself conceals an
ambiguity, for a legal system may in certain respects regulate or license
the conduct of individuals or bodies without addressing itself directly to
them. Thus, according to the classical or traditionalist view, international law directly concerns certain entities alone, 2 principally States,
and reaches individuals only through the medium of such entities by
obligating or permitting the latter to regulate or license individual
conduct in certain ways.
It is therefore clear that the question of who are the subjects of internationallaw is closely bound up with the whole concept of international
law itself, and its definition as propounded by writers and publicists;
for according to the classical and traditional view, international law
consists exclusively of the body of rules governing the conduct of states
and related entities, in their relations with one another - a theory
1. Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, chap. viii. The meaning 'subject' in
relation to international law is analysed in Spiropolous, L'individu en droit International, where is said, p. 32: 'A subject of the law is one to whom the rules of a
juridical system are Immediately addressed, that is to say, one who is directly
qualified or obligated by the rules of a juridical system.• To the same effect
Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge (Mass) 1945, p. 343. But
many writers use the terms 'subjects', 'persons•, 'international personality', as
representative of the same notion.
2. Consequently, in Spiropoulos' definition as given in the preceding footnote,
the key words are 'immediately' and 'directly'.
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which makes such entities, as juristic persons, the only subjects of international law.
This view is strongly challenged in modem times, and it is desirable
to draw attention at once to the fact that the classical definition of
international law has itself undergone a remarkable change. It is interesting to review the definitions given by some authoritative writers
in this field in our time, since they reflect the changing concept of
international law, at least in theory. The definitions, in their respective
groups, perhaps do not differ greatly from one another, but a number
of writers seem to present a sociological rather than a juridical definition. Others emphasize the primacy either of states or of the individual
as being the key subjects of international law.
Fauchille recognizes international law as the body of rules which
determines the respective rights and duties of states in their mutual relations. 3 Renault, in a sociological rather than a juridical definition, holds
that the law of nations, or international law, is a body of rules meant
to reconcile the freedom of everyone with the freedom of others. •
Ahrens differs in his own definition from the classical pattern, asserting
that international law in its highest generality is the body ·of rules which
governs the natural intercourse of peoples in conformity with the conditions of their coexistence, mutual assistance and international relations.5
Anzilotti says briefly that international law is the legal order of the
community of states. 6 H we understand the term •community of states',
as so used, to mean all the independent states which maintain permanent relations inter se on the basis of some mutually recognized
system of rules-this system being international law-the definition
would not be satisfactory since it would explain the term to be defined
by the use of the same term.
Another question-begging definition is Westlake's who sees in international law the body of rules prevailing between states, 7 while Lord
Russell presents international law as •the sum total of the rules and

3. Traitl de droit international public, U., premi&-e partie, Paris, 1922, p. 429.
4. Encyclopaedia Juridique, French ed., Paris 1888, t.1, p. 429.
S. Ibid.
6. Dionisio Anzilotti, Cours de droit international, 1er volume, French edition
Paris,1929,p.43.
'
7. The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law, ed. by
L. Oppenheim, London 1914, p. 1.
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usages which civilized states have agreed shall be binding upon them
in their dealings with one another'. 8
In a number of definitions as well as in other connections, the expression •civilized' nation, or state, is used ~~out further. e~lanation.
This expression, apart from the fact that 1t IS unclear m 1tself, has
various controversial implications. It seems to have been regarded as
self-explanatory to such an extent that the drafters of the Statutes of
both the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the present
International Court of Justice included it in Art. 38, para (c) which
refers to •the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations'.
Some leading American and Soviet9 international lawyers, although
using various wordings, accept the •classical' definition in most cases
by underlining the exclusivity of states as the only subjects of international law. Two leading American international lawyers, C. C. Soule
and C. Macauley define international law as the system of rules that
civilized nations acknowledge to be obligatory as their collective law
10
for regulating their mutual rights.and duties in peace,and ~ ~ar. This
is merely a slightly different vemon of Lord Russell s definition - and
so is that of Hughes who writes that international law is the body of
principles and rules which civilized countries consider as binding upon
receiving the consent of sovereign states. 11
Charles Cheney Hyde stressed that the term international law may
be fairly employed to designate the principles and rules of conduct
which constitute it, and which states feel themselves bound to observe
in their relations with each other - a very •circular' definition. u Charles
- Fenwick writes that international law may be defined in broad terms as
the body of general principles and specific rules which are binding upon
13
members of the international community in their mutual relations.
This definition equally appears not to advance matters, and still
leaves us without an answer as to who make up the membership of
this international community and what makes the law binding upon
them. Nelsen contends that in principle only individuals are subjects
oflaw, but recognizes that, as regards international law, states as legal
8. In James Brown Scott, The Spanish Conception of International Law and of
Sanctions, Washington, 1934.
.
9. The Soviet doctrine of international law will be treated separately m the next
section.
10. International Law for Naval Officers, Annapolis, 1928, p. 3.
11. American Bar Association, Journal, XVI, 1930, p. 153.
12. Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Boston, 1945, Vol. 1, p. 1.
13. Charles Fenwick, International Law, New York, 1948, p. 27.
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pex;wns are subjec!s of it. If he teaches that one may define international law as an mterstate system, it is because this definition is not
m~t to r~fer to .the specific objects of the system, but to the process
of ~ts crea~on; this process is characterised by the fact that the norms
of mternationallaw are brought into existence by the collaboration of
two.or more states. This is true-for conventional as well as for customary mternationallaw.
Nic~olas Politis, .however, sees international law as the body of rules
govemmg ~e re!ations of men ~longing to various political groups, 14
and Scelle m his textbook of mternational law, published after the
second World W~, consistently taught that international law, in the
mos~ comprehensive sense of the term, is a legal order of the comZ?um~ of peoples of the universal society of men. In Scelle's conception, mternational law is superimposed - a final legal order the
nor;ms of. whic~ prevail over those of all other systems of law:' thus
national, Impenal and federal systems lie below international law. IS
. As lll:te as 194:4, J. L. Brierly stated that the primary function of
m~mationallaw IS ~to define or to ~elimit the respective spheres within
whi.c~ each of the SiXty-odd states mto which the world is divided for
.political ~n~~oses is entitled to exercise its authority.'16 This conception
.
we submit IS madequate and unhelpful now.
~e. various ?Pini~ cited above represent the general trend of those
d~~tions of mternati?nal law which consider the state or the indiVIdual as the sole subJect of that law. They can be said to illustrate in
general the view of Western legal scholars on the topic. We must now
mo~e on from this general position to an examination of how the
So~et doctrine of .interna~onallaw looks at the problem. What has the
SoVIet concept of mternationallaw to offer on this controversial issue?

2.

THE SOVmT DOCTIUNE ON THE SUBJECTS OP INTERNATIONAL LAW

We co~ider it essential to .point out from the beginning that the
academ.~ debate on the question of the subjects of public international
law has m no w~y. been ~ess controversial among Soviet legal scholars.
No. common oplDlon emts. However, in the Soviet concept of international law, there do exist two leading schools of thought on the
14. Hague Recueil, Vol. 6, 1925, p. 7.
15. Manuel.de droit international public, Paris, 1948, p. 4.
16. J. L. Bnerly, The Outlook for International Law, Oxford, (1944), p. 9.
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general question of international personality in internationallaw. 17 The
first school favours what we may· call the ~traditionalist' or 'classical'
concept which grants a monopoly of international personality to
sovereign states, tQ the e9mplete eJ~:clusion of all other entities operating
on.the international plane, inclu~g universal international organizations .such as the ·United Nations and its related agencies. The chief
protagonists of this view are Professor L. A. Modzhorian, 11 Prof. V. M.
Shurshalov,; ,and a nQm.b~r .of other Soviet writers on international law.
According to Professor Modzhorian, the possession of sovereignty is a
conditiQ sine qua non for any international person; and so long as any
~ti.f;ies 1lfe .not .sovert#gn entjties they are ipso fac.t~ not subjects of inter::national.law:~ She writes that:
.
-.
·: 'A necessary attribute for- any subject of ~ternationallaw is the capacity to -be repre$ented on the international plane by a supre~e authority
which is. capabJe of participating in law-creating processes, is capable
of :undertaking ~temationallegal obligations and of fulfilling them, and
is so capable of taking part in measures aimed at the enforcement of the
observation of norms of international law by other subjects . . . All
subjects - of international law ·are sovereign, ipso facto, have equal
rights.' 19
Howe~er, it is interestirig to observe thl:lt, Professor Modzborian later
iii -the. same book grants the possession of international personality tO
'belligerent' .nations and also to 'national liberation fronts'. 2!1 In our
opinion, this appears to be in contradistinction to her conclusion quoted
above on what she considers to be the necessary attributes for any
subjects of i;nternational law, for these entities, though enjoying . a
reasonable measure of international per.so~ality, do not meet up with
her own requirements.
· Turning to the second Soviet school-of thought on this problem, the
position is held strongly by G. L Tunkin and others that in contemporary general international law a subject of international law is not
merely an entity possessing .international rights and obligations, but
one which also actively participates in the international law-creating
processe!l; 21 arid if only States did this, they alone would possess inter-

.

.

· 17. For a detailed and lucid analysis of this question, see Chris. Osakwe, Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on the Juridical Nature of Universal International
Organizations, AJIL, "1971, pp. 502-521•
. 18. L. A. Modzbarian, Sub'ekty Mezhdunarodnogo Prava, Moskva 1958.
19. Ibid.
. 20. Ibid.
.
21. G. I. Tunldn, Omovy Sovremenogo . Mezhdunarodnogo Prava (Moskva,
1956).

13

national personality. If not, however- in so far, that is to say, as other
entities may now participate in these processes, sovereign states no
longer possess a monopoly over international personality. We find that
this point of view, which we submit represents a majority opinion in
Soviet doctrine today, is shared by other Soviet authorities in international law such as S. B. Krylov, 22 F. I. Kozhevnikov 23 and D. B.
. 24
Levm.
Professor Krylov, then a Judge of the International Court of Justice,
in his Hague Academy lectures in 1947 25 defined international law as
'The body of rules which governs the relations between states in the
course of their struggle and their cooperation, which express ·the will of
the dominant classes in these states, and which is guaranteed by coercion
applied by states separately or collectivelt. Speaking about •Subjects of
International Law of the Future'·, 26 Professor Krylov affirin:ed, and in
our view rightly so, that one could envisage an enlargement of the
circle of subjects of international law in the future, and maintained that
for instance the World Trade Union Federation, (WTUP), on the one
22. s. B. Krylov (1888-1958) is no doubt .recognized in the eyes of Soviet legal
scholars as one of the greatest authorities in this field, who has made innovative
contributions to the development of Soviet doctrine of international law during
its creative years 1946-47. He served as the first Soviet judge of the ICJ from
1946-1952. Perhaps his wonderful legal career is best seen from his personalia.
See SYIL 1958, at pp. 482-483.
23. F. I. Kozhevnikov served as a Soviet judge at the ICJ from 1953-1961.
Professor Kozhevnikov, apart from being an important executive member of the
Editorial Board of the SYIL, bas been the editor responsible for many international
law textbooks used in Soviet law faculties and other legal institutions.
24. Professor D. B. Levin has been rightly descn"bed by Chris Osakwe (op . cit.
at p. 504) as the most prolific writer of all Soviet international legal experts. At
60, in December 1967, he had published over 120 scientific works on various
·
aspects of international law.
25. For his Hague Academy Lectures, see Hague Recueil des Cours; 1947,
No. 70.
26. His position (Krylov's) on this question is vecy clear from a standard textbook of international law, 1946, in Russian under the responsible editorship of
hiinself and V. N. Durdenevskii, and published in Moscow by the Juridical
Publishers of the Ministry of Justice of the Union of Soviet Socialist RepubliCs
(VSSll). Commenting on the same point in this book, the authors recognized the
fact that it is possible to suppose that as a result of the declaration made in the
Charter of the United Nations Organization on the defence 'of human rights and
fundamental freedom', there will be cases in futur~ when an -individual will
directly appear before international organs. See V. N. Durdenevskii, and S. B.
Krylov, Mez.hd11narodnoe Pravo-Uchebnik, vipusk 1, 1946, at 112, paragraph 6.
However, another Soviet jurist, V. U. Eugeniev, asserts that neither international
organizations nor individuals are subjects of international law. He also denies
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Church was a subject of international law, and a highly influential one.
. Fro~ the above analysis of the Soviet doctrine on the subjects of
mternation~ law, one. can ~dly say that there exists a genecally accepted pos.tti~n on ~ question among Soviet international lawyers.
The Sovtet mternationallaw experts ace unanimous on the point that
States are the main subjects of international law. On the other hand,
they are not, as Professor Ushakov 30 claims, in agreement on the international personality of physical persons or individuals. The major bone
of ~ntenti~n is that while some authors regard only States as subjects
~f mte!Dational law, as. well as peoples and nations fighting ·for their
31
lib~ration, others constder that some international (inter-state) organizatio~ are also subjects of international law. Although the latter view
prevails at the moment among many Soviet jurists, it is often expounded
with insufficient clarity.
~owever, we agree with Professor Ushakov that the question of the
subjects of international law is primarily a theoretical problem With a
great_practical signifi~ce. 32 .It is undoubtedly one of the major problems m the theory of mternationallaw and the theory of law in general.
~e says that ~ccording to the general theory of law, the bearers of
~ghts and du~es are called subjects of law. The term •subjects of law'
JS used ~o desJgnate both personS capable of becoming bearers of rights
and_ duties and persons already participating in legal relations. Thus a
subject of law is (a) a person participating or (b) a person capable of
participating in legal relations. 33
The c.oncept of subjec~ of law is, ~ essence, identical to the concept
of a subject of l~g~ relations. A subject of legal relations is a necessary
component, an mdispensable element, of legal relations. Law is always
someone's law and a duty is always someone's duty. It finally must be
no~ that contemporary Soviet doctrine on the subjects of inter.;
national law was formulated under the impact of the world community
after the second World Wac. The above discussions show that at least·
'dogmatism' in the formulation and interpretation of nonns of international law is slowly but surely giving way to 'realism' among Soviet
30. Sec N. A. Ushakov, Subjects. of Contemporary International Law, srii_.
19~, pp. 61-75. Professor Ushakov u the present Soviet member of the United
Nations ln!ernational Law Commission and Head of the illtemational law section
of the InStitute. of ~tate and Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
. 31. The SoVIet vtew on the legal personality of National Liberation Movements
will be treated separately ill a sort of general way later ill this study.
32. N. A. Ushakov, Ibid, op. cit., at p. 72.
33. Ibid., op. cit., at p. 72.
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international lawyers on this controversial question, as well as on other
questions of international law.

3.

CONCLUSION

Having now reviewed the diverse standpoints of selected legal authorities of both West and East on this important theoretical issue of the
subjects of international law, we may remark that the sum total of the
discussions so far has not greatly helped to formulate a concept of international law acceptable to them all. At the same time, the discussion
has achieve4 some useful purpose; and it must be explained that the
.main object of the survey on this question is to produce not so much a
ne_w definition generally acceptable to Western and Eastern lawyers
alike, as well as to (emerging) (young) international lawyers from the
new nations of the world, but a restatement of the essential elements
and characteristics of the issues involved.
Even among the founders of modem international law, such as
Vitoria, 34 Suarez 35 and Grotius, 36 to mention only three outstanding
names, ·the solution of this problem has not been possible. Each of
them proceeded in their different ways upon the hypothesis that •the
individual is the ultimate unit of all law, international and municipal, in
the double sense that the obligations of international law ace ultimately
addressed to him and that the development, the well-being and the
dignity of the individual human being are a matter of direct concern to
international law'.~
'Controversies among those who are not held together by a common
bond . of municipal law' writes Grotius, 'may arise among those who
have not yet united to fo~ a nation and those who belong to different
nations, both private persons and kings';JS such controversies are governed by the law of nations which he describes as •the law which is
broader in scope than municipal law' . 39
34. Vitoria, F. de, De lndl.r et de lure belli relectlones, ed., Classics of International Law, Washington 1917.
35. Suarez, F., Selections from three worlu, ed., Classics of International Law,
Oxford/London, 1944.
36. Grotius, H., De jure belli ac pacl.r librl tres, ed., Classics of International
Law, Oxford/London, 1913-1925.
37. Lauterpacht, H., 'The Grotian Tradition ill illternational Law,' ill BYIL,
23 (1946), p. 27.
38. De Jure Belli ac Pacl.r (1646), Bk. 1, Chapter 1, para. 1, translated by
Kelsey, Classics of International Law, ed., Vol. 2 (1925), p. 33.
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It therefore appears that it would be a difficult task to elaborate such
a definition of international law as to include all the diversity of entities
apBr! from the states which play a role in contemporary international
~elatio~. On the other hand, it would, in the opinion of this author, be
tmposSlble as a matter of reason and reality, to continue to maintain
that states are the sole subjects of international law.
The developments in the substance of international law which have
occured in the first half of the twentieth century have so transformed
the character and content of the international legal system ·t hat it can
no longer be satisfactorily presented within the .framework of the
former classical concepts. It should be recognized that international
law .has outgrown the limitations of a system which has consisted ·essentially, or perhaps primarily, of rules governing the mutual· relations·
of states. While the priniaty function of international -law remain's that
?f re~ating the relations of states with -o ne another, contemporary
mternationallaw has become increasin:gly coricemed with international
organizations and institutions, the individual and various other inter.·
national units of limited legal capacity.
.
.
·
. If an. entity claims to have international legal capacity, no· rule of
~ternational law comes into play until the entity appears and asserts
Itself. Then the question whether it is entitled to do ·so is substantially
the. same as whether the entity has the international capacity which it
clatms to have. ~f the answer is in the affirmative and so :retognized; it
m~s that a senes of acts performed by that en~ty in the field of inter.
national relations are legal acts, and it is admitted to have the capacity
to perform them.
It is obvious that within the framework of any given l~gal syste~ not
all the subjects of that system will possess exactly the same chaiac:.;.
teristics. In its Advisory Opinion on Reparations for .Injuries ·to 'UN
~ervants, givin~ ~uridical recognition to the international legal personal.;
tty ~f such entities as the United Nations, the International Court of
Justice affirmed this, when it said: 'The subjects of law in any legal
system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of
their rights .. ,'40
·
· .
~tis a mis~e, therefore, .to suppose that. merely _by describing. an
entity as a 'subJect' one is formulating its capacities in law. Since the
rules of law ~ alone ~e~ermine who or what is competent to act, they
~y select different entities and endow them with different legal functions.
39. Ibid, Bk. 1, para. 14, p. 44.
40. ICJ Reports, 1949, at p. 178.
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To be a .subject of a. system of .law, or to be a legal person ·within
the rules of that system implies the following essential elements:
First; a subject of law has duties, thereby incurring responsibility 'for
any behaviour at variance with that prescribed by the legal system.
Second, a subject of law is capable of claiming the benefit of the
rights conferred by the content of the law. This is more than being the
mere beneficiary of a right, since a considerable number of rules may
serve the interests of groups of individuals who do not individually have
a direct legal claim to the benefits conferred by the particular rules.
Third, to the extent recognized by the legal system, a subject of law possesses the capacity to enter into contractual or other legal relations with
other subjects of the system, 41 but the extent of such capacity may vary
with the nature of the person or entity concerned.
Possessing these essential elements so enumerated is of great importance. But we must keep in mind also another vital consideration
- that as soon as an entity has asserted itself in international life and
has acquired an authority of its. own - whether it did so· autonomously
(liberation movements, unrecognized states etc.) or by virtue of a
transfer of authority by other entities - (international organizations governmental and non-governmental); or the component members of a
federation which are independent with regard to certain functions of
government, but subordinate to higher authority with regard to others
and can for many purposes enjoy the rights and · owe duties regularly
connected with international persons; or the Holy See- such an entity
should be awarded the status of subject of international law. The content of this personality depends upon the way it functions in international society, but this does not take away the substantial element of
personality itself, which is not vested in them by international law but
by the facts of international life itself. In this sense, personality itself is
not totally a legal concept as such but also a sociological notion from
which legal consequences ensue. In the past, international law has
behaved itself according .to this truth, vide the position of the Holy See
and the component parts of federal states to which we ~ve devoted
two chapter& in order to illustrate our main thesis. However, before
discussing these two items, we consider it desirable first to examine the
notion of states as subjects of international law separately.

41. Nkambo Mugerwa in Sjlrensen, Manual of Public International Law, New
York, 1968, p. 249.
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2. The notion of ·states as subjects
of international law
··
·

1.

THE GENERAL NOTION

In th~ry, a state is. a· permanently organized· -politlc~l' socie~: which
occu~xes a fixed tem~ry. The· terms 'state' and 'nation' are sometimes
~~ ~terchangeably. In the nineteenth century the alternative term
nation was frequently used to describe a body of people more or less
of the .s~e race, religion; language and historical traditions. In that
sense, lt IS Clear that nation and state do not necessarily coincide. .A
state sh~uld n~t be regarded as co-terminous and ·identical: with the
_whole. commuruty of persons living on its territory. It constitutes rather
the highest degree of political organization in national soci~ty and
~~p~s within itself {though it also transcends) a multitude of other
mstitutio~ such · as churches, foundations and corporations which a
commuruty establishes for securing different objectives. Nor should a
state be ~nfus~ with .a nation: although in modem times many states
are org~ed on~ national basis. Yet a state can·consist of more than
one nation (Austria- Hungary).
· ·
- -..
After ~e third partition of Poland in 1795, that coui:J.try ceased to be
a s~te, m the sense of international law, although the Polish nation
~~ed., Long be~ore ~e unity of lt~y was achieved in 1870, she was
a nation . The nationality problem as 1t was presented in the nineteenth
ce?~ was the problem of how to let the notions of •nation' and •state'
comcxde.
· ·
. ~oday, !he spirit

~f arden~ ·nationalism is sweeping the continents ~f

Airi~, Asx~ and La~ Amenca. ~ this era, as before, confusion·exists,
and mdeed mcreases, m the termmology connected with states nations
and peoples, as found in international treaties made by experts of the

1. As in tho title 'United Nations' which in fact is a league or an organization
of states.
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law. 2 Further, the term 'state' is relatiY.e, for there may, physically and
geographically, be a state within a state. l There is also a tendency to
identify the ·notion of state with that of nation, and vice-versa. International iaw.is not, however, concerned with all the institutions which
in cominon parlance are called states, but -only with those whose governmental powers extend, at least to some extent, to the conduct of
their external relations. Whether a state has such-powers or not is a
question which must be answered by examining its system of government and its international position.
· The state can of course be represented as a natural association of
persons bouild. together by bonds. of a common race, language, religion
and historical tradition. 4 But this would be fat .' truer of the nation. The
essential thing concerning ·states as subjects of international law is to
determine those elements· by which the 'state' is distinguished from the
nation and derives ·its legal character. What elements mark off a state
as having separate and independent legal personality, on the basis of
which it claims admission to the membership of an international com·munity? ·The political scientists represent the state as an abstract institution. ·
According to Chapter 2 Article 4, para. 1 of the United Nations
Charter, membership of ·the organization is open to all 'peace-loving
states' which accept and are 'able and willing -to carry out' the obligatioils of the -C harter. The Charter does not define what constitutes a
'state'. The o.nly .extra qualification is the provision in paragraph 2 of
Art. 4,- which reads: 'The admission of any such state to membership in
the United Nations will be effected by a decision of ·the General As. 2. Arti~le 1 of the Kellogg Pact~ 'The High CQntracting Parties .•. in the name
of their respective peoples ...' The term 'peoples' should mean either populations
of a country, or a nation which is not politieally organized, a social group without its own government, or 'a social group living under the government of a
people which .does not belong to that social group. The United Nations Charter
starts with, 'We tho Peoples of the United Nations .. .'. This wording was
probably meant to portray and stress the direct interest and the role of the broad
masses of the populations of tho States which signed the charter, during the
creation of tho organization. Chapter XIV of the Charter dealing with the International Court of Justice uses only the term 'State' which is applied also in
Art. 107, in all four -paragraphs of Art. 110 and in Art. 111/1. The statute of ~e
.C ourt which provides that 'only States may be parties in .cases before the court'
.(Art. 34/1) speaks only about 11tates and not about nations or peoples.
· 3. · For ~ple. the Con!ltit\ltional Principality of Monaco; tho Holy See.
. 4. ··Pew . States in tho real aenso po1111ess tho characteristics which the above
definition suggests.
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sembly upo~ the ..r~mmendation of the Security Council'. It can be
seen .that this proVlston does not offer any clarification as to what
constitutes. a state. In o~ ~ew, the term 'peace-loving', as applied to
states seeking mem:bership m the United Nations, has· political rather
~an leg~ conn~tations; and even ~ it seems· that often an applicant is
Judged ~ practice not on the basts of its being 'peace-loving' but on
.
.
the basts of political affiliations.
I~ is clear that a majority of States which are members of the United
Nations are organized groups that have succeeded in maintainin .
separate legal
by demonstrated effective political pO!e:.
Oth~~ hav~ been recogmzed as political uilits by their former colonial
a~trations. and- are accepted ·as such by the international ·communtty. There Is hardly even any enquiry into the four theoretical elements ·of race, language, religion and traditions. However, it is doubtful whe~er these elemen~ ~e sa~factorily prevalent within· a given
state. It IS more of a . comadence if at all they occur. Of ~ore importance are the so-cilled legal criteria of statehood in international
law as enumerated, for instance, in the Montevideo Convention of
1933, 5 on the Rights and Duties of States. From a legal point of view·
these serve our purpose more than the socio-political elements althoush
they are ~ot to be discarded entirely as unimportant. ·
'
. ·
In ~cle 1 ?f the ~ontevideo Convention it is laid down that a state
as a·subJect of_ mternationallaw should possess a permanent population,
~ defin~ temtory, a government and the capacity to enter into telalions WI~ other S~tes. is clear ~at the above qualities are present in
a sovereign state m which· there. IS one ·central political authority and
where the government represents the state internally and externally'
· I_t ~ust be pointed out, however, that states acting on the ~ter
national plane, may assume many different constitutional and political
forms. The examination of these different forms in relation to the place
of the states concerned. as subjects of intemationl!llaw and their power
to make agreements 1s of fundamental interest. It is important to

·personali~

!t

s_. Montevideo Conventi~ on Rights and Duties of States signed at Moo·
!eVIdeo on ~ecemb~r 26, 1933. The text of the convention is made up of versions
m the S~an~sb, ~gl1s~ Portuguese and French languages. According to the editor's
n~te. th11 conven~on 11 based upon a draft elaborated by the· International ComJDIISJon of Amencan Jurists at Rio de Janiero in 1927 meeting (Pr""' ___..,_ ) •
p. 19.
~,gs IV,
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examine further those essential characteristics which a state must
6
possess to qualify it as a person in international law.
2. THE"SOVEREIGN 7 STATE AS A SUBJECT OP INTERNATIONAL LAW

The problem of sovereignty of states occurs in all fields of international
law. This is for the simple reason that sovereignty constitutes the furtdamental basis upon which the whole structure of international law as it
stands at present is built. It is interwoven with the problem of the
equality of states, since there is no organic bond between sovereignty
·and equality in· the· practice of international law~ The problem of the
subjects ·of international law is closely linked with that of sovereignty.
Sovereignty is often considered to be the essence of the state, at least
from the point of view of law. The international coJI1Jilunity exists: as
one in which all the sovereign states are legal persons on the basis of
the principle of sovereign equality. The nature of this community does
not allow the occupation of a .superior·position juridically by any one·
state so as to regulate all international relationshipS. Dominance, if it
exists, is de facto not de jure; and even so, no· state today could afford
to· do so without cooperation with other states. The. principle of sovereignty is, therefore, of the most vitai ·.i mportance· in the relationship
between the subjects of international law through their treaty-making
capacities.
·
It may be observed that those who derive the concept of subjects of
6. These matters will be looked into in 'the sections that follow, particularly
to what degree these elements are indispensable and if all of them muSt be
existent in other subjects of international

~aw

before the latter can be accepted

as 7.
such.
For our research, a dct.ailed study of the doct,rine of 'sovereipty' is not

envisaied. Our ex&mination of those aspects of sovereignty that may have a
direct bearing on the subject of the study is based on· three considerations: (i) the
rec;ognition that the principle of state sovereignty is a corner-stone so to say,
on which the whole structure of international law rests, ("d) other principles of
international law seem to revolve around this principle, (ili) the principle of
sovereignty can be used as a good starting point for the consideration o.f the legal
status and treaty-making powen of subjects of international law other than the
state. Wherever possible and necessarY in our present study, any question of
soven;ignty will be looked into summarily. For special studies on 'sovereignty',
see: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter xviii, J. L. Brierly, The Law of Natlon.r; J. L. Walter Jones, Historical introduction to the theory of law, Oxford,
1940, pp. 79-97, about the · theory of soverei.gllty: .Jan Tomke, The domestic
jurisdiction of Statu and the UNO, p. 9-47.
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international law mainly from -sovereignty seem to have adopted a
correct starting-point which can be used to advantage for examining the
question of other subjects of international law, so long as it is borne in
mind that the extreme view of the absolute sovereignty of states as the
only subjects of international law would not correspond with the admitted fact that other such subjects do exist. Therefore, the concept of sov~
ereignty may never function as a bar against the recognition of the legal
personality of non-state entities.
Thomas Hobbes in his famous work 'Leviathan', published in 1651,
held the view that sovereignty was an essential principle of order.
Hobbes believed that men need for their security, a common power to
keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit' . 1
For him the person or body in whom this power resides, however it
may be acquired, is the sovereign. Law, continues Hobbes, neither
makes the sovereign nor limits its authority. It is might that makes the
sovereign. Law is merely what he commands. Moreover, since the
power that is the strongest clearly cannot be limited by anything outside itself, it follows that sovereignty must be absolute ·and illimitable:
'it appeareth plainly that the sovereign power ... is as great as possibly
men can be imagined to make it'. 9 In our opinion, this would in modem
times be rated as totalitarianism pure and simple. To identify sovereignty with might instead of legal right is to remove it from the sphere of
jurisprudence where it now properly belongs, and to transfer it to that
of politics, where it can only be a source of error.
Hobbes does not recognize the right of existence of any community
as a nation, where such a nation cannot maintain its independence by
its own forces against attack from outside. This belief was, in our
opinion, reactionary even at that date. It amounts to the contention
that only strong nations or perhaps peoples can have the -right to be
states.
A number of great theorists realized that if the concept of sov.ereignty
in the sense of absolute freedom of action in international relations,
and absolute power within the state, were applied consistently, the
development and even the existence of international law as a legal
discipline would be impossible.
According to -lean Bodin, for instance, the state is an entity in which
the government is, as he calls it, a recta or a legitima gubernatio, that
is to say, one in which the highest power, however strong and unified is
8. Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Chapter XX, London 1651.
9. Ibid.
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still neither arbitrary nor irresponsible, b~t derived. from, and defined
by a law which is superior to itself. To him, sovereignty (so regarded)10
is ~ essential principle of internal political order; and it was Bodin
who in 1576 in his De RepubUca, first .explicitly formulated the
doctrlne of so~ereignty.- Subsequently, sovereignty became the central
problem in the study of both the theory of the mod~~ state .and the
theory of international law. It seems likely that Bodin s .doctrtne contains all the elements of the modem concept of the sovereignty of states
in international law. He affirms that:
.
1. sovereign is he who has the supreme power over the terntory and
its inhabitants;
2. this power is under no restriction by any law or rule made by any
other power on earth;
3. this power is, however, restrained by
a. the law of God (Divine law);
b. naturallaw;
.
c. the ruler's own obligations towards other sove~eigns or towards
individuals, being nationals of his state or foreigners;
d. the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
.
The
Divine
Law
and
the
Law
of
Nature,
which.
are
supranational
4
' laws since they are objective provisions independent of !11~ ~uman
will, are, in Bodin's view, superior to intemallaw,.thus limiting the
State's sovereignty to a greater extent than international. law created
by international agreements. This supranational law ts of a ~r
manent nature and even a formal agreement between sovereigns
may not change it. It is what would today be called jus cogens:
Hugo Grotius, in his system of intem~tional l~w,. asserts the eXIste~ce
of a body of rules and principles, which are bmding on states and mdividuals according to natural law. He defines natural law. as the
dictate of right reason (dictum rectae rationalis); 11 i~ can be dtsclosed
by the work of the human brain, it can be ascertaine? by ~~· ~ut
never created by him. His doctrine concerning sovereignty ts s~.ar
to Bodin's. He subordinates sovereignty to the rule o~ naturall~w m 1ts
universal, perpetual and immutable character. Grotius recogmzes _the
right of independent states to war against other states. At the same time
10 see Max A. Shepard, 'Sovereignty at the Crossroads: A Study of Bodin, in:
the Pol Science Quart., Vol. XIV (1930). ·The importance of Bodins' s~dy lay
the fact that he took the idea of sovereign power out of the hmbo of
::~ogy in which the theory of de~e ri~t left ~Y so doing it led both to an
analysis of sovereignty and its incluston m constitutional theory.
11. Hugouis Grotii, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Ubrl Tres, first edn. 1625, L1, c.1,

u;

!t.

25

1J,e strqngJy advises 'three methods by which independent nations should
settle their quarrels without recourse to the -sword.' He clearly recommends comproxnise in the case of those who have no .c ommon judge.
To the Christian powers, he recommends general congresses for . the
adjustment of their various rights·. For the Christian Kings and states,
he favours the method of the balance of power and of settling peace~y their mutual pretensions. 12
We can say that Grotius' imp9rtance in the history of jurisprudence
rests not upon his theory of state or upon anything that he had to say
a~Qut constituti,onal law, but upon· his ·conception of a law regulating
the relations between sovereign states. IDs contribution to the . special
subject of .P.lternationallaw i$ beyond the limiUJ of.a .history of political
theory. The outstanding success of Grotius' WOJ"k& which spread quickly over the whole of Europe, can. be attributed in part to awakening
realization in his time that war without limits in the last resort defeats
itself; and in part to Grotius' willingness to consider the sovereign state
as the basic unit of intemational-law. 13
From the history of the existence of. states, it can be seen that the
bearer of sovereignty (kings, governments) etc. have shown this awareness of being, wi~ the state, the supreme power over its territory and
its inhabitants. This power is independent of any other state. 14 At least
from tJJ.e end of the middle ages, with the disappearance of the concept
of the spiritual unity of mankind, the sovereign power of the state is
independent from any other temporal power. But also before the middle
ages in ancient Gr~ and Rome, .independence had its legal definition
and legal consequences. A number of historians of law. agree that .until
the battle of Chaeronea (388 B.C.). Greece consisted of a number of
'4ldependent and sovereign' cities, jealous of each others' advancement
in power and. dominion, although this sovereignty and independence
$eemed at times to be modified, in greater .or lesser measure, by the
foi'JIU!.tion of leagues and combinations to repel the non-Hellenic invaders.
Belief in. the. doctrine of absolute sovereignty was very pronounced

amongst the rulers of the 16th and 17th centuries. Wri~rs. of that time
view ·that sovereigns had absolute power mstde the state,
favoured the
· hi
'th n an.
and absolute freedom of conduct in therr relations . ps WI o e
other. In the 19th and 20th centuries in Ge~y, an unpo~t pro~or
tion of scholars, by giving the aggressive policy ~f the.state therr doctrinal
su
rt, created and fortified the German nationalist ~eory of.soverei:, which played a sinister role in international relations until after
the second World War.
.
Geo Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831) may be constdered as a great
hilos~lier who contributed in the highest degree t~ the German. d~c
~e. of sovereignty. He taught that absol~te po~er. ~ the world IS . m. the state which is a soveretgn entity, mdependent of all
corporated m
'
nl if 't
tes from
other states. The law of nations is real law o Y 1 • c:mana trea
treaties as an expression of $e will of states, the validity of a
ty
always depends on the will of the state. This view of cour:se ~ancels
itself out, for it means that a state is bound by ~ treaty w~ch tt concluded with another state only for a period of time dependin~ on th:
will of the·state. Power is for Hegel a symbol of law. The .s~te IS ~way
free to have recourse to war, as it pleases, since war ts . the highest
manifestation of sovereignty'· 15·
·•
A doctrine. of sovereignty which has obtained greater c~rrency ts _the
called Vattel16 doctrine, which maintains that international law ts a
80
body of rules governing the intercourse of independe~t ~tatC:S, and. that
· ty means th
_ e supreme power of the state mstde tts tern_tory
·
thi · ailed
sovereign
.
.
and its independence of any external ~utbon~. Sometimes s ts c
.
. ·
the classical or traditional doctrine of mtemationallaw.
With regard to the source of sovereignty, as distinct.fromits ~xtenston
and amount, the 17th century concept of the 'ci!-vine right o~ kings' was
nfronted with a radical challenge, - for wtth the commg of con~tutional government, Locke, n and after him Roussea~, 11 propo~ded
the. theory that the people as a whole was the sovereign,. ~d .m the
18th century this became the doctrine which was held to JUStify the
American and French Revolutio~.
1S. Roscoe· Pound,

12. Ibid. .
13. Only ignorance of the continuity in the development of the concept of
international law can explain tho statement that Grotius .is the fathu of contemporary international law. Nevertheless, he can claim to be a systematic ex•
pounder of it, on a scale not p~eviously reached.
14. There are ~o. concepts which are often used alternatively in relation ·to
sovereignty, namely ·independence and self-determination. Although related they
should be kept separate. These concepts will be looked into later.
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Interpretation~ of Legal History, Cambridge, Mass., 1946;

about Hegel, p. 47.
·
'
. · than H el'
, eg s.
.
16. In terms of time, Vattel's doctrines ~e earlier
p Laslett, 'The English Revolution and · Locke s Two TreatiSes of
o:~~=ent;, Camb. HisL Jr; XII, (1956), pp. 40 ff. Locke published-three letten
Concerning Toleration in: 1689, 1690 ~d 1692.. . . f J
J
ucs Rousseau''
18. See C. B. Vaughan, 'The Poli~cal Wtttings .o can acq
2 Vols., Cambridge, 191S.at introduction.
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. As a fighting slogan, as a proteSt against arbitrary government and a
demand that government should serve the interests of the .governed ~d'
?o~nly of the governors, the doctrine .of sovereignty as being resident
m e people has bad beneficient resUlts. Still another modem development of the theory of_ sovereignty lies . in renouncing the attem t to
many specific person or body within the :tate·
and m _ascnbing .tt to the state itself regarded. as a J"nristic pers
Th,
unqualified
•.n"ght to make war, which
. was considered an attribute
on. ofe
.
sovere~gn~ m the 19th century has happily ceased to figure as such
Man~ JUnsts have urged that the term 'sovereignty' should be discarded.
~tebemg out of harmony with the actual f~cts of modern· international'
m rcourse; 19 ·
·

loca~ abso~u.te ~wer·

3.

QUALIFIED SOVEREIGNTY

It ~emains .to give s~me consideration to the case of a number of states.
which, w~e sovere.tgn, are nevertheless ·subject to certain restrictio~
upon thetr freedom of conduct voluntarily assumed by them and not
cc:~on to other states .. These cases are comparatively recent and are
~ati:r:~a':~ as marking an element in the development of interup to this P~int, us~ the notions independence. and sovd · bl
d
•·
1 now- seems
eslfa. e to o so by way of concluding this section. Independence and
be seen .as external and m·ternal aspects of the state
soveretgnty
It
b can
·
~y e nght to say that independence is the external and . t .
natio.nal characteristic of a fully sovereign state. It .describes
:::nght of
state generally to conduct its own affairs without
tion,_ co~U:ol or interference by any other authority. According to Jud ~
Anzilotti, mdependence is the political and legal autonomy of.the sta:C

er 'Y!e

hav~,

etgnty Without attempting to differentiate them· but "t

~e

1~
~J'

~e

'

.

19. The literature of the subject is vast See ;
.
·
·
·.
Function of Law in the International "c
m particular, Lauterpacht, The
Theories of international relalions, Chapter .:';'.~~tyd Oxford. 1933; Russell,
of c~~temporary political notion; F. W. Coker
.E :
so;:re'g'!ty
Study
Political Theories, 3rd edition, London 1961.
. . . • ur ard m a.Hutory til
20. The neutralized states the writer has in mind for ill
:
.
are Belgium
(though no longer neutralized since 1918) Switzerland d
of the treaties relating to these countri '
an
us · For the·.text

and

-1--

B

~=

~~~r~· ~:·tr'!~~7~1 ::i =~ ~;i'!~c:2~1~::. '!J~;;::;;c!Ti:;e:,~:
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in its.. not being subject, except with its free consent, 21to any external
direction, interference or control by any like authority.

'bidcpendeilce .in rcg~d tO. a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein,
to the excluiion of any other State, the functions of a State . ·. . Territorial sovereisnty . . . serves to divide between nations the space upon which human
activities are employed, in order to assure them (th}at all points the minimum
protection of which intemationallaw is the guardian.' n

Statehood is however, quite compatible with partial independence;
for the external independence of the state has nothing to do with
whether or how internal -sovereignty is distributed or controlled within
it. It is clear that a country may have statehood without in actual fact
being independent. Countries in the British Commonwealth in the
period before formal political independence, such as Ghana before
1957, Nigeria before 1960, ~o mention only two -though they had internal seU-government - were still under the United Kingdom Government as regards the conduct of their external relations. While they had
their legislature and a cabinet of ministers responsible to it, they had no
independent status externally, and consequently were not states for
21

international purposes.
Except under the peace settlements of Vienna in 1815 and Paris in
1919 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878, there have been few cases
creation of
during the last one hundred and fifty years in which the
24
new states has come about as a result of collective action.
Independence may be attained by any of three other processes. The
first is the transfer of sovereign power by the metropolitan power to a
dependent territory. Examples of this are the separation of Iceland
from Denmark in 1928, and that of Brazil from Portugal in 1825. The
second process, where the dependent territory is not part of the metropolitan territory, is by unilateral declaration of independence, an
example of which is the case of Rhodesia..The third process, where the
territory is not 'dependent' but part of the same entity, is by an act of
secession as was the case when Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905,
21. Judge .Anzilotti in Austro-German Customs Union Case (1931), PCII,

Ser. AID 41.
22. Island of Palma& Arbitral Award (1928/2 RIAA 839).
· 23. Perhaps, the tenD 'autonomous' might be more appropriate for their status
then. Certainly,. they were no sovereign states as such in th-e ordinary sense of
that
24.concepL
Sec for - example, on Greece (1890) British and Foreign State Papera
(BFSP}; xvn, p. 191ff; on Belgium (1831); id.
645, 723ff; Serbia and
Rumania (1878), id. 1XXI. 1136, 1186ff.

xvm.
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Biafra from Nigeria in May 1967, or the most recent- the secession of
Bangladesh from Pakistan. 15
The concept of independence is often regarded as the normal characteristic of States as subjects of international law. A number of jurists
have stressed independence as the decisive criterion of statehood .. But
this goes too far. If an entity has it own organs, such as law courts,
legal system, and law of nationality, then one could say that there is a
prima facie case of statehood. Sovereignty on the other hand is power,
in the form of legitimised authority over all persons and things within
a defined area of jurisdiction, vested in certain bodies or persons who
· in the exercise of their authority are not subject to any other power. This
area is ·domestic, and the principle of domestic jurisdiction is that the
State shall be master in its own house.
It must be observed that, :within the framework of international law~
a state may by voluntary action impose or accept limits upon its exercise of sovereignty, though it will be difficult to determine how far such
a limitation can be accepted without loss of independence.
The Pcu addressed itself to this problem on more than one occasion.
In the Wimbledon Case 26 it distinguished restrictions upon sovereignty
from its abandonment - i.e., loss of independence.
The Court declined:

. al re1ati'ons. Our discussion of
0 f . temation
mhi h undoubtedly forms the basis on
no more serve the PllfP?se
the doctrine o~ sover~gn:, 1w ~ has made it too evident that this
which modem mtemation aw es,
d
lied in the various funcelem.ent as it is pr~sently unde:_~~!: :f!emationallife is no m.ore
tions and cooperation amongst t te entities should not be denied the
absolute. Therefore, _other n~n-s a
merel on the grounds that they
status of subjects of mte~atio~el::tes ~ contemporary position in
do not possess full soverelgn.ty
'
tests the correctness of
· ty which strong1Y con
.
ific person or body to us satiSfies
the theory of sovere1gn. .
reposing absolute po~er m ~Jn:l'~e It is hoped that further discusthe modem needs of mtemfunati . al h.aracteristics of som.e non·state
.
f th
ture and
ction c
.
. al
slons o
e n~
'd b 'd with sovereign states on the mtemation
entities interacting Sl e Y. Sl e .
plane will illustrate this -Vlew-pomt.

'to see, in the conclusion of a treaty, by which a State undertakes to pedorm or
refrain from performing a particular act, an abandonment of its sovereignty. No
doubt any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon
the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State in the sense that it requires them
to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.•27

By now it has become only too clear that absolute sovereignty does
25. The last two recent cases of secession (Biafra and Bangladesh) will be
treated in detail later.
·
26. In the case of the Wimbledon in 1923, the PCU had to decide the questiO!l
whether the right of passage through the Kiel Canal was ~ improper limitation
upon the exercise by Germany of sovereignty over its territory. Article 380 of the
Treaty of Versailles provided that there should be a right of free passage for all
vessels through the Kiel Canal in peace and war. The Wimbledon was a vessel
carrying arms to Polish forces engaging in fighting the Russians. Germany argued
that to require her to let the vessel pass through the Kiel Canal was to compromise her right as an independent and sovereign state to observe neutrality in
face of the hostilities then in progress. The Court rejected this argument in the
light of the clear provisions of Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles which was
a treaty of obligation accepted by Germany.
27. (1923) PCU, Ser. A.l., p. 25.
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3. The international personality of
states which are members of
a federation

1. A FEW SHOR.T PRELIMINAR.Y REMARKS AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
In the framework of our study, we have insisted that an entity should
be granted legal· personality in international law once it is satisfied that
such an entity has acquired the necessary authority to can}r out its functions as prescribed by international life. We have explained this position rather elaborately in the preceding two chapters. We have dismissed the concept of absolute sovereignty as undesirable to form a
correct premise from which to determine who should be clothed with
international legal personality and participate in international relations
if we still wish to talk of an international law that should be aware of
what is going on in international life. It is our view that any other type
of international law outside the type we have in mind, will never go
further than ordering and regulating yesterday's society, as it has done
already too long to its own and the world's detriment.
We must therefore take as a basis for our study that the international
world community is not a static phenomenon. It is in constant process of development blended with various changes. Therefore the law
which should guide and regulate the needs of life in this international
community ought not to be obsolete and should never be an impediment
to the functioning of international life, but, on the other hand, it should
be the vehicle, so to speak, through which international relations are
canalized in an orderly and progressive manner. Perhaps, it is necessary here to stress the view which we have expressed earlier - that the
substantial element of personality itself is not vested by international
law but by the facts of international life. The content of this personality itself is not vested by international law but by the facts of international life. The content of this personality is another matter. In our
opinion, it should depend upon the way an entity conducts its afftairii
in international society.
In this chapter and the one after, we intend to illustrate our main
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of thought by discussing the international personality of" states
which ~e m~mb~rs of a federal union, and then, that of the Holy See.
Our mvestigation on the legal personality of states which are members ~f a federal uni~n is divided into three paragraphs, and aims to
~ook m~ three questions - namely, {1) the theoretical-aspects of the
mterna~onal personality of the component members of a federation;
(2) a .bn~f surv~y of the relevant characteristics of a number of federal
constitutions Wlth a vi~"': to .es~bli~g how they stand as regards the
degree of separate partictpation m mternational relations of their member-states and {3) an examination of the treaty-making capacity of
states -members of a federation .- based on an analysis of state practice.
Definitions of terms:
.
1. The terms 'Federal State' and 'F~d~ral. Union' will be us~d interc~~eably and in a broad sense to cover all constitutional subdi~tons of ~ state and component entities of a constitutio~~
umon or assoctation.
.
2. ?reaty'. will be used in ~e widest possible· sense as. covering all
m~rnational ~greements between states and othenubjects of interna~onal law, m accordance with ·the original concept of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles ·on the Law of TreatiesILC YB . .at 161-162 (1962/11). ·
'
3. 'Constitution'. 'Wi!-1 be used in its formal sense, of a written on~.
S~ch a constitution makes it easier for a foreign state to deterrome whether the prospective other -party possesses a capacity to
.
.
conclude the treaty or not.
4. It should be mentioned -t hat wherever necessary, a distinction· will
be .made between the nature of a federation formed between states
whf:ch were already sovereign and independent, for example, the
Umted States of America or Switzerland, and colonial federations
formed .out of self-gov~ming colonies - for example, federations of
Australia! Canada, India, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the
West Indies, etc.
2. THE THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY
OF COMPONENT PARTS OF A FEDERATION
.

We have pointed out that in the intematio~ system, . the p~ncipal
though not the only subjects of international law are the sovereign in~
dependent states. The international community is not a stationary
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phenomenon devoid of development. It changes just like every other
community. The laws regulating activities within it also continue
to develop. As the community · continues to grow day by day, ·so
the problems facing it get more and more complicated. This persistent development in various fields renders it necessary to seek the solution of many international problems outstde the exclusive field o_f the
community of sovereign and independent states. It became essential ~o
equip this community with additional machinery in order to r.egulate tts
multifarious and difficult tasks. Thus, at various times· in history,
states resorted to a number of different constitutional and political
forms of unions· in order to achieve their political and economic purposes. Most of those have gradually disappeared from the internatio~al
scene. I This is perhaps, because they failed to give the expected satiSfaction to those who originally .organized ·them. On the oth~r hand,
the explanation may also be that the conditions which oalled for such
arrangements ceased to exist. Among all the types of unions, it seems
that -the Federal Union of States is. the only one that has endured up
to the present time, the difficulties and shortcomings surrounding it
notwithstanding•
·
·
It is theoretically still an unresolved issue whether international law
as such accords any measure of rights· to the individual participating
states of a federation· to take part directly in international relations, as
subjeCtS of that law. There seem to be two main views on the problem.
The traditionalists hold finnly to the position that it is only the collective federal state as such which is the subject of international law;
therefore, states which are members of -a federation are -not themselves
states in the sense of international law and cannot regard· themselves
or be regarded as possessing such rights. The other point of view -is
maintained by those who, while refusing to recognize component states
of a federation as having full personality in international law, never1. We shall not therefore discuss here the question of such unions as_'states
in real union' ·or 'states in personal union'. While recognizing their usefulness in
their time, they are undoubtedly obsolete now, and are of little practi~ im-

portance. The same may be said of confederated states. Presently, ther~. 1s no
union of confederated states, unless that proposed between Egypt, Syria and
Lybia is to be regarded as one. The last confederation in existence - the
Republic of Central America, which comprised the three fully sovereign States
of Honduras,. Nicaragua and San-Salvador, was established in 1895 and was
dissolved three years later, in 1898. Notable historic confederations are those of
the Netherlands from 1579-1795; the United States of America from 1778 to
1787; Gerlil.any· from 1815 to 1866; ·Switzerland from 1291-1798 and from
1815-1848; and the confederation of the Rhine from 1806 to 1815.
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that they may t;njoy a measure of international personality, m so far as the f~deral constitutions of such states -permit.
Many other complex theones have been advanced in an effort to support one or ~e other of the above-named positions, but we do not iiitend to de~nbe all thes.e doctrines· and theories or what has been said
by ~e vanous protago~sts to support or disapprove the various· points
of vt~w. ""!'~ sh.all restri~t o~elves to a few that are representative of
cert~ .distinctive contributions to the main body of thought. It is our
conVIction that a more flexible approach to the controversy, taking cogniz~ce of actual s~te practice in contemporary international life, may
gtve the .most reliable answer. Our specific aim, therefore, is to seek
t? ~tablish what extent doctrinal and theoretical views on this question ~gree With what obtains in practice.
. We ~ave ~et ourselves the strictly juristic task of describing the
mterna~onal legal status of states which are component members of a
federatio~. Are th~y states within· the mea.iling of international law?
~ow far m the past have they participated in international relations
mdepend~ntly of the federal authority? In order to find this out, it
?ecomes nnportant and interesting to devote some space to inquire
mt~ the treaty-practices of federal States with special reference to
~e1r component parts. This area has been chosen both because treaties
lie at the centre of in~rnati~nallegal rel~tions and'because the capacity
to en~er treaty rela.tions With other subJects of internatiomil law is a
very nnpo~ant ~ttribute of personality in international law. This will
be looked mto ~ paragraph 3 of the present section. In this way, it
I?ay become ~~1er. to s~e ~ow far !ederal constitutions which grant the
n~t of partiCipation m mternational relations to· their component
umts, do so as a ~ere form~ty rather than as a reality as a result of
the n~ed~ of genume necessity of life. In other words, are such formal
c.onstitutional p~ovisions in line with what takes place iii the practical
life modern times. It is to these questions that we now turn.
. It .IS D;~t necessary for our purposes to devote time to an exhaustive
mqwry mto the definition of what a federal state is. It will suffice to
~ay that a fe?e~al state is a union of several states which has organs of
1ts own and IS mvested with certain powers, not only over the member
~tates, b.ut also over their citizens. The union is sometimes based on an
mternational treaty be~ee~ the component states followed by a subsequ~ntly accepted constitution of the federal state sometimes a constitution only will do.
.. ,
' .
A federation is to be distinguished _from a confederatjon where a
number of states retaining and continuing to retain their political
th~less. consider

!o

o!

38

personality intact, co~bine Without surr~ndering to the .'confederal'
union in which they all associate any nghts whatever directly over
their subjects or, as a ~e, in regard to theU: ow~ ~teTD;al se~-govern
ment. <~ Thus, an important characteristic which distingmshes 1~ fro.m a
confederated state, is that its central federal organs have certaill direct
powers over the citizens of both their own state and those of the component states.
·Looking into these elements more closely, it becomes evident that
when a federal state is formed out of sovereign states by means of an
inte~tional treaty, such states agree under the treaty to transfer C?ntrol over certain functions of government to a central federal_authonty.
ThiS central federal authority from then onwards is alone competent to
deal with theile particular transferred functions. At the same time; the
component states retain their sovereignty in all other ~tters- exc~pt
those entrusted in the care of the central federal authonty. The umon
itseH is based on a subsequently accepted constituti~n; but what has
just been said·is also true for those cases where there is no treaty but
only a coliStitution ~tablishing a division of competences, whereby the
component states retain their competence& ~ all other matte~ except
those entrusted to the-federal authority. Here 1t needs to be pomted out
that ·not only is the division of powers between the fede~ation ~d ~e
states laid down by constitution, it is important that this constitution
be a written one. In case of controversy between the members of the
federation concerning any of the provisions of the constitution, the
decision lies with a federal court of law.
The foregoing description offers a goo~ starting:po~t f?r o_ur discussions but although it reflects in the mam the baste. pnnctpl~s of the
concept of federations formed out of alrea~y sovereign a?-d mdependent states -it fails to accommodate the notion of federations formed
within and out of already self-contained colonies, for in this. ~e
there is not a coalescence of previously separate states, but the sphtting
up of ail existing unit into separate parts which however remain r~lated under a federal system.
. .
In addition it is necessary to recognize· that if any federation 1s to
prove satisfactory and to last, certain political conditions must be

a

2. Edward Mousley, The meaning of federalism in

'Fe~eral ~nion', c;<lit~d by

M~ Charning, pearce, London, 1940, p. 21. For more readmg on federalism , see,
Federalism Mature and Emergent, edited by Arthur W • .Macmahon; New York,
1955; Federalism and the Problem of Small States, Sir J. A. R. Mariot, Lond~n,
1943.
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satisfied. It must be formed with the full consent of the parties, given
voluntarily. In other words, units desiring to form themselves into a
federal state must be allowed to do so freely without any let or hindrance, or any pressures, political, economic or physical (military).
This is in our opinion, undoubtedly very vital for all federations.
History has, perhaps, proved that the absence of these elements in a
federation may make all the difference between its success and faihu;e
as a form of political union.
Having now considered the elements or characteristics of a federation, the first question which arises, therefore, is whether the compa:nent states which are the members of a federation can n.evertheless be
considered as continuing to be separate international _persons. Korowicz ·says that a member-state of a federation does not enjoy-·inter3
national personality. Whether or not this view is correct wilJ be seen in
the course of our investigation and consideration of a number of factors. At the same time, it is worth-while pointing out that the traditional concept of international Jaw as regulating relations ·only between
sovereign states is no longer in accordance with contemporary international conditions, which require the recognition of other entities as
playing a significant role in international relations, and as enjoying
some measure of international personality. The need for recognizing
this state of affairs cannot be over-emphasized. If the stark realities of
international life require a State to structure itself in such a manner as
to enable its component units to participate in some ways in international life without infringing in the other actor's rights and comforts, it
would not appear to us that there are, in principle; any rules of international law that will nullify this ·right, for according to President John
F. Kennedy, 'We must deal with the world as it is and not as i~ might
have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different'. •
Component members of a federation are independent with regard
to certain functions of government, but subordinate to a higher authority with regard to others. States members of a federation can for many
purposes enjoy the rights and owe the duties regularly connected with
5
international persons. In the words of Professor Oppenheim, 'the member-states of a federation can be international persons in a degree. 6
p. 3.
277.Marek St Korowicz, Introduction to International Law, The Hague, 1959,

4. ·John F. Kennedy, American Speech, 1963.
5. Patrick Ransome, Federation and International Law, contained in: The
Federal Union, edited by M. Chaming-Pearce, London, 1945, p. 240.
6. Oppenheim's International Law, Lauterpacht, Vol. 1, Peace, 8th edition,
1952.
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the heading of what he described as 'the hall-mark of internn~ti~nal_ state~ood', S?" Gerald considers that 'the essential factor that
distingwshes mternational states, even semi-sovereign or Protected
States, even States which have placed the whole conduct of their
fo~eign relations in _the hands of another State' - from entities that are
neither States nor mternational persons - 'is not the mere fact that
these ~atter entitie~ are not independent, but the fact that they lack that
~paetty to enter m~ trea~ or other international relationships which
IS. po~sessed by all ~tt:rnational persons, including international orgamz~tions (s~e the Opwon of the Court in the Injuries case) and which
all mt~rnational States possess, whether ~ese . are fully or only serisovereign, and whether the ~elationship is entered into directly or
through the agency of a third State having the conduct, in part or
whole, of the external relations of a Protected State'. •
.w~ share the vi~ws expressed in Sir Gerald's statements on the basic
pnnetples underlymg international statehood in general. However he
went on to deny that, normally, international statehood c()uld be ~as
sess~ l?y the ~mpon~nt states of a federation, which meant in effect,·
den~g them _mternati~nal personality. Yet, if it is agreed that treatym~g cap~etty constitutes the 'hall-mark' of an entity qualifying as
an mternational person under international law _ as Sir Gerald
thought - th_e conclllSion would be that states which are members of
a f~eral um~n can possess separate international personality if they
are mvested wtth that capacity by the federal constitution.
If the Court (1c1) in the Morocco case, affirmed the principle that
pro.tected or semi-sovereign states nevertheless have or retain inter~ation~ ~erso~ty - are international persons, although their position Within t:J:te mte~ation~ community, and their legal relationships
to othe~ states. (or ~ternational persons not being states) is governed
by speetal considerations, 9 it seems that the Court would not in principle
~ave denied th~ _possibility of such right to states members of a f~dera
tion. ~e. reqUISite personality in an international sense would be seen
to e~t. if the enti~ claiming it had in fact entered into separate
ass~ation or relationship with other members of the international
society, for example, by treaty ~hich, even if concluded by t)le federal
govemm~nt, could mark the emtence of a self--contained relationship
~etween Itself and the other contracting party, even if, in case of violation by the component state, the federal state was held to be jointly
responsible with iL

u;.

8. Op. cit., p. 2, footnote 2.
9. ICJ Report, 1952, p. 185.

It is the possession and enjoyment of this capacity, with or without
restriction, which distinguishes the state of international law from ~e
large number of political entities also given that name, and yet which
10
do not appear to -be endowed with such a capacity.
As concerns the federal state itself, it is of ·course an international
person, with all the rights and duties of a sovereign state in international law. 11 It is a sovereign state and, as such, is in its relations with
other states and subjects of international law, bound by the rules of
international law. Express assent to those rules ·is not required; from
the day the federation acquires the statllS of an international person, it
is subject to the law regulating the conduct of states in international
intercourse.
.
To go into the theory of whether sovereignty is divisible is not now
necessary, as this has been considered earlier. u Suffice it therefore, to
re-emphasiZe that internally there is a division of sovereignty between
the federal state on the one hand and the component member-states
on the other.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL llBVIEW: A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CONSTITUTlONAL
STIPULATIONS OF A NUMBER OF FEDERAL STATES, WITH AN AIM OF
ESTABLISHING THEIR STAND ON THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL llBLATIONS BY THEIR MEMBER-STATES

After the foregoing theoretical discussion of the international legal
personality of states which are members of a federation, we can proceed to review the relevant portions of specific federal constitutions
and see how far they still correspond to, or to what extent they have
rendered out of date our existing train of thought. For this purpose,
we choose the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Federation of Switzerland and
the United States of America, and would like to treat them in. that
order.
The Federal Republic of Germany
Under the German Constitution as it existed before the Ftrst World
10. Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Applied · and Interpreted by the United States, Boston, 1947, 2nd revised ed., pp. 22-23.
11. Oppenheim's International Law, Lauterpacht, Vol. 1, Peace, 8th ed., 1952,
p.176.
.
.
.
.12. See, the section on The sovere~gn State as a SubJect of International Law.
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the member-states retained their c;ompetence to send and receive
di?lomati_c envoys, not only in intercourse with one another but also
With foretgn states. 13 Article 32 of the Constitution of the. Republic :of
Germany, 1949, proVides that in so far as the member-states are competent to legislate, they may, with the approval of the Federal Government, conclude treaties with foreign states.l4
In Germany as well as in Switzerland, the member-states of these
two countries have not only the right to conclude treaties between
themselves wit?out ~e consent of the Federal Central Authority, but
they also retain a nght to conclude treaties with foreign states on
matters of common interest between them, the exception being that
such a treaty should not be of a political nature.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
.
The member-states of the Soviet Socialist Republics (ussR) existed as
separate sovereign states until December 30, 1922, when the Union was
leg~y formalised by the signing of the Union Treaty between the
Russtan Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the Ukranian Soviet Socialist ~epublic, the Byelorussian 'Soviet Socialist Republic and the three
republics of _the Transcaucasian Federation. In subsequent years nine
more republics acceded to the treaty with the same rights and obligations as the original members. 1s
.
In May. 1~45, the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia were
separately mVlted to the San Francisco Conference. This was in accordance with the Yalta Conference agreement of February 1945.16
.13. ~cle 45 of the Weimar Constitutions of August 14, 1919; According to
~~ ~cle, 'The ~resident of the Federation represents the Federation in . its
mtema~onal relations. He conclu~es alliances ~d other treaties with foreign
powers m the name of the Federat1on. He accredits and receives foreign Ambassad~rs. Declaration of war and conclusion of peace are effected by federal law
All!&nc:es and ~uch treaties with foreign states as refer to matters of federai
l~plation reqwr~ the ~nsent of the ReiChstag'. Under Article 78, the administration of th~ relations w1th foreign States is the business of the Federation alone,
bu~ Bavana was allowed to maintain intercourse wid!. the Holy See. (Oppenheuner, The Co':"'t,itution of the Gernum Republic (1923), p. 28.
14. Oppenheun s International Law, Llluterpacht Vol. 1 Peace, 8th · edn
1952, p. 176,
.
.
•
•
. .,
. 15. Prof P. E. Nedbilo and V. A. Vasilenko, Soviet Union Republics as subJects of International Law, Soviet Y urbook of International Law, 1963, p. 106.
16. The Yalta Conference took place ·in February ·1945, betWeen the three
hea~s of s_tat~ - of USA, usSR and Great Britain. The Conference is of great interna~onal slgnificancl?· Its main task was the definition of all the principles under
which the post-war peace was to be built; and particularly the position of post-war

Althougll both these countries are constituent republics of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, they were admitted as separate original
members of the United Nations. Possibly in anticipation of or preparation for this the So\'iet Union had on February t~ 1944, adopted an
amendment 'to· its constitution by virtue of which each republic ~f the
Union acquired the right to enter into direct ~elations with _states, .to
conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic representatives With
them. 17
•
Article 13 of its present constitution provides that 'the Umo~ of
Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state formed on the basiS of
voluntary union of equal Soviet Socialist Rep~blics'. The Sovi~t Uni?n
Republics are sometimes referred to as a speCial type of federation wtth
features of a confederation.
Article 18 (a) permits each Union Republic to enter into direct
relations .w ith foreign states and to conclude international ~ments
with them and exchange· diplomatic and consular representatives too
and Article 18 (b) provides that, 'Bach Union Republic h~ its own
Republican military formations'. In the s~e manner,_ Arti~le 60 (a)
stipulates that 'The Supreme. Soviet of ~ 'l!m?n ~epub~c deCides ~po~
the representation of the Umon Republic m 1ts mtemational relations .
The issue of the international personality of the member-states of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics remains controversial. Some
writers deny completely the international personality ?f the U~on
Republics and others question strongly the degree of 1ts federalism.
Thus Professor Rousseau, for example, writes that, 'the structure of
the ~SSR remains very centralized and the federalism there is nothing
but a fa~ade'. 1a Others think that the ussR is neither a confederation
nor a federation but merely a unitary state. The question of inter. national personality of the Union Republics of the USSR h~s always
aroused wide interest among jurists of both Bast and West alike. Much
effort has bet;n expended in discussing this issue amon~ So~et inte~
national lawyers themselves. It may be fair to look bnefly mto therr
reasoning.
. .
It seems that the Soviet legal science is unanimous in the op1n1on that
the Union Republics are full subjects of international law.
Germany. It was here that the decision to occupy Germany by the armies of
uu, uSSB. and Great Britain was taken.
.
17. Law of Granting to Union Republics of Authority in the Sphere of F~re1~
Relations; see Dobrin in Grotius Society, 30 (1944), pp. 260-283, and Aufricht m
A.IIL, 43 (1949), pp; 695-698.
18. Rousseau, Droit International Public, Paris, 1953, p. 137.
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V. M. Koretsky,l.l. Lukashuk, V.I. Losovski, M. V. Inovski, M. E.
Korostarenko and A. N. Visnik to mention a few among the leading
Soviet international jurists, agree that the Union Republics of the ussR
are full subjects of international law, whose sovereignty is not limited."
In furtherance of the same point of view, Prof. P. E. Nedbilo and V. A.
V asilenko vigorously argued that the Soviet Republics did not cease
to exist as sovereign states after uniting into ussR. This, they continue
to explain, is recorded and guaranteed by the constitution of the USSR,
based on the fundamental principles of the Treaty of l)'nion in 1922,
and the constitutions of the Union Republics. Their articles record all the
main attributes and elements of a sovereign state; territory, population,
supreme organs of power and _administration of the republic, budget,
etc. 20 Further, they argue that, 'Unity of sovereignty of the Union State
and the Republics exists in the Soviet Federation in the form of the
USSR. The ussR possesses sovereignty because it is an expression-of the
sovereignty of the Union Republics. The sovereignty of the ussR is .a
result of the sovereign will of the republics; they have created it and
its supreme power by free voluntary and sovereign agreement. The
sovereignty of the USSR, consequently, is based on the sovereignty of
the Union Republics; without the sovereign Republics, there would not
be a sovereign Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, either. 21
We are not here concerned with the sovereignty of states which are
members of a federation as such, but Prof. Nedbilo and Vasilenko's
arguments ma:ke it necessary to offer a few remarks. To argue that the
Soviet Union Republics did not cease to exist as fully sovereign states
after uniting into the USSR is begging the question. Granted that the
Union Republics before joining to form the USSR under the Union
Treaty of 1922 were fully sovereign and independent states, which,
according to Nedbilo and Vasilenko freely and voluntarily agreed to·
give up part of their powers to ma:ke the formation of this Union possible, it is in our view contradictory to persist in maintaining that the
Union Republics even after that still possess full sovereign status, on
the basis of which they can claim full international personality. It may
19. V. M. Koretsky, The sovereignty of the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Visnik A. N., Ukranian Soviet Socialist
Republics, 1954, I. I. Lukashuk, 'On the participation of Soviet Union Republics
in international treaties', Soviet Yearbook of lnte17111tioruzl Law, 1958, 1959,
pp. 506-513; M. V. lnovsld, Decree; M. K. Korastarenko, Inte17111tional Law
Part 1, Kharkov Univ. Press, 1962, pp. 47-48. .
'
20. Prof. P. E. Nedbilo and B. A. Vasilenko, 'Soviet Union Republics as subjects of International Law', Soviet Yearbook of lnternationlll Law, 1963, p. 106.
27. Ibid, p. 107.
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be correct to assert that the sovereignty of the USSR is a result of the
sovereign will of the Union Republics. But to agree with Nedbilo and
Vasilenko that these republics still have full sovereignty would be
tantamount to agreeing with the Austinian theory of the indivisibility
o( sovereignty. After all, the formation of the USSR federation just ~e
every other federation, ·-presupposes that the former fully soveretgn
Union Republics transferred control over certain functions of government to a central federal authority, which thereafter alone assumes the
competence to deal with these transferred matters.
In our opinion therefore, the attempt to describe the governmental
structure of the ussR as confederation fails. We submit that the ussR
is ·a federal State with special and peculiar features, which resulted
from the historical situation at the time of its formation. Many would
regard it as being in essence a unitary State that has been given the
forms of a federal structure. In any case it is incorrect to m~tain
that it is a confederation because, in the first place, the Union has a
common citizenship law which is under the jurisdiction of the Union's
highest organ of State powe{. In the second place, the U~on R~pub
lics, practically speaking, do not enjoy o~e of the essential a~but~
of a Confederation - the right of secess10n. 22 We, therefore, find 1t
difficult to accept that the federation of the USSR has such a _loose
nature and organization (which it certainly has not)_ as to permtt the
assertion that the rights of .the component states forming it are equal to
those which a{e enjoyed by the ~ember states of a confederation.
The fact cannot-be denied that the component States of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics participate in international relations, particularly the UkraWan and Byelorussian Soviet Soci~t Repub~cs. E~en
then, the participation is not so unlimite~ as to gtv~ the Sovte~ ~mon
the legal entitlement to claim for its U~on Re~ublics ~e posttio: of
separate, sovereign and independent subJects of mternationallaw.

· 22. Even fuough Article 17 of the Constit1,1tion of the Union of Soviet Sociali~
ReJ)ublics reserves the right to every Union Republic ~ s~e fro~ the USSlt, 1t
is a mere·formal stipulation and would be strongly resiSted m practice. Attempts
secede have ~ways been conin the put by component units of a federation
sidered under the constitutional law of a federation as a revolutionary act ~d lUI
act of high treason. This provision in Article 17, is therefore purely theoretical.
23. See Article 14 of the VSSR Constitution, paragraphs (a), (x), (b),. (g), (h),
(i), (v). It is also necessary to remark that the membership of th~ Re~ublic o~ the
Ukraine and Byelorussia in the United Nations is really an blStoncal acc1dent
brought about by the situation prevalent after the second World War.
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Switzerland
Switzerland is one of the examples of Federal Unions whose memberStates exercise the right to conclude treaties, not only between themselves, b~t also with foreign States in regard to certain specified matters. Article .9 of th~ Swiss Constitution provides 'Exceptionally, the
Can~ons retain the ngh~ to conclude treaties with foreign States concernmg matters of pubhc economy, neighbourly relations and police
provided such treaties contain nothing contrary to the Confederation o;
to the rights of other Cantons'.
We may note here, that the authority and sovereignty of the cantons
occupy an important place in the history of the constitutional development of the Swiss State. Thus, Sir J. A. R. Marriott 24 writes that althoug~ the occupation and control of Switzerland was one of great
strategrcal value to Napoleon, particularly in the campaign of 17991800, Napoleo~ was quick to perceive that the Unitary Republic imposed upon SWitzerland by the French doctrinaires was quite incompati~le. to the traditions of the cantons. Accordingly, in the act of
Mediation of 1803, Napoleon purported to restore the sovereignty of
the cantons - some with their burgher aristocracies, others with representative democracies; but over all there was still superimposed a
central Government with a Federal Diet.
The Act of ~ediation lapsed on the fall of Napoleon in 1814, but it
formed the basiS of the new Federal Act which was approved by the
~owers when by the Treaty of Vienna (1815) they guaranteed the
mdependence and neutrality of Switzerland. The compromise attempted
by the Federal Pact resulted in such acute friction between the cantons
that in 1843 the Sonderbund or League of Swiss Roman Catholic Cantons, threatened to secede. Civil war broke out in 1847, but a brief
and almost bloodless campaign resulted in the dissolution of the Sonderbund, and the Swiss, freed by the revolutions of 1848 from all interference on the part of the autocratic powers, carried out a radical revision of the makeshift constitution of 1815.
. The constitutio~ adopted in 1848 and extensively amended in 1874
still forms the basiS of the Helvetic Confederation. It is at once truly
democratic: federal because, within their respective
federal and
sph~res, the nati~nal and can~onal.governments are sovereign: democratic because ultimate sovereignty IS vested in the people who exercise
it by means of the Referendum and the Popular initiative.
'
According to Article 8 of the constitution, 'The Confederation alone

trulr

24. Marriott, Federalism and the Problem of the Small State, 1945, p. 81.
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has the right to declare war and to make peace, as well as to conclude
alliances and treaties, especially customs and commercial treaties, with
foreign states'. There is consequently some possibility of conflict be- tween this provision and Article 9 (vide supra); 25 but unless the latter
is to be nullified entirely, the conclusion must be that the cantons retain the right under Article 9 to conclude with foreign states international agreements of the kind specified in that article.

Federations of the former colonial self-governing countries
The constitutions of the above class of countri~ are undoubtedly
different in their nature and content from those so far considered,
perhaps as a result of the conditions under which they were drawn up.
The creation of federations after the second World War pursued, in the
main, two objectives:
Firstly, to try in every possible way to camouflage the fact of colonial supremacy;
Secondly, to use the federal form of government to aggravate national incompatibilities with consequent prejudice to national liberation movements among the indigenous citizens of the colonies.
The essential difference from the earlier~mentioned federations
is that these categories were superimposed and did not spring from
historic sources and from deep-felt needs of the indigenous population.
Using different kinds of Colonial Federations, the colonial powers
were guided above all by the aim of strengthening their position and,
apart from that, of creating among the colonised people the expectation
of a gradual grant of independence from above, not in the form of
armed struggle but exclusively by peaceful means. In all cases, the
colonial federations were completely dependent on the metropolitan
country. Their constitution never reflected the will of the people of
these colonies, since the great majority of the indigenous population
were virtually without any political rights. The creators of these federations lost sight of basic important conditions; for example, that there
should be a group of communities so united by blood or creed or
language, or by political tradition, as to desire union; neither did they
make any effort to ensure that there would be as little inequality as
possible among the component units. Although this last desideratum
may be a counsel to perfection, the fulfilment of which has so far
25. Article 9 reads: 'Exceptionally, the Cantons retain the right to conclude
treaties with foreign states concerning matten of public economy, neighbourly
relations and police provided such treaties contain nothing contrary to the Confederation or to the rights of other Cantons'.
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number of Federal States, paying particular attention to the position
of their component units in this exercise. Another interesting question
would be to determine whether the limited treaty-making rights
granted by some Federal Constitutions to their component units have
enabled the latter to attain international personality.
It is a universally accepted principle of international law in respect
of the question of what authority or authorities shall excercise the
treaty-making power of a sovereign state or other subject of international law; or what procedure is to be followed by its central or
provincial governments, or executive organs, for making treaties internationally binding upon them; and of whether itS political component units should have any part iD. their conclusion - that these are
matters entirely for the constitution of the particular State or Organization to determine. 26 A number of legal systems recognize this process.
Thus, according to the view taken by English and American law, the
authority in whom the treaty-making power is vested in any State
depends upon the fundatnental or constitutional law of that State. 'D The
Soviet legal system and practice also recognizes that •the determination
of the authority to conclude a treaty lies with each State and is to be
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found in its Constitution.' 21
It must be observed here that a case may arise where the effective
Constitution of a State may not be quite identical With its written Constitution. It often happens also that the treaty-milking practice of a
State differs considerably from the norms of its written Constitution.
Thus, in the United States of America, the President makes executive
agreements which are as binding in international law as treaties, although they do not require to be approved by the Senate in the same
way as treaties properly do. There is, however, a difference between
municipal regulations determining the organ which can conclude treaties, and municipal regulations determining. whether component States
can conclude treaties. In the first case it is entirely for the national
law to determine. It does not seem that in the second case the internal
law is completely indifferent to it.
Where the Constitution of a Federal State grants the component
members treaty-making power, international law recognizes this
26. Hans Kelsen, Prindplu of International Law (1952), p. 323.
27. Halsbury, lAws of England (1954), Vol. 7, p. 286; Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, (1957), pp. 882, 887; Crandall, Treatiu: Their making and

enforcement (1916), pp. 2-3.
28. Memorandum on the Soviet Doctrine and Practice with respect to the Law
of Treaties, Doc. A/CN.4/37, dated 21 November 1950, p. 7.

51

grant and regards the treaties made by them as valid when they are
within their constitutional contractual capacity. But if this grant is not
expressed, and if the constitution is completely silent about who should
have power to conclude treaties in a Federal State, the presumption in
international law is that this power is vested in all its totality in the
Central Government. :19 It seems that the reasoning behind this presumption in international law is that ·the general object of most federations
is to prevent the component units from entering into international engagements which are inconsistent with national interest and policy, or
which diverge inter se and to pursue a unified foreign policy vis-a-vis
other members of the world community. In the absence of a clear
authority conferred by the Federal Law, member:-states of a federation
cannot be regarded as possessing the power to conclude treaties. For
according to international law, it is the Federation which, in the absence of provisions of constitutional law to the contrary, is the subject
of international law and international intercourse. 30 But if, on the other
hand, a Federal state by its constitution of treaty practices is not seen
to deny its component units the right to enter into international relations with foreign countries through treaties, the treaties so concluded
will be recognized as valid under international law. We hope that a
survey of the treaty-making capacities of a number of Federal States as
reflected in their treaty-practice will give an insight into the place of
their component units, so far as the independent action of such units
on the international plane is concerned, before and after the Second
World War.

Canada
Although the Dominion of Canada falls within the group of. Federal
States where treaty-making power is concentrated in the hands of the.
Central Government, Canadian State treaty-making practices show
that there have been and can be cases when the regional governments
of the Dominion carry on treaty relations with other States.
The British North America Act of 1867 is very reticent of the
powers of the executive, and about the treaty-making power. The Act
contains no provision expressly vesting treaty-making power in the
Dominion executive or distributing this power between it and the provincial governments. Even though the BNA act does not contain any
provisions like those in the Constitutions of Switzerland, Germany and
29. International Law Commission Report (1953), p. 150; Schwarzenburger,
Elements of Power Politics (1951), p. 89.
30. Doc. A/CN.4/63 (1953), p. 150.
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the ussR, which permit the member-states limited power to make
agreements, yet the provincial legislative organs have the competence
to legislate on certain enumerated subjects of which that of agreements
with ·foreign countries is one - this matter being within their legislative· competence. In this way, some of the provinces such as Quebec
and Ontario have, no doubt, made in the past certain agreements with
Britain and some of the member States of the United States, for encouraging prospective immigrants and promoting exports. It cannot be
denied therefore that the Provinces have wielded diplomatic and treatymaking power in the past~
· The current .trends in Canadian treaty practice show that the limited power of the provinces to make treaties :bas not been completely
abrogated. On March· I, 1965, the following question was asked in the
House of ~mmons by Mr. Lambert, M.P.: 'Since April21, 1963, has
the Government of Canada granted to. the government of any provinc~
of Canada the right or privilege of negotiating and concluding with any
foreign state either independently or in .conjunction with the Government of Canada any agreement, accord or treaty of a commercial or
cultural nature, whatsoever nature, and if so: (a) on how many occasions, to which of the provinces and what has been the nature of such
agreement; (b) is it contemplated that any province shall have the
right to participate as an independent signatory?':
The Honourable Paul Martin (Secretary of State for External Affairs) replied as follows
'In relation to question (a), there are two occasions, namely:
1. by an exchange of notes dated December 22, 1963 and December 27, 1963, between the Ambassador of France in Ottawa and the
Secretary of State .f or Extemal Affairs; the Canadian Government
gave its assent to a program of exchanges and cooperation in the industrial and technical field being agreed upon between the Association
pour l'OrganiZIJtion des Stages en France (ASTEP) and the Ministry
of Y auth of the province of Quebec and the University of Toronto.
2. By an exchange of letters dated February 27, 1965, between the
charge d'affaires a.i., of France in Ottawa and the Secretary of State
for External Affairs, the Canadian Government gave its assent to an
entente or understanding between France and Quebec covering a program of exchanges and of cooperation in the field of education being
signed by the Minister of Education of Quebec and the Deputy MiniSter of -Education of France and the director general of cultural and
technical affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France.
'These two instruments relate to education and culture. They cover
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matters such as the exchange of professors, scholarships, research, etc.,
~hich have traditionally been the object, on the provincial plane, of
informal arrangements between Ministries of Education and universities
in the English speaking proVinces and corresponding institutions in
English speaking countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the
United · States of America. Generally these countries prefer the informal non-governmental approach to cultural relations. On the other
hand, many countries of Western Europe, and France in particular,
prefer to place their cultural relations on a formal inter-governmental
basis, wherever possible. This is a fact of international life which the
federal government cannot ignore in carrying out its international responsibilities ·in respect of cultural relations'. 3'
The answer of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to question (b) was in the negative. He eXplained that: 'On the international
plane, the federal government represents all of Canada and under
international law only sovereign states are recognized as members of
the international community. One, if not the most important attribute
of this international personality accruing exclusively to the Canadian
gove~ent is the power to negotiate and conclude agreements or treaties of a binding character in international law to bind the whole country or of any part thereof with foreign countries.'
'The procedure followed on the occasion of the· agreements cited
above between France and Quebec is a reflection of and accords with
the Canadian government's status under international law and the constitutional position in Canada. Standing alone, these agreements between France and Quebec could not have been regarded as ·agreements
subject to international law. The Federal government stands ready ·to
co-operate with any province in facilitating, in · appropriate circumstances, · the negotiation and conclusion in similar manner of agreements between the provinces and foreign governments in the field of
education and culture'. n
Some of Mr. Martin's views need to be commented upori. We fail to
agree with the opinion of the Honourable ·Secretary of State for External Affairs that, on the international plane, only sovereign and independent states are recognised as members of the international community. Our contention on this and · the reasons for holding these
views have been stated earlier in this study.
~1. See (1965), 109 House of Commons Debates 11818, at p. 12017; see also
(1965) 110 House of Commons Debates 395, 528, 886, 978, 1091, 1290, 1353, 1763
and statement of Mr. Martin, Press Release, No. 25, April 23, 1965.
32. Op. cit.
·
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It needs to be pointed out that the ·expansion of the international
community in size and content since· World War II made an increase
in the legal persons of various capacities operating within it inevitable.
This trend has been, in the main, a re8ponse to the evident need arising
from international intercourse. The growth of international intercourse
in the sense ·of the development of relations between different peoples
was a constant ·feature of maturing civilizations. · This is ·evidenced · in
the present·position of the contemporary international community. The
degree of intercourse among peoples of the world has ultimately called
for regulation even by institutional means. To refuse to recognize these
facts would be tantamount to a rejection of reality. Therefore, for the
Honourable Secretary · for External Affairs to find the basis for ·his
answers, particularly on question {b), in the principle of the exclusive
international personality of ·sovereign states under international law, is
not convincing. It is even more doubtful when one considers the time
he was giving the answers (March 1965).
No one doubts the fact that in a federal state such as Canada, where
it is not otherwise stated in the constitution, the Central Government
reserves the sole right to bind the whole country under an international treaty or agreement In the case of Canada, the BNA 33 Act of
1867 - the fundamental law on which the constitution is based - was
not explicit as to who ·ha5 the exclusive power to 'conclude international agreements. - the Dominion or, whether such power can be
distributed between the Union and the provincial governments. This
leads one to at least two presumptions, namely:
1. that only the central government has it; or .
2; that the provincial governments may also exercise treaty-making
rights:
The Commonwealth of Australia33
The treaty-making power of the Australian Federation seems to rest to
a.-large extent with the· Commonwealth Government. As with most
federations formed with the British Empire or Commonwealth; the
executive authority of the federation is vested in the Queen. This
authority is exercised by the Governor-General who ~s the Queen's
33. The Commonwealth of Australia came into being on January 1, 1901. It
was created by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, which bad been
passed by the Imperial Parliament. The Act·received royal assent on July 9, 1900,
arid was ·proclaimed on September 17, 1900. It united the people of New South
Wales, Victoria. South Australia. Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia
in a federal Commonwealth under the title of the Commonwealth of Australia.
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representative. Under sections 51 XXIX and 61 of the Australian Constitution the Commonwealth Government was not competent to conclude international agreements before 1919.
According to the Sydney Draft of 1891 and the Adelaide Draft of
1897, covering clause 7, provided that 'all treaties made by the Commonwealth of Australia shall according to. their tenor, be binding on
Courts, Judges and peoples of every State, and of every part of the
Commonwealth, anything in the laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding'. Section 52, XXVI of these drafts vested the Commonwealth Parliament with power to legislate with respect to 'external
affairs and treaties'. Later in the final draft, the provisions relating to
~eaties' 34 were ultimately dropped from the corresponding covering
clause 5 and section 51, on the ground that being a part of the British
Empire, Australia could not have treaty-making power of a sovereign
State. But before the federation was formed, the individual Australian
provincial colonies entered directly into certain agreements with
foreign powers on technical matters. 35
However, an incident took place in 1902 which brought strongly in
question the exclusive nature o( the power of the Commonwealth
Government to make treaties and power to legislate with respect to
external affairs.
In 1902, Mr. Chamberlain, the colonial Secretary asked for a report
from the Commonwealth Government of Australia in relation to a
complaint made by the Netherlands Government that the authorities in
South Australia failed to render help which they ought to have given
to the Dutch Consul under article 10 of the Anglo-Dutch Convention
of 1856, in connection with the arrest of the crew of a Dutch vessel,
the 'Voudel' at Adelaide. The South Australian Premier, Mr. Jenks,
refused the request of the Commonwealth Goyernment to furnish it with
the necessary particulars. The Commonwealth Government pointed
out that .its right to ask for particulars rested on the fact that the incident involved the observance of an imperial treaty and •matters affecting consuls' which fell within federal competence under sections
51 XXIX and 75 (i) and (ii).
34. Official records of the Proceedings and Debates of the National Australian
Convention, 1891, (Sydney), p. 771, 944, 952, Official Records of the Australian
Federal Convention (Second session, Sydney), 1897, pp. 238-240; (3rd Session,
Melbourne), 1898, Vol. 1, p. 20.
35. Postal Convention between the USA and New South Wales, January 15,
1874; Convention between USA and Victoria on Money Orders, October 5, 1881,
etc. See Australian Treaty List (Australia Treaty Series, 1951, No. 1, Department
of External Affairs, Canberra), p. 7.
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The Prime Minister of South Australia's refusal was based on the
argument that the term 'external affairs' was not included among the
subjects with respect to which the Commonwealth Parliament had e~
clusive competence. In the second place, in the opinion of Mr. Jenks,
the term 'external affairs' was very vague, and might or might not
mean that the Commonwealth Parliament had power to make laws to
enforce imperial treaties. .Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister claimed the right of the State of South Australia to communicate
directly with the Imperial Government in all matters relating to the
fulfilment of imperial treaties.
In 1906, just before the Colonial Conference of 1907, Australian
States claimed the right to have direct representation at that conference.
Their demand was that unlike the Canadian Provinces they were 'independent of Federal Government' which was not any better than their
agent. The second contention was that several of the subjects proposed
for discussion at the conference such as law, trade, communication,
immigration, education and science affected their state rights. 36
The Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin, refused to accept this view. He
pointed out that the Commonwealth States were not separate political
entities. They had surrendered some of the distinctive attributes of
statehood, namely, power over defence, customs and' exise, posts and
telegraphs, etc. The British Government made an authoritative declaration in 1908, that 'His Majesty's Government is pledged to the view
that, so far as the relations of Australia with foreign nations are concerned, the Government of the Commonwealth alone can speak, and
that for everything affecting external communities the Government of
the Commonwealth are alone responsible.'
The conclusion from the above discussion is that although the treatymaking power of the Commonwealth of Australia Federation seems to
be largely vested in the Commonwealth Government, there is reason
to think that the states do have dealings and enter into relations with
foreign authorities on matters which are clearly seen to affect the interests of the state concerned. Thus, Australian states maintain agents
in London for promoting their trade. They also hold direct communication with the United Kingdom Government in respect of certain
matters which are not within the federal jurisdiction.
The _Australian case shows again that there is in principle nothing
inherently impossible in the exercise of treaty-making powers by the
36. Correspondence relating to the Colonial Conference, 1907, No. 3340,
Statement of Mr. Thomas Price, at p. 9.
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component states of a federation. Ultimately, whether they can or not,
or can continue doing so, must depend on the Federal Constitution· and
its developments.

The United States of America
Article 1, Section 10, of the constitution of the United States of Ameri-·
ca has two clauses, one of which declared: 'No .State shall enter into
any treaty, alliance or confederation', and the other . says: 'No State
shall without the consent of Congress . .. enter into any agreement or
Compact with another -state or with a foreigp. power'.
There have been wide debates among the. United States jurists . in
establishing the real differences between the two clauses. However,
Professor Willoughby thinks that 'the possibility of the States entering into direct relations with foreign Powers .provided the consent of
Congress is obtained, is recognized, at least as regards certain but undefined agreements or compacts'. 37 How often has the United States
Congress consented to a state entering into agreements or compacts in
practice?
.
.
·
In 1909, there was a ·question whether the State of Minnesota could
enter into an agreement with Canada without the consent of 'Congress,
for facilitating the construction of a dam on the Rainy River. In giving
opinion about this, Attorney General Wickersham denied the capacity of the State to do so. He .added, however, that by implication,
Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 3, permits such an agreement to be entered into if
Congress had given its consent thereto. In 1917, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota heard a case concerning certain counties of· that State
which had entered into an agreement with a municipality in the.Canadian province of Manitoba for the construction of a drain for securing
an outlet for surface waters. ·The contract was made.under the authority of the State but without the consent of Congress; and invoived expenditure of money in a foreign country. According to the opinion of
the State Court, the agreement was not political in its nature and not
calculated to encroach upon the authority of Congress. This being the.
case, it was not within the constitutional prohibition. 31
In 1934, there was a proposal for an agreement or compact between.
the State of New York and the Dominion of Canada for the establishment of the Buffalo and Fort Erie ·Public .Bridge Authority. A Joint
Resolution was passed by the Congress which ran as follows: 'Resolved
31. The Constitutio.nal Law of the United States, 1929, Vol. 1, p. 306.
38. McHenry County v. Brady, 37 N. Dak. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1927).
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by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that the consent of Congress o(- the
United States of America be, and it is hereby given_ to the Stat~ -of New
York to enter into the agreement or compact with the Dominion of
Canada set forth in Chapter 824 of the Laws of New York 1933, and
an Act respecting the Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority
passed at the fifth session, seventeenth Parliament, Dominion of
Canada, assented to March 28, 1934, for the establisb,ment of the Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority as a municipal corporate
instrumentality of the said State and with power to take over, maintain
and operate the present highway bridge over the Niagara River between
the City of Buffalo, in the State of New York, and the yillage of Fort
Erie in the Dominion of Canada' . 39
Congress passed a joint resolution in i947 which brought into effect
the Agreement between the United States of America and the United
Nations regarding the Headquarters of the latter. By this resolutioQ,
limited power was given to the member-States of the Union to enter into
. agreements with the United Nations. Section 4 of this resolution runs as
follows: 'Any States, or to the extent not -inconsistent with State law,
any political sub-division thereof, affected by th~ establishment of the
headquarters of the United Nations in the United States are authoriz~d
to enter into agreements with the United Nations or with each other,
consistent with the same: provided that, except in case of emergency
and agreements of a contractual character, a representative of the
United States to be appointed by the Secretary of State, may, at the
discretion of the Secretary of State, participate in the negotiation, and
that any such agreement entered into by such States or political subdivisions thereof shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of State.':40
The above discussion proves that the Constitution does not totally
block the member-states of the United States from making agreements
with foreign states, especially if such agreements are seen to be of
importance to the State concerned and does not contradict the general
interests of the Union.
Switzerland
The position of the Swiss Constitution in regard to the treaty-making
power of its compone~ts has been stated. The Cantons have a reason39. Public Law, No. 22, approved on May 3, 1934, 73rd Congress, Sess. 11,
Chap. 196, 48 Stat. 662.
40. Public Law, No. 357, approved August 4, 1947, 80th Congress, Sess. 1,
61 Stat. 756, 767.
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able m~asure of right to enter into treaty relations . with foreign
powers m so far as the constitution permits. What is interesting here is
!o ascertain what procedures the member-States are required to follow
m ~e making of trc:aties within their competence. The Central. treatymaking procedure 1s governed by the provisions of the Federal and
Cantonal Constitutions. The essential thing is that the treaties which
the Cant~ns have power to make under Article 9 are required to be in
conformtty not only with the Constitution of the Federation and
Federal Laws, but also with the public policy of the Federal Government. Further, they should not be opposed to the rights of any other
Canton.
.
It is often the case that when a Canton wishes to make a treaty it
asks the Federal Council to pass its correspondence to the foreign
gove~ent concerned or to take other necessary action. Once .the
Council considers the treaty permissible under the Constitution it begins the. negotiation d~pen~g on the nature of the treaty. Wh~re the
matter mvolves technical lSSues on which the Cantonal officers are
likely to possess better knowledge, or where local sentiments deserve
speci~ consideration, Cantonal officers are appointed as chief representatives. It could happen that at the end of negotiations the treaty
would be signed and concluded by the Federal Govem~ent in the
name of the Canton, or the Canton itself might conclude it in its own
name. In the _first case, th~ tr~aty is still known as a cantonal agreement, as the nghts and obhgations under it are considered to be those
of the Canton.
· Treaties negotiated through the intermediary of the Federal· Council
but c:oncluded by the Cantons in their own names are numerous. Such
tr~aties. relate to. d~uble taxation, e;g., the agreements made by BileVille wtth Pruss1a m 1910; by Soleurs with Alsace-Lorraine in 1911·
by different Cantons with Germany in 1923; cross-frontier intercours;
(e.g., the agreements made by Bale-Ville with Baden in 1894 providing
f~r. the establishm~nt of a ferry; by Berne with France in 1888, proViding for schools m the frontier districts; by Bile-Ville with Baden in
1894 regar~g. improvem~nt of the river Wiese; by Bile-Campagne
and ~goVle wtth Baden m 1907 for the establishment of a hydroel~ctrt~ plant ~ea~ August Wy~~n); police matters - e.g., St. Gall
wtth L1c~tenstem. m_1916, proVlding for mutual judicial assistance; by
Vaud wtth Austria m 1907, and St. Gall with Austria in 1908 each
providing for the execution of civil judgements. 41
'
41. H. Edward, De Ia Competence des Cantons Suisse de. conclure de traites
lnternatlonawc - Specitdement concernant le Double Imposition, Brussels, 1869,

60

Sometimes member-States of a Federation have common frontiers
with foreign States. The necessity for occasional agreements between
the border commwiities, particularly in police matters, cannot be
denied.
5. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S VIEW ON THE TREATYMAKING COMPETENCE OF COMPONENT UNITS WITHIN A FEDERAL STATE
In seeking to formulate a rule on treaty-making capacity within a
federal structure which would make it possible to distinguish between
the elements which derive from the constitutional law of that structure
and those which derive from general international law, the Commission
was faced with a problem similar to that relating to the international
capacity of organizations. With regard to federal structures, the Commission finally lent its support to the idea that there was indeed a
rule of general public international law on that subject, but that under
each federal constitution had full competence to distribute capacity to·
conclude international treaties between the federation and its memberStates.~

6.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of the comment under this subdivision has been to illustrate that facts of international life may, as a matter of great necessity, cause States to .resort to different constitutional structures or
forms resulting in their component parts being permitted, according to
their respective constitutions, to interact directly in certain cases with
other international legal persons operating on the international plane.
Our discussion touched on three questions, namely, the theoretical aspects of the international personality of the component members of a
federation; a brief survey of the relevant characteristics of a number of
federal constitutions with a view to establishing how they stand as regards the degree of separate participation in international relations of
their member-states; .and finally-an examination of the extent of the
treaty-making capacity of states-members of a federation.
pp. 460-462; Huber, H., How Swltz:erland is Governed, Zilrich, 1946, p. 69.
Recent examples of Cantonal treaties have not been possible to come by.
42. See, Bartos, Yearbook of International Law Commisnon, 1965, vol., 1,
779th meeting, para. 83.
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Our theoretical analysis shows that in fact nothing, in principle, precludes the component units of a Federal State from exercising this
right, unless otherwise prohibited by the constitution of the state concerned. This being so, it means that the extreme traditionalist view that
it is only the collective federal state as such which has treaty-making
capacity is exaggerating. The persistent development of the international community in various fields renders it necessary to seek the
solution of many international problems outside the exclusive field of
the body of sovereign and independent States.
Under the constitutional examination as we have seen from those of
a number of federal States looked into, not all the constitutions . give
clear indication of the degree of separate participation of the component units in international affairs. We have established that in the treaty-practice of a number of Federal States, the component members of
such states were granted the right to enter into international agreements with foreign states, even where the constitution was either silent
or categorically opposed to such action. This practice of ignoring what
the constitution permits, when considering whether to give a memberstate of a federation the power to enter into an international agreement
with a foreign country on specific matters, is probably a result of the
changing nature of the world community coupled with increasing new
nature of interests and aspirations of the member-States of the federation.
Treaties lie at the centre of international legal relations and the capacity to enter into treaty-relations with other subjects of international
law is a very important attribute of personality in international law.
Some component members of a federation have, or have had, explicit
treaty-making capacity. In others this power is implied. The true position is seen clearly by an investigation into the treaty-making practices
of such federations. The power to make treaties is more evident in some
than in others.
From the foregoing discussions, and in the light of our earlier arguments, we come to the conclusion that component members of a federal
state, depending on either their expressed constitutional rights or the
state treaty-making practice which can be evidenced, apparently have
international legal personality, but it is a limited personality- not fully
sovereign or independent
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Parte

4. The 'debatable' subject of
international law and its treaty-making
capacity: the Holy See

1.

INTRODUCTION

The notion 'debatable' as used here needs explanation. It is used to
designate the entity or subject of international law which at first sight
seems to be of doubtful status and relatively limited in its participation
in international relations. This may possibly be so by virtue of its inherent nature, the particulars of which may be wholly different. However, it does have a place and plays a role which international law is
not completely indifferent to.
It will be observed that the doubt as to what degree of international
personality this entity possesses, emanates from its lack of one or more
of the legal criteria or essential elements of statehood as until recently
understood in international law. That is to say, it lacks one or more of
such characteristics as: territory, population, governmental authority
- particularly in the conduct of external relations. But does this necessarily entail that it lacks the power to enter into international agreements? - the latter being one of the most effective and important
evidences of personality in international law.
The difficulty arises when semi-independent states or international
institutions are wanting in one or some of these necessary features.
What non-state institutions can perform juridical acts recognized by
international law? Can non-territorial entities be endowed with international personality? This question presents itself in connection with
the various organs of international cooperation among states, such as
the United Nations Organization and its specialized agencies. The
same question presents itself with reference to the entity enlisted here
for investigation, though for differeat reasons.
To conform to the scope of the present study, we shall in the following discussion devote primary attention to the international personality of the Holy See and its treaty-making power.
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2. HISTORICAL SUMMAR.Y l

In order to understand its true position in contemporary international
law, a historical perspective is required. However, in view of the wealth
of information and numerous studies available on the Roman question
and its definitive settlement by the Lateran Agreements signed on
February 11, 1929, 2 it may be superfluous to attempt here any complete
account of the historical diplomatic background.
When the law of nations began to grow among the Christian States,
the Pope was the monarch of one of those States - namely, the socalled Papal States. Throughout the existence of the PapalSta,tes. until
their annexation by the Kingdom of Italy in 1870, the Pope was a
monarch and as such the equal of all other monarchs, but his influence
and the privileges granted to him by the different states were due not
only to his being the monarch of a state, but also to .his being the head
of the Roman Catholic Church. However this anomaly did not create
any real difficulty, since privileges granted to the Pope existed within
the province of precedence only.
The entity of the Papal States owed its existence to Pepin-le-Bref
and his son Charlemagne, who established it in gratitude to the Popes
Stephen II and Adrian I. It remained in the hands of the Popes until
1798 when it became a Republic for ·about three years.
In 1801, the former order of things was re-established but in 1809
it became a part of the Napoleonic Empire. In 1814 it w~ once again
re-established and remained in existence until 1870.
3.

PRESENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE HOLY SEE

The question of the international legal personality of the Holy See has
b~n much commented on by well-known international lawyers and
wnters, both before and after the final settlement of the Roman ques.

4. THE VlEW OP WESTERN COUNTlliES
Although Western jurists (Continental and Anglo-Saxon) were, for a
long time, not in agreement on the question of the international personality of the Holy See, it seems that the dominant view among them
today is that the Holy See does in fact possess such personality. The
reason for this shift of opinion among modem writers on international
law may not be far to seek.
For many years before 1914, the accepted conception of the international community was that·of society comprised apart from the Holy
See, 5 only of sovereign independent states. It was, so to speak, an era of
the 'European concert' in the history of international relations. It was
a period of an exclusive club of sovereign states. According to the

.

1. To make a complete bibliography of the .subject is beyond the scope of this
work. For modem views' on the Roman question, see: Ehler, Sidney z, and Morrall, John B., Church and State through the centuries,· A collection of historical
documents with commentaries, Westminster, 1955; Gaiter Albert, The Red 'Book
of the Persecuted Church (tr.) Westminster, 1954, Graham, Robert A., The Rise
of the Double Diplomatic Corps In Rome, A study In Diplomatic Practrice
(1870-1875), The Hague, 1952; Hertling, Ludwig, A history of the Catholic
Church (tr.) Westminster, 1957; Kunz, Josef L., The Status of the Holy See in
international law, AJIL, XIVI (1952), pp. 308-314.
2. . Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, 8th edition, 1952, pp. 250-251.
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tion. Even after this settlement, some countries still maintained a rigid
attitude as regards the position of the Holy See in international law.
But, as will be seen later, a general relaxation became noticeable in the
position of some countries on this question. 3
In contemporary international life, the Holy See manifests its personality in a variety of ways. Apart from exercising the right and
capacity of concluding concordats 4 on behalf of the Catholic Church,
it now participates side by side with other entities operating on the
international plane in the negotiation and conclusion of various international conventions.
One would be inclined to think today that the original doctrinal
stand of certain legal systems on the issue of the Holy See would be
scarcely consistent with the practice of states in their international
relations. It is this shift in state practice, notwithstanding the theoretical positions of States on the subject, which perhaps makes a review
of the status of the Holy See in international law even more interesting.

3. Grzybowsky, Soviet Public International Law, Doctrines and Diplomatic
Practice, Leyden, 1970.
4. For our purpose, the term concordat is an international bfiateral agreement
between the Holy See and a State, whereby the Holy See as the head of the
Church regulates the relations of tlie Catholic religion in a given State with the
Government of that State. We shall later note which agreements are in force
between various States and the Holy See on behalf of the Church.
5. In the days of sovereignty over the Papal States, the Holy See was a sovereign state in every sense of the term and even during the non-territorial interregnum of 1871-1929, it was accorded sovereign status.
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system at the time, institutions and other entities that were not sovereign independent states were without any personality in int~rnational
law. This theory worked well and seemed to correspond to the needs of
Europ.e up to the end of the First World War. For almost a century after
the Napoleonic wars, Europe experienced no large-scale war. The few
wars that did take place were brief and limited to a· small number of
States. It was still possible for a state to play a neutral part in international relations.
The cataclysm of 1914-1918 ended that phase. The sovereign state no
longer sufficed as the only organ capable of representing people on the
world juridical plane. It became necessary to create other instruments
for international political action. Earlier, international organizations of
a technical character existed, but the setting up of the League of Nations marked the first .change in the old system, whereby states alone
had political life on the international plane. This organization enjoyed some degree of juridical capacity. Today, the United Nations
Organization and its numerous specialized agencies, enjoy uncontested
international juridical personality. Such institutions were unthinkable
to 19th century international lawyers. The wind has now changed, and
as one result of this shift in doctrine, international law has become
disposed to accord to a number of new entities, non-territorial in
character, the juridical status unthought of before. The Holy See belongs to these entities.

Between 1870 and 1929 the Holy See possessed only a doubtful legal
personality and sovereignty in the international sphere, 6 but in the socalled Lateran treaty and Concordat of 1929, Italy recognized the
personality of the Holy See in the international domain and its exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction over the city of the Vatican, 1 thus
restoring to it in principle its territorial basis as a State, however small
·
the area involved.
In discussing the status of the Holy See in international law, certain
important issues necessarily come in. FirStly, the right to conclude
concordats. Secondly, do concordats fall within the notion of treaties

or conventions in international law? Thirdly, how far has the Holy See
exercised the right of concluding international agreements? Fourthly,
did the Holy See's right of diplomatic representation fall within the
framework of international law?
The Holy See is recognized as enjoying an undisputed right to conclude concordats, and this is evidence of its possession of personality
under international law, for these are international agreements, and
only such entities as possess a measure of international legal personality (fully or in limited form) can conclude them in a legally binding
fashion with other subjects of international law. We have already
stated that it was a result of a treaty and concordat, signed between the
Holy See and the State of Italy in 1929, tJ!.at Iialy formally recognized
the personality of the Holy See in international law. These agreements
are often described in the standard works on the Roman question as
the Lateran Agreements. Through these agreements a Vatican State
was created which,· as already noticed constituted a physical basis for
the legal personality of the Holy See in international law. 8
The view seems to be dominant today that the Holy See enjoys intermitional personality. The international rights which the predominant
doctrine ·reco~ in the Holy See include the conclusion of concordats and the right of active ·and passive legation. We shall return later
to the Holy See's right to diplomatic representation.
As to the issue of whether concordats fall within the concept of
treaties or COI'lventions in international law, we naturally think that if
the Holy See had no ·international juridical personality, it would have
no capacity to conclude agreements legally binding in inteqtationallaw.
If this were the case, the concordats would not fall under the heading
of internatj.onal treaties. But, since on the contrary, the Holy See does
have such personality, and is a subject of international law as our discussion shows, then the concordats are as valid and obligatory as
any legal commitment ratified between two States.
It now seems clear that the agreement-making capacity of the Holy
See does not stop with concordats but extends to participation in other
international agreements and conventions. For example, the Holy See
has entered into treaties, particularly of a humanitarian nature, such
as the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954 (360
United Nations Treaty Series, 117) 9• The Holy See has also been a

6. Mario Falco, The Legal Position of the Holy See before and after the
lAteran Agreements, 1935, p. 17.
7. Ian Brownlie, Principles of International lAw, Oxford, 1966, p. 59.

8. · Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects of International Law, as in Max
Manual of.Public International lAw, New York, 1968, p. 261.
9. Ibid., at p. 261.
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party to a .number of multilateral conventions, including those on the
Law of the Sea concluded in 1958. Having regard to its functions and
in terms of its territorial and administrative organization, writes Judge
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 10 the Vatican City is proximate to a State and
is widely recognized as a legal person with treaty-making capacity.
The Pope's right of active and passive legation is a right of international law. The present prevailing opinion amo~g writers is that envoys sent and received by the Holy See are diplomatic agents in the
full sense. Their titles, such as nuncio, ambassador, envoy extra-ordinary and minis~r plenipotentiary are not merely ordinary titles. Above
they, like other diplomats, enjoy the privileges and immunities of
diplomatic agents. In the world of diplomacy, the Pope enjoys the right
of active and pa8sive legation. He can send· and receive representatives
·who are public ministers in the sense of international law.
It is true that the Holy See belongs to that group of entities in international law which irrespective of their anomaious character participate
in international relations. It is also true that there can be some negative
consequences which may arise as.. a result oflhis fact of anomaly in an
entity like the Holy See. But, · it is also true that international law
recognizes that provided no rule of jus cogens is infringed upon, the
incidence of bilateral relations with other subjects of international law
can do so much to obviate such consequences.
Functionally, the Vatican . State is a state under international law.
Its territorial and administrative organization do not differ essentially
from those of other international persons. Besides, it is widely recognized as a legal person with treaty-making capacity. Even now, although there is a Vatican State which is under the territorial sovereignty of the Holy See, treaties are entered into not by reason of territorial
sovereignty over the Vatican State, but on behalf of the Holy See. 11

,.u,

6.

SOVIET DOCTRINE AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE

The Soviet doctrine of international law does not recognize the statehood of the Holy See, nor does it recognize its international personality. According to the Soviet legal system the Holy See does not enjoy
10. See, Fitzmaurice, United Nations Yearbook of International Law, 1956,

n, p.us.

11. It is difficult to treat the problem of personality divorc:cd from territorial
base in isolation simply because of the interaction of the Vatican City, the Holy
See and the Roman Catholic Church.

any measure of statehood in the international sense, ~sentiall~ because it lacks some of the legal criteria of statehood reqmred by mternational law. Professor.L. A. Modzhorian u argues that the Holy See
has no territory, no citizens of its own in the strict sense of the word,
and above all, no organs of·public order.
.. it is perhaps not surprising that the Soviet Union has an entirely
different view from that of Western countries on the question of the
international personality of the Holy See. As a state whic~ p1upo~ to
establish a social order that will exclude, as a matter of national policy,
~y place for churches and religion as such, the Soviet ynion, as a
matter of course does not maintain diplomatic relations With the Holy
See. u However, ft does appear· as will be seen later; that Soviet ~plo
tnatic ·practice is not compatible with its· theoretical stand on the IS~ue.
· 'the· Soviet government in the past is known to have entered mto
agreements with the Holy See in order to ~egula~e matters of common
interest. In 1920-21, for example, the SoVIet Umon accepted the o~er
of the Holy See to assist the Russian population afflicted by f~e
and by the resulting ·epidemics. It therefore made an agreement WI~
the Vatican regarding the assistance to be given throu~ the Cath?lic
missions in Russia. 14 During the early days of the revolutionary re~e
in Russia, the Soviet government conchided similar agreem~nts With
other charitable organizations and these were given special status R?d
privileges as they were not endowed with ~ international personality
and .did not aspire to such a status. 15 What ts the legal nature of these
kihds of agreements and how· can they be interpreted? Acco~ding to
Soviet law it seexns apparent that they Will not be regarded as mternational agreements. Rather they will be ·placed in th~ same .category ~
other contracts ooncluded with non-governmental mtemational chantable organizations such as ICRC, Caritas International, Oxf~ etc. By
this arrangement the issue of the international legal personality of the
Holy See in Soviet legal theory is dismissed. This. is an e~~ line to
take and clearly saves much trouble. But is the sol~tion c_:o~vmcmg?
Modem Soviet diplomatic practice shows that 1ts mtmSters and of12. The position of the Soviet doctrine of international law in relati.on to the
international personality of the Holy See remains unchanged, at least m theory,
see International Law, edited by Prof. L. A. Modzhorian, Moscow, 1970, PP·
143-145.
.
. 1
.
13. Orzybowsk.y, Soviet Public International Law, Doctrines and D1p omattc
Practice, Leiden, 1970, p. 65.
14. Ibid, op. cit., p. 65.
15. Ibid, op. cit., p. 65.
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ficials make visits to the Holy See. For example, Andrei Gromyko, the
Soviet Foreign Minister and chief delegate to the United Nations, met
the Pope during his visit to the United Nations in 1965. Later during
his visit to Italy in 1967, Gromyko, together with the Soviet ambassador accredited to Italy, was received in an official audience by the
Pope. 16 In 1967, Podgorny, the Soviet President and Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union - a position corresponding to that
of a ceremonial head of state - visited Pope Paul VI. He was received by the Pope in the presence of the Soviet ambassador to Italy
in an official audience. Again, in the later part of 1970, President Podgamy made a similar visit to the Holy See. The legal meaning attributable to these events is a matter of conjecture.
It is clear that the Holy See is a party to a number of multilateral
agreements and conventions ·to which the ussR is also a party. The
Holy See has equally become a party to a number of them by accession. The Soviet Union has so far neither reserved its position in regard
to the participation of the Holy See in these international acts, nor
has she ever protested against the Holy See's accession to those conventions that have long been in operation between state members of the
international community.
By the Holy See's ratification of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, she became a full bearer of rights and obliga- ,
tions flowing thereupon. It does appear to us, therefore, that a nuncio
appointed on a foreign diplomatic service by the Holy See falls within
the category of diplomats whose welfare is covered by the Convention.
If, for example, such a nuncio were to make a stop in the Soviet Union
while proceeding to his destination, he would be entitled to all the respects and immunities due to normal state diplomatic agents.
The above illustrations added to the fact that in the Soviet diplomatic practice, Ministers pay official visits to the Holy See, leads us to the
conclusion that the Soviet Union at least in practice recognized the
international personality of the Holy See.
7.

CONCLUSION

But it is also common knowledge that the most recent doctrine and
practice in international relations . admits . that in addition t? states,
which are the normal subjects of mternational law, there eXISt other
subjects of international law with limited international personality.
This view even goes so far as to reject the dogma that only states can
be subjects o( in!ernationallaw and, basing i~elf upo~ vario~s theories
supported by a diversity of arguments, considers as mternational persons - or at least as subjects of international law - institutions and
groups which are not states. This is not the place to examine all th~e
theories· it will be enough for our discussion here to recall that, m
'
.
general, starting from the acknowledged fact that there are mternational rights of a . mixed territorial-ecclesiastical character which
belong to- the Holy See, or which are at any rate exercised by it in its
capacity of supreme.organ of the Church, it has always been recognized
~t the Holy See possesses legal personality, or at any rate the status
of a subject of international law.
· The recognition has derived from the general principle of law that
wherever there are rights and obligations, there is a person or subject
of such rights and obligations. It follows therefore, that if positive
international law recognizes in the Holy See one or more international
rights, then the Holy See is a legal pers~~ in intem~~onal law. The
existence of such rights is necessary, and 1t 1s also suffiCient as the holder's status as a subject of rights is neither increased nor diminished
according to the quantity of rights held. So the fact that the Holy See
happens to enjoy a lesser quantity of international rights than perhaps
is enjoyed by states is no longer important in this connection, nor
should the fact that it is in its true essence a non-territorial institution
be any longer regarded as a reason for denying its international
personality.
This 'points to the conclusion tha~ there is no reason to wi~~ld
recognition of international personality from other non-state entities
merely because their claim to it is not based on possession of the full
attributes of an ordinary sovereign state, still less so seeing that in
view of their greater numbers today the case is no longer exceptional,
as perhaps it once was in regard to the Holy See.

To sum up, it is common knowledge that until quite recently international lawyers were almost unanimous in denying international personality to all entities other than fully sovereign independent states.
16. Ibid, op. .dt., p. 65.
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Appendix

A. Agreements in force between various States and
the Holy See on behalf of the Church
Date••

State

Instrument

Switzerland (Cantons of Luzem, Bem,
Solothum and Zug)

Convention March

Switzerland (St. Gall)

Convention November

Haiti

Concordat

Switzerland (Ticino)

Convention November 29, 1884

May .

Other Particulars
26, 1828

Concluded by the Cantons
on their own l;Jehalf

7, 1845·

Concluded on its o\VD behalf

November

Bavaria

Concordat

January

Poland

Concordat

June

2, 1925

France

Agreement

December

·4, 1926

Lithuania

Concordat

December 10, 1927

Czechoslovakia

Modus
Vivendi

February

Portugal

Convention May

3, 1928

Regarding certain dioceses
in India

Colombia

Convention May

5, 1928

On minions

Italy

Treaty,
Concordat

Italy

Convention June

Convention December

Switzerland
(Luzem, Zug. Solothum, Baselland,
Argau, Thurgau)

Convention November 29, 1884

Colombia

Convention July

5, 1888

Switzerland (Ticino)

Convention July

15, 1888

Colombia

Convention July
Exchange
of Notes

Concluded by .the Swiss
Federal Council on behalf
of the Canton

2, 1884

Portugal

Convention June

Rumania

Concordat

July

On liturg. honours wh. capitulations w. abrogated/
not applied

2, 1928

11, 1929

7, 1929
29, 1929

On the settlement of the
Roman Question: Lateran
Agreement
On finance
Regarding the diocese of
St. Thomas of Meliapor in
India

7, 1929
11, 1933

Baden

Concordat

March

Germany

Concordat

September 10, 1933

Austria

Concordat

May

Philippines

Agreement

September 20, 1952

1, 1934
Military Vicariate in Armed Forces of Philippines

Concluded by_ the Swiss
Federal Council on behalf
of the Canton

2, 1893

26, .
March

February

24, 1925

10, 186()

Switzerland (Ticino)

Great Britain

3, 1922

Concordat

Latvia

1

20, 1890

Concerning the Islands of
Malta

•• Dates are those on which the instruments came into force.

1. The Agreements listed here included bilateral as well as General International Agreements. They will be classified as follows:
A Agreements in force between various States and the Holy See on behalf of
the Church;
B. Agreements on behalf of the State of the Vatican City;
c. General International Agreements to which the Holy See is signatory.
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B.

Agreements in force on behalf of the State of the Vatican City

State

Instrument

Date••

Italy

Agreement

June

C. General International Agreements to which the Holy See is
signatory •

Other particulars
30, 1930

Nature of Agreements+ Remark.s

On tariff

February

1930

Motor and Highway Circulation

Italy

Convention September 10, 1930

On telephone and telegraph

June

Italy

Convention September 10, 1930

On car circulation

January

Italy

Convention September 10, 1930

On Postal Matters

December 27, 1932

Intemation&l. Telecommunication

Italy

Convention May

25, 1931

On Monetary Matters

september 12, 1935

San Marino

Convention May

25, 1932

On Monetary Matters

International Union for the Protection of . Literary
and Artistic Works

Italy

Convention May

8, 1933

On civil and Commercial
Proceedings

June

26, 1948

Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Ratification,
20th June, 1951)

Italy

Agreement

Railroad

July

28, 1951

Italy

Convention October

On the use of Italian Hospitals by Vatican City Nationals

Status of Refugees; extension of Obligations (Ratification, March 15, 1956)

May

10, 1952

Unification of rules relating io penal jurisdiction
(Ratification, August 10, 1956)
Rules concerning civil jurisdiction (Rat., Aug. 10,
1956)
Arresting of Seegoing Ships (Accession August 10,
1956)
UniversiU · Copyright Convention Protocof (Ratification July 5th. 1955)

August

24, 1934
4, 1934

26, '1930 ·
3, 1931

Germany

Exchange
of notes

November 13, 1935

·on Passport/Visas

May

10, 1952

Austria

Exchange
of notes

April

30, 1935

On Passport/Visas

May

10, 1952

Italy

Agreement

December 16, 1955

Tax exemption for- Italian
Diplomatic Agents

September

•• Dates are those on which the instruments came into force.

6. 1952

Universal Postal Union
lntemational Radiotelegraph (adhesion)

May

14, '1954

Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event of armed conflict (Accession, February 24, 1958)

April

29, 1958

Fishing and conservation of living resources of the
High Seas

April

29, 1958

Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone

April

29, 1958

Continental Shelf

• The source of Agreement listed under this sub-beading lies heavily on the
Treaty Series.

UN

•• Dates are those on which the instruments came into force. Where the Holy
See acceded later, it will receive comments as regards the date of accession under
'remarks'.
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PartD
Natur~ ~I

Date

.Agreements

+ Remarks

April

29, 1958

Convention on the High Seas Final Act

April

29, 1958

Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes

June

10, 1958

· Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

June

10, 1958

United Nations Conference on Intem. Commercial
Arbitration

March

30, 1961

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

APril

18, 1961

Vienna Convention on diplomatic Relations (Ratification, APril 17, 1964)

September 18, 1961

Unification of. rules t:elating to international carriage
by air, performed by a penon other than the contracting carrier

October

4, 1961

Intemational Atomic Energy Agency (l'AEA) (Acceptance January 11, 1962)

October

26, 1961

Protection of performen, producen, phonograms and
broadcasting organizations

December 10, 1962
APril
March.

24, 1963

Marriage: consent, minimum age and registration
Vienna O?nvention on Consular relations

1, 1965

S~ppression

April

9, 1965

Facilitation of International maritime traffic

July

8, 1965

Transit trade of land-locked countries

January

5, 1967

Broadcasting in the cause of peace (acceded, January
Sth, 1967)
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of counterfeiting currency( Acceded,
March 1, 1965)

5. The personality of unrecognized
states in international law: A case study
on Rhodesia as an illustration

1.

INTRODUCTION

It is not our intention here to undertake a general study of the international personality of unrecognized states as this would go far -beyond the original scope of the present work. Therefore, this section of
our inquiry is directed towards using the case of Rhodesia to illustrate
the personality of nonrecognized states in international law.
Th-e question of the legal status of unrecognized states touches on a
wide range of interesting issues connected with the theory and practice
of contemporary international law. Undoubtedly, the role of such
states in day-to-day .international life is heavily on the increase. One
modem author whose monograph dealt mainly with the question of
Treaty Relations of Non-Recognized States, observes that there is a
visible tendency today, to stress the position of the non-recognized
regime as one of the component parts of the international community
to which the framework of existing rights and duties called international law should somehow-apply more extensively.'
A state may exist without- being recognized, and if it does exist in
fact, then, whether or not it has been formally recognized by other
states, has a right to be treated by them as a state. The act of recognition .eXpresses the intention, on the part of the recognizing state, to
observe in regard to the new state all rights and duties as prescribed
by international Jaw. 2 The primary function of recognition is, therefore,
to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been uncertain,
namely,. the independence of the body or unit claiming to be a state.
The consequences of the acceptance of this fact is the normal courtesies of international intercourse. 3
1. Bot, B. R.; Non-Recognition and Treaty Relations,. A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden,
J968,p.9.
.
2. Brierly, J. L., The lAw of Nations, 6th edition, Oxford, 1963, at p. 139.
3. Brierly, ibid., at 139.
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However, in the past as well as in the present, international relations
have witnessed many cases of states or entities which although they
play a leading role in the evolution of modem international life, are,
nevertheless, denied that courtesy of cooperating normally with other
established actors already-opera~g on the international plane.
Examples of these are not far to seek and can be multiplied. For
instance, until recently, the question of the Peoples Republic of China
had been glaring. In refusing Communist China recognition, the United
States, had often based its arguments on the principle of the so-called
'lack of democratic legality' by which the USA holds the view that the
Communist regime in China lacked positive support of the ·population.
The same arguments are invoked by many other states that so far
have withheld the official stamp of approval from the governments of
DDR, North Vietnam, North Korea and c,wen s1ill Communistc.m.na. · -, ·
It is necessary to observe that the test of the principle Qf democratic
legality has never been consistently applied so as to make it one of the
standard requirements · for. recognition .and ~fun participation· in international affairs. 4 Too ·many governments have been recognized 'that
failed to· meet the requirements and too often, states that ·inserted tbe
doctrine of popular support among their conditions for recognition
closed their eyes to obvious violations . when political climate · demanded them to do so.
Often, a government which is confronted with this issue of recog:.
nition, will partly judge its acceptability. on the basis of legal criteria
for statehood formulated by international law. Meanwhile, we are concerned with the question whether the· state of Rhodesia is one of · the
component parts of the international community capable of ·fulfilling
its functions aceording to international law. In view of this consideration, we shall-pay more attention -to international standards. This
simply means that we· are not to concern ourselves much with .the Considerations advanced by municipal law. They deal mainly with the
inner cohesion of the group acting as a state or with internal ·constitUtional factors which may not have been observed by .a new. government nonetheless in firm control of the situation.
,
·
· On the basis of its reciprocity, sovereign states as ~ tule treat' each
other's ·internal structure as a ·matter which is rio concern of theirs~

that is to say, as a matter of exclusively domestic jurisdiction. 5 nius,
each sovereign state decides for itself whether it wishes to organize
itself on democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian patterns or to tum
its economy on lines of laissez-faire, state planning, state socialism, or
communism. 6 Simihirly, subjects of international law do not necessarily
concern themselves with the question whether the government of another sovereign_state hils come tO power in .accordance With its con·
stitution.
-_In principle, however, the state refused recognition remains isolated
until international approval has been granted to its new rulers. Until
such a recognition is accorded, the establiShment of diplomatic relations is not pos!lible. Some authors are of the opinion that it is by the
act of recognition tliat the sovereignty of the new government is internationally accepted and the body of rules regulating the normal intercourse between states becomes applicable without restrictions. 7 In our
opinion, this is not entirely correct. It is not generally right to maintain tbit every·regime recognized by a certain number of goveniinents
would necessarily be a state or government in the international law
sense. Many a fu:n~ in state practice, reasons which are politicallymotivated form the fundamental b&Sis of recognition. In that case, the
consistency of such an action with legal prerequisites raises some
·
doubts.
In any case~ the principle of nonrecognition needs to be of short
duration in order to be effective. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a
purely formal·gesture. The Rhodesian case with which we are presently
concerned is a case in point. Thus far, although the economic sanctions
have considerable influence on the economic situation of that eountry,
they have not accomplished the aim for which· they were established.
Besides, it does not' appear that the general isolationist policy of the
international world community declared towards her since 1966 is
playing any significant role in bringing the Rhodesian regime to her
heels.
To recapitulate: One of the <{Uestions we shall look into is the examination of whether, and under .which conditions, it is theoretic8ily
feasible to also attribute to the uni'ecognised regime the capacity -to
participate, perhaps merely in a limited way in international iniercourse. We consider that .if we can coDfirm. this capacity, then it ma¥

4. <llen-Ti-Chiimg, The lntemational'Law of Recognition, With Speciol Reference to Practice in Great Britain and the United Statu, (edited by L. C. Green),
London, 1951, at p. 111; .Lauterpacht, H., Recognition •in International Law,
Cambridge, 1948.
..

S.
at p.
6.
7.
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Scbwarzenberger, G., ..4 Manual of International Law, vol. 1, 4th edition
49.

Ibid.
Chen-Ti-<llians, op. dt., at p. 97.
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offer some help in determining. the status ~ well as the rights and
duties of an unrecognized state under international law.
..
Besides, it is consider.ed ~eful apd proper _not to leave the read~r
completely unaequainted with the historical past of Rhodesia's political
origin and structure. A -discussion of the legal nature of the unilateral
declaration of independence is envisaged. To what 4egree has Rhod~ia
satisfied the. essential legal criteria of statehood in international law?
Is Rhodesia a state? An inquiry into the problem of recognition in so
far as it relates to Rhodesia will be conducted. An effort will be made
to see if international law places any obligation on Jts subjeets to
recognize the other emerging new ones. Alsq; we -shall see how far the
ab?~v~ Anglo-Rhodesian ·~· imply recognition .o~ the part of .the
Bntish government. F~y, tt does not seem to us to be entirely out of
place to examine the scope of participation .of unreco~ed state!! an~
governments in international ~lations. This surely will lead us t() reflec~. on the extent to which nonrecognized states .c~ participate in
bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties·, &n:d a~ove all other r~lations. .

2.

RHODESIA AND THE QUESTI~ OF INDBPEND~B (UDI)

The name 'Rhodesia' took. its origin from Cecil Rhodes who, at th~
head of the British South Africa Company, conquered . Mashonaland
and Matabeleland with thef assistance of regular British troops in the
1890's. The British government formally took ·over the administration
of the area from the B.ritish South Africa Company in 1923. · After
that, they. were granted internal self-gove~ent. In late 1940, threatening African nationalist . movements emerged ·in the copper~ch
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and labour-rich Nyasaland (now
Malawi).
Tbe European colonialists. had less political power or influence in
these latter areas. As a diplomatic move, they persuaded Britain to
establish in 1953 the federati~n of Rho4esia and.Nyasaland, which was
e~ectively ·ruled by the European settlers in Southern Rhodesia, but
the A,frican nationalist movement increased at the end of 1963 and led
Britain to dissolve the f~eration. The two northern territories were
allowed to prepare for independence under African ~jority ·rule. Thus,
in 1964 the two independent states of Malawi • and Zambia 9 were born.
8. Malawi became independent on June 6, 1964.
9. Zambia became independent on October 24, 1964.

84

· The 1962 Rhodesian constitution provided for a Prime Minister and
a ·parliament. of 65 members, elected under ~ coQJ.plicated system designed to ensure that 50 were Europeans and 1S were Afticans approved by the Europeans. The franchise was restricted on the basis of income, ownership of moveable pn~perty and education. The result was
that virtually all voters were European.
.
. In the May 1965 elections, the. Rhodesian· Front, which was pressing
fQI' independence under a European govemJD.ent,· won an overwhelming
majority of votes, the few eligible Africans having boycotted the elections. The leader of the Front, Ian Smith; was retained as Prime Minister.· The central theme .of the Front's progr~e ·which Mr. Ian
Smith was co~tted . to execute· was the retention· of , political and
ecot;tomic power in·the hands of the white minority. Thus, on assuming power, .his regime~ apart from declaring the independence of. Rhodesia unilaterally in November .1965, bas: suppressed and outlawed
African nationalist · org~tions and has imprisoned the leading members of such org&Qizations.

3.· THB UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ITS LEGAL NATURE

On 11 November 1965, the Rhode!!ian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, de·clared. Rhodesia to be .-an indepet;tdent and sovereign state. This act,
which has incurred comments and criticisms from aiJ over the world,
was carried out despite strong objections from the British government,
international public opinion and the United Nations Organization.
An· interesting· question which· flows ·from this act of Unilateral declaration of independence is to determine its legal nature, if any,
under international law. Did it bring about any legal consequences?
I)id this declaration transform the original status of Rhode&ia from that
of a.British Crown Colony into something else? ·
·.· rt seems that most, if not all doctrines of inteJllational law, recqg-nize . that ·the creation and appearance of a new state as a fact is a
matter of internal law rather · than of international law. On the other
hand, such questions as whether, how far, and in what circumstances
existing states may, should or m115t recognize the entity concerned as
clothed with international status, is a matter of internaf;ionallaw.
It is questionable if even as a matter of internal Rhodesian law whether
the d~laration of independence was valid. At t~e same time, it can be
maint~ed with c:Qnsiderable force that Rhodesia had been in a condition of de faeto independence for many years. before the .acb,lal de85

claration. .In these circUmstances, the declaration ~ be taken at its
face value intefJlationally, as a proclamation imide publicly and formally in explicit terms on a specific state of ~~: as a ~tat~ment ~Y an
entity that it regarded itself as a fully sovere1gn state m mterna~onal
law, that it no longer recognized the existence of any. other higher
authority, either as regards internal affairs or external affmrs.
In consequence, Rhodesia on 11 November 1965 unil~terally mad~
known to the other subjects of international law that it no long~r accepted the. jurisdiction of Britain over its te~tOry, , the British govern.
ment's opposition tO this step notwithstanding.
. It iS. submitted here that in. essence, the· act of a unilateral declaration of independence falls within the category of international acts. Its
unilateral character cannot however per se· make the . act' illegal, for
internationally an act constitutes a breach of international. Ia~ just
because, and only if, it is attributable to, or imputable tO, .a subJect. of
international Iaw. 10 On this ·basis, unilateral declarations of indepen~
dence, if illegal, would themselves create the conditions which' ~de. an
international act 11 a breach of law; and a logical objection to this View
is that it is based on an obviously circular process of reasoning.
act can be imputable to an entity as an international
, Before
wrong, that entity must be shown to be a subject of international law.
Hence even if Rhodesian independence originated in what was, on the
inteni~ pbme ·(i.e.; as a matt~r of United Kingdom ~r Rhodes~ l~w
or of the Anglo-Rhodes'ian constitutional set-up) an illegal act, 1t must
be taken in the cirCumstances to have resulted in independence on the
international plane. This 'kind of case is by no means the only one iti
which acts. illegal in their origin can produce v~lid effects in the field
of status.
·
.
Recognition is, o'f course, another matter. By the. declar~tion of .independence, Rhodesia notified the members of the mtemation~ community of a new state of affairs. Naturally, by such a declaration, the
entity making it anticipates tha~ the notified situati<?n ~ be reco~
nized by other subjects of interna~onal law and thus a~~e a definitive basis in that system. On the other hand, such recogmtion may tak~
a long time to come, and existing•mternational law is ·":'.ery unsettled ·as
to the ·circumstances in· which, and the moment at which, other states
are on the one hand, entitled to, or, on the other hand, bound to acco;d it. We shall return to this question of recognition at a. later stage.

an

10. Schwarzenberger, A .Manual of Intei7Ultiotllll Law, yol I, 1960, p. 1~.
:
11. For a more lletailed analysis of the c:Qnditions which. make a breach an
international act, ~ ibid., op. cit., p. 163.
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4.. 'IS RHODESIA A STATE?
It follows that iii order to determine whether Rhodesia is a state as
understood in international law,, an examination of the concept of state·
hood is necessary.
Article f of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and ·-outies of
States 1 · provides that: 'The state as a person of international law
should possess·the following qualifications~
a. a permanent population; ·
b. a defined territOry;
.
c. a goveniment; and
d: · capacity to enter into relations \vith other States'.
The above enumeration include the so-called legal criteria of statehood
recognized among a good number of jurists. u These criteria may~ however; be regarded as constituting only the main elementS of statehood
- as a·sorf. of minimum '- and as no more than a starting point for
further investigation. 14 Other criteria considered by some authors as
rele-vant· in relation t.O the.· concept of ·statehood, ilte: independence·;
sovereignty; a certain degree of civilization; willingness· to observe
international law; ability tO function as a state and a degree of per:-:
manence. 15
·Even though we have ·considered most of the elements o( statehood
enumerated above; 16 it is' necessary to· re-examine some of ~em strictly
in relation to-·Rhodesia, in order to establish to what extent Rhodesia
satisfies these conditions.
·t. Population: The eXistence of a state is normally established Within. an organized community; it is" the people that form the basis for
this. Without a· population; it would be difficult to establish such an
existence. ·There ·is no doubt that Rhodesia ineets thiS requirement.

· 12. Signed 26 December 1933.
·
13. See for example, Fitzmaurice, 92 Hague Recueil, 13; Higgins, The Development oi International Law through the Political. Organs o~ the United Nat~ons,
pp. 11-57; Briggs, Law of Nations, pp. 65-85; Whiteman, D1gest of International
Law, Vol. I, pp. 221-233, 283-476; Kelsen, Principles of International Law: pp.
205-207, 257-264; Oppenheim, International Law, 2nd edition, p. 108; Bnerly,
The Law of Nations, 6th edition, p. 137.
14. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1966, p. 66.
15. Op. cit., pp. 68-73. See Fawcett, The Law of Nations, ·London, 1968;. Starke,
An Introduction to International Law, Seventh Edition, London, 1972.
16. We have considered these under the section, 'The general notion of states
In Inteinational Law.'
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2. Defined territory: It is often held among jurists that a state"must
have a specific territory with more or less defined boundaries. 17 Ac-:
cording to past-practice, the existence of fully defined frontiers is ·not
required. 18 In the case of Rhodesia, it is very clear that she has a territory with defined boundaries.
· 3. Government: A State must have a stable government which is
not subject to any other authority or government 19 A State is a stable
political community, supporting a legal order in a certain area. The
existence of effective government, with administrative and legislative
organs, is the best evidence of stable political community. 211 ·
4. Capacity:_The government of Rhodesia is in fact subject to no
other government. Britain is not effectively in control of that government which "in effective ~ontrol of Rhodesia.
However, the question arises, whether it is always correct to think
that. the existence of effective government is a sufficient support for
statehood. The principle of self-determination is already becoming a
recognized principle of international law. Today, it can be set against
the concept of effective -government, more particularly .when the latter
is used in arguments for the continuation of colonial rule or the creation
of a government which is in. clear violation of human rights, such as,
for instance, by the furtherance of the policy of apartheid. n The question comes up, in whose interest and for what legal purpose is the
existence of 'effective' government being pleaded? Lauterpacht 22 had as
late as 1947 prophesized that it is not inconceivable that in future, a
rule of international law may be formulated whereby the recognition
of a -country in which human-rights are violated would be considered
as illegal. The government of Rhodesia may be effective, but it would
appear that tlle way in which the government is organized with the
economic and political power concentrated in the hands. of a minority
is, to say the least, a violation of human rights.
In the resolution adopted on November 17, 1970, the United Nations
Security Council expressly urged all States 'not to g1:ant any form of

17. Schwazenberger, A Manual of International Law, vol. 1, p. 49.
18. Ian Brownlie, op. dt., p. 67.
19. Montevideo Convention; op. cit., 1933; Whiteman, op. dt., p. 17.
20. Ian Brownlie, op. cit., p. 67.
21. Sec, Ian Brownlie, p. 67.
22. Lauterpacht H ., Recognition in International Law, 1947, (Chapter 21).

recognition to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia,' 23 and if this is
to ·be taken as ·mandatory the states, members of the United Nations
organization cannot accord official recognition to the Smith -regime,
without implicitly violating the Charter of the organization itself, .the
letter and spirit of which also calls for promotion, encouragement and
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedotns for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 24
Independence and Sovereignty: These two categories (used synonymously) can orily be applied concretely in the light of the legal purpPse with which the inquiry is made and the particular facts. Many
jurists stress that independence is the ·decisive criterion of statehood.
Among the categories enumerated in the Montevideo Convention 1933,
the concept of independence is represented by the requirement of
~pacity to enter into relations with other states. .
· It appears that Rhodesia has the capacity to carry out this function.
Row far she has been able to demonstrate this capacity in practice is
another matter, but it is hard to believe that, after so many yeiu:s of
existence as a unilaterally declared state, Rhodesia has not been engaging in international intercourse with other s·tates. One obvious illustration is that Rhodesia has an accredited representative in South
Africa without being recognized by S~th Africa.
5.

RHODESIA AND THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION-AN APPRAISAL

In international relatj.ons, states and other subjects of international law

have basic rights and duties in the conduct of their affairs with ·one
another. 1 Often the question arises whether an unrecognized State (such
as Rhodesia) can have rights and duties under international law. The
answer to this problem is closely linked, to some extent, with the
theories concerning the nature and function of recognition in international law.
. The .theories in relation to-admission to the.international ·community
follow·opposite conceptions:
1. The constitutive school: According to this school, a personality in
23. Also the Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
November 17, 1966, implicitly upholding a duty upon member states to recognize
the former status of RhodeSia, and not to recognize the regime which had come
into being after the unilateral declaration of independence.
24. See, Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, ·paragraph 3.
1. Montevideo Convention, 1933.
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international law is created througiJ. a legal act, namely. recogniti911
which introduces into relations between a recognized and recognizing
state (or states) .the elements .of rights and obligations. Recognition, 5:0
to speak, creates tile international personality.
.
2. The declaratory ~chool: According to. this school, international
personality pre-exists and the eff~ of recognition is limited to establishing legal relations between the two parties concerned beca\l$e a new
state. (as shown by the fact that it already. exists and exercises power
over a territory) is already .a member . of the community of nations
and·under the protection of international law. ·
.
The Soviet tl:ieory and practice of recognition ten~ more to~ards the·
declaratory school. This .derives from ·the pre.mise that the creation .of
th,e state .is the ~ction of internal law rather than ihat of iiiterna:..
tionallaw. V. M. Koretsky, making his contribution as a member of
the International Law Commission in 1949, -'wondered whether it was
necessary to set down the requirements for statehood, since witil .t hat
time the declarative method in conjunction with diplomatic recognition
had sufficed'.
.
.·
.
l[e opposCd any n~w prop~al which woul~ be a check 0~ th~ iegit~acy of the birth · of a new - state by · postulating recognition . $8
authorising existence; and any proposal which would introduce a new
criterion transferring to the international community a power which
rightly belonged to the people. That super-authority would be substituted for the principles of international law and.he could not support
that question. Only the sovereign people created the state; therefore he
felt that the people's sense of sovereignty woul~ object to that .p roposal,
since-it overlooked their fundamental right to choose in complete fre,edo~ the government they desired. 2 . . .
·
.
.
.
.
.. According to Mr. Koretsky, 'the establishment of a state was a matter of ~unicipallaw. The. supremacy of international law was a·.-concept invented. in an attempt to set up a supreme authority and should
.·
be rejected'.-l
Another Soviet jurist and former member of the International La.;
Commission, G. I. Tonkin was also opposed to concepts, provisions or
d~finitions whi~h would .suggest .t hat the legal personality of a ·state
was dependent upon international law. 4 The arguments of the ·Soviet
Year book of International Law Commission, 1949~ p. 85.
3. Ibid., op. cit., 194~, p. 95.
.
.
.
. ~· See, Yearbook of the internatioMI Law Commission, 1962, p, 241, Sc;e also~
Ibid., n.c 1965, p. 25.
:
.
. . .. .. -

. 2.
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authors mentioned here have something to do ~th criteria for. statehood
in, international law discussed before, although in their observations,
they fail to distinguish clearly the existing diffe~;ences.
It . is of interest tQ review what some well-known Western . jurists
think about the problem of recognition. Brierly 5 thought the conclusion
that the unr~ state b.&$ neither rights nor duties in interD..!ltional law 'might be startling', e.g., an intervention otherwise illegal,
might be legal. Non-recognition may cert&Wy make the enforcement
of rights _and duties more difficult than it would otherwise. ~. but the
p~cti~ of stale!> does not support the view that they have no legal
existence before recognition.
.
Briggs 6 holds that a state is bound to observe the principles of internation!ll law also tOwards those states which it has not recognized.
The Charter of the Organization of American States, 1948 7 says that
even before recognition a state h~ the right tQ defend its integrity and
independence, to provide for _its preservation ~d prosperity, to organize
itself as it sees fit, to legislate concerning its interests, to administer its
services and to determine the jurisdiction and competence of its co~.
It appears that the gener~ view among Western jurists ~ that recogni,tion is of no relevance for the granting of rights and duties which
international law prescribes for a state. 8
H. Lauterpacht' put forward a new theory on recognition. While
generally he favoured the constitutive theory, he alleged that if a state
meets the test of independent statehood, other subjects of j.nternational
law have a duty to recognize it. Naturally, if this view is correct, Rhodesia is entitled to recognition. However, his view seems to be at ;variBJICe with much of state practice which, we submit here, is of prime
evidential value in the formulation of international law.
It is quite clear that the practice of most states tends to treat recognition as a matter of policy and not a matter of law. A state in the
formulation of its policy, decides whether or no.t to recognize. Recog5. Op. cit., pp. 138-139.

6. See, Yearbook of the ILC, 1962, p. 101; see also Starke, An Introduction to
International Law, Sth edn., p. 124.
·
7. Art. 7.
8. ~tarke, op. cit., p . .141, says it gets .'full privileges of membenhip of the
international community'. See also, the Charter of the Qrganization of AmeJican
States, Art. 10. 'Recognition implies ••• the personality of the new State with all
tho rights and duties that international law prescribes •.•' See also, Oppenheim,
op. cit., p. 121.
_9. H. Lauterpacbt, Recognition In lnternatio_nal Law, 1947, pp. 'JQC, 442:
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nition· appears to be entirely discretionary. The fact that recognition· is
a ·matter of policy and not of law as- such seems to be more hi· harmony·
with the declaratory theory,. which,. we submit, -is the theory to. be
preferred .because it agrees more with the practice of states. However,
we do not go so far as to share the opinion that as soon · as an entity
has the marks of a state it is a full meinber of the family of nations
and therefore entitled to treatment as such. This view is obviously an
exaggeration. 10 Schwarzenberger 11 draws attention to the fact tllat international personality may· be unlimited "(full capacity) as in the case of
sovereign and independent states, or restricted (limited capacity). He
gives the following examples of the latter: international protectorates, 12
states in the process of colonial evolution, free cities, diminutive
states, u the Holy See, 1• international institutions, 15 and in certaiil. case5
even individuals. 16
·
·
·
In the above cases there is recognition as an international person,
though for limited purposes. Is it ·possible then that an unrecognized
state may also enjoy a limited international personality-with the capacity to enjoy some rights and carry o~t . some duties in international
law? On the other hand, recognition withheld on purely policy grounds
ought not to be allowed to deprive an entit}r of its rights ·as a state if in
fact it is one.
··

6.

DUTY TO RECOGNIZE

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we come to the conclusion that
there is no duty under international law which places an obligation·
upon the subjects of that law to recognize a ·state, even if. it meets the
test of independent statehood; 17 and if such a duty does not exist under
10. See, for example; Hall, op. cit., pp. 9-10:
11. Op. cit., p. 47 (Schwarzenberger).
12. Ibid., p. 54.
13. Schwarzenberger, op. cit., p. SS.
14. Ibid.·, p. 71.
15. Ibid., p. 72.
16. Ibid., p. 73.
17. · Schwarzenberger, · op: cit., p. 62; Oppenheim, 'op. cit:; Brierly, op. cit.,
pp. 139-140; Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in the
United States, 2nd edition, vol. 1. p. 160; Hackworth, Digest' of International Law,
vol. 1, p. 161; De Visscher, Theory and Reality in International Law, 1957. (translated by P. E. Corbett), p. 228; Hall, International Law (8th edn.), p. 103'; For

the practice of the United States,· see Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol.
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international law, Rhodesia is not entitled as of right to recognition
by other states. If Lauterpacht were correct, it would follow that the
States of DDR, Israel, People's Republic of Chlna; and North Korea
would be entitled to recognition. The fact that a varying number of
states do not recognize them would appear to indicate clearly that state
practice is against this view. On the other hand, it is important to point
out that there are cases when there may be a duty not to recognize a
new entity as a state·in the meaning of international law. If for example, an entity secedes from its mother-state, premature recognition of
the new entity may be an international wrong against the mother-state.
It may constitute constructive intervention.
The question arises, when is recognition of an entity as a state
premature and when is it proper? There are various factors which may
indicate that recognition, if accorded, would no longer be premature,
e.g., if the rev:olutionary .state has utterly defeated the mother-state;
if the mother-state is apparently incapable of bringing ~e revolutionary
state back under its control.
Thus, when the South American Colonies of Spain declared their
independence in 1810, no power recognized them for many years.
When it became apparent that Spain, although still maintaining its
claims, was not able to bring them under its sway, the United States of
America recognized them in 1822, and later the United Kingdom followed in 1824 and 1825. 18

7.

THB INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF RHODESIA

The mere fact that Rhodesia is a state does not suggest or mean that
it is automatically a full international person. It also does not presuppc)se that it is a full-fledged subject of international law ipso facto.
1, pp. S-8, 10, 13; For the practice of the Soviet Union, ibid., pp. 13-14; Orzybowaky, Soviet Public International Law, Doctrine.s. and J?iplomatic pra~tlce,
Leiden, 1970, pp. 69-73; For the practice of the Umted Kingdom, see, Bnggs,
op. cit., p. 102; See too, Chen, The International Law of Recognition (1951);
H. Lauterpacht's theory has been criticised. See for example, Cohn, 64 LQR,

pp. 404-408; Briggs, Recognition of States, Some Reflections on Doctrine and
Practice; 43, American JoUTIUII of International Law, 1949, pp. 113-121; Jessup,
A Modem Law of Nations (1948), p. 55; Kunz, 'Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's Recognition in International Law'; 44 American Journal of International
Law (1950), p. 719 points out that even Lauterpacht has to admit that he cannot
find a clear statement in the practice of states in favour of a duty to recognize.
18. See, Oppenheim, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
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One of the most practical and important criteria of personality in international law, is the capacity to enter Into international agreements
with states and other subjects of international law, and the ability to
bear rights and obligations emerging therefrom. How far Rhodesia
satisfies this condition is not clearly known. However, one cannot
deny that she is in de facto control of the territory. According to Dr.
John Basset Moore, 19 'the origin and organization of government are
questions generally of internal discussion and decision. Foreign Powers
deal with the existing de facto government, when sufficiently established to give reasonable assurance of its permanence, and of the acquiescence of those who constitute the state in its ability to maintain itself, and discharge its intemal duties and its extemal obligations'. 70
The same principle is advanced by Profess~r· Borchard 2 ' who .states
that, ' ... The legality or constitutional · legitimacy of a de facto
government is without importance internationally so far as the matter
of representing the state is concerned.'
It needs to be pointed out that in state practice, states for certain
policy considerations desist from making a formal public statement 'of
recognition of a new state or entity, while at the same time their conduct tends to imply recognition. Even though up to now no state has
expressly recognized Rhodesia, the positions of South Africa and the
United Kingdom deserve attention.
Since the unilateral declaration of independence, the South African
Government had continued to allow normal trade relations with Rhodesia. Some jurists, particularly South Africans and their sympathisers,
try to justify the existing trade relations between South Africa and
Rhodesia from the standpoint that in international law, the principle
exists that a government is not responsible for acts of its individual
citizens. They reason that such actions on the part of private individuals cannot compromise the attitude of the South African government
in the matter of Rhodesian recognition. This stand is not convincing
and is open to argument. It is known that the normal ·trade relations
which exist between Rhodesia and_the Republic of South Mrica since
. 19. Dr. John Basset Moore, Digest of International Law, Washington, 1906,
vol. l.s. 78, p. 249.
20. Tinoco Concessions case, Great Britain - Costa Rica Arbitration (1923) 1.
United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards; 1948- - 369 (IUAA).
Moore regarded this principle as one which has had such universal acquiescence
as to become well settled international law.
21. Borchards, The DiplomGtic Protection of Citizens Abroad, New York,
1951, pp. 206-207.
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the Unilateral declaration of · independence seem to be manned by
private South African citizens ~d .companies. It is only a matter of
guess-work. what .amount of the South African government's. quo~ of
capital is involved in that country's ·trade in oil as well as. other business
concerns with foreign states, Rhodesia .in particular. To entrust certain
extemal trade activities into the hands of private persons, ~sociations
and companies will, no doubt, give some leeway ~o the South African
authorities when explaining their position in the event of any international criticism;
.
As Stanley Uys rightly pointed out, 'An examination of Dr. Verw.o erd's statements since the UDI shows that he has been ·entirely
consistent in a ·cunning sort of way: while proclaiming official 'noninvolvemeq.t', · he has given ~ the go ahead to private traders, organiza. tions and individuals tQ. carry oQ.· trade with ·~odesia'. 22 This was pre7
cisely the policy of the South African go\'ernment under Dr.. Verwoerd.
There appears to be no chang~ in the policy of the subsequent government led by Mr. Vorster. 23
· While addressing the South African P~liament on the stand of his
Government in the Rhodesian crisis, on 25 January 196.6, Dr. Verwoerd said: 'I now tum to the question of petrol and oil supplies for
Rhodesia. Here we continue to follow the fundamental pljnciples we
have laid down, namely, that we could not in any way or form participate in boycotts or sanctions. H there are producers or traders who
hav.e oil or petrol .to sell, whether to .this country or the Portuguese or
Basutoland or Rhodesia or Zambia, then it is thCir business and we do
not interfere. We do not prevent them from selling. H we were to try
to prevent them, we woUld be partieipating in boycott'. 24
' On ·April 4, in a post-general election broadcast, Dr. Verwoerd repeated that So_uth Africa did not ta)te part i.r) any measures directed
by. any state or group of states agai.r).st any other, such ~ boycotts or
sanctioDS.. In other statements he made betweeq. January 25 and
April 4, he said that 'normal trade' for South Africa included not only
normal trade, . but also the. provision of items, such as petrol, which
South Africa had .never previously exported to RJ;J.odesia, .and any
. . 22. Stanley Uys, Dr. Verwocrd's HigJ:J. Stakes, Spectator, April 15, 1966, p. 457.
23. Tho Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Verwoerd was assassinated on
7 September 1966. Seven days later, September 14, 1966, he was sua;~ded in
office by Mr. John Vorster, the former Minister of Justice.
.. . . .
.24. ExcerpJ , from. Dr. Verw.oerd's parliamentary statement of January 25,
1966, as !QUOted by Stanley Uys· in 'Dr. Verwoerd's High ·Stakes', SpectGtor,
April15, 1966, p. 457.

95

additional trade that might arise as a result of South African firms
competing for new Rhodesian customers, further, he advised captains
of South African ships not to disclose their cargoes if intercepted. 25
From Dr. Verwoerd's Parliamentary statement of January 25, 1966,
and the .other subsequent statements quoted above, 26 the following conclusions must be drawn, namely:
1. That the pronouncements have undoubtedly rendered useless the
argument that the actions of the individual citizens of South Africa in
perpetuating trade with Rhodesia cannot compromise the position of
the South African Government on the Rhodesian dispute in general.
2. That they have disproved the assumption (optimistically entertained in certain diplomatic circles) that 'non-involvement' meant 'noninvolvement'; it meant in fact that while Dr. Verwoerd'sJ government
was officially neutral towards UDI, the rest of South Africa could
commit itself as much as it wanted.
3. That the other assumption, namely that Dr. Verwoerd's January
25 statement to Parliament may have been made under election pressure, and that after the general election on March 30, he would come
round, has fallen to the ground because of his statement of April 4. Besides, Dr. Verwoerd's notice served on the United Nations not to try
to divert him from his course shows that his true position was to continue to allow South African interests to assist Rhodesia as much as
possible.
The next interesting point worth commenting on is the existence of
an accredited representative of the Government of Rhodesia in South
Africa. What is the legal consequence of this fact? It should be remarked
that as a general rule of customary international law, the establishment
of diplomatic relations between two states will imply recognition. 71
What exists between South Africa and Rhodesia is consular relations.
Under intematidnallaw, the establishment of consular relations between two states can only imply recognition if there is an issue of the
instrument of consular exequator. Even though it does appear that, so
far, the current representatives of Rhodesia in South Africa fall short
of this, we believe that what actually matters as regards the real situation of affairs, is what such Rhodesian representatives are permitted to
do within the South African territory. For us, the fact that the persons
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Starke. op. cit., p. 128; Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 143. It may, however, be
vicariously liable for certain acts which are injurious to another State, Oppen:
heim, op. cit., pp. 330-331.
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representing Rhodesia in the Republic of South Africa are allowed to
carry out official consular functions may, depending on exactly what

these are, be sufficient evidence to assume that the recognition of Rhodesia by South Africa is in fact inexpressly accorded.
To our mind, the best way to throw more light to the legal nature
of the Rhodesian representation in the Republic of South Africa is by
quoting the relevant excerpt of an official letter addressed to us by
the South African Embassy at the Hague to this effect dated 30, July
1973 in which the following was stated: 'The Union of South Africa
and Rhodesia exchanged High Commissioners in 1951. This representation was continued during the Federation of Rhod~ia and Nyasaland
when this state came into existence. On South Africa leaving the Commonwealth, she insisted on the South African representation in the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland having the same status as other
Commonwealth countries. This request could not be complied with but
the appointment of an Accredited Diplomatic Representative to the
Federation was agreed upon. He would rank immediately after the
High Commissioners of the Commonwealth countries. The Federation reciprocated by making a similar appointment in the Republic.
After the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, the status quo was
maintained with Southern Rhodesia.
The Accredited Diplomatic Representative is appointed by a letter
of appointment to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the receiving state,
signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the sending State.
On the South African Diplomatic List, the Accredited Diplomatic
Representative of Rhodesia ranks immediately after the Charge's d'Affaires en titre.' 21
8. THE RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE DISPUTE: THE BRITISH POSITION (00
THE ABORTIVE ANGLD-RHODESIAN 'TALKS' IMPLY RECOGNITION?)
Since the unilateral declaration of the independence of Rhodesia, the
Government of the United Kingdom has at different times and stages
conducted 'talks' or 'negotiations' with the representatives of the
Government of Rhodesia. These 'talks' have been mostly described as
exploratory in nature, in order to see if there are grounds upon which
subsequent 'negotiations' for a settlement could proceed. They have
28. It must be held from the above that a c:Iear element of recognition of the
Rhodesian Government by the South African State is evident.

97

been conducted at different levels and are ·too many·to·be ·_enumerated
here. However, it is essential to mention that. the ·most important of
these series of talks were those of the ·'Tiger' and 1Fearless'. Apart
from the fact that the leaders of· the two governments participated ih
these talks, the other representatives from·both parties· iricluded the top·
most government officials.
Could such 'talks' ·or 'negotiations' imply recognition de facto of
Rhodesia by the United Kingdom? It is a general .rille onntemational
law· that while diplomatic relations normally imply recognition, initiation of 'ilegotiation.S' with a hitherto ·unreCognized entity does .no~
necessarily do so. 29 In all types of ·iniplied recognition, it is of .paramount importanCe to oonsider the intentions of the party whose conduct
is·subject to scrutiny. 30 EffortS ought to be made to establish ·what· purpose is behind such moves. "If it is evident -enough b'eyond doubt that 'i f
an intention to recognize can be. implied ·from such ,•negotiations' or
'talks', there will be recognition but otherwise not.·.Thus, for example,
negotiations with: an entity for the purpose .of prote91ing·Iives ·will not
usually imply recognition. 31
·
It does ·appeilr that in the case of Rhodesia ·there has obviously
been no intention to recognize on the part of the United Kingdom for
the following reasons: the discussions have been described -as· 'explora"
tory talks'. Secondly, the United Kingdom ha5 expressly ·reserved· jts
position by making it clear that the talks do not imply condonation of
Rhodesian independenCe. It is not right also to suggest that the draft
agreements between United Kingdom and Rhodesia during these talks
automatically tantamounts to recognition of Rhodesia by Britain. It
is, therefore, apparent that it may be incorrect to assert· that ·the United
Kingdom has by its conduct recognized the state of Rhodesia de facto.
At the same time, the results of the legal battles on the Rhodesian
crisis up till now, those carried out under ·thtf alispices of ·the ·united
Nations Organization and its organs, and within Rhodesia itself, show
the British Government's inability to bring the Rhodesian independence

conflict under . control. It is worthwhile reviewing some of these
battles.
By a resolution.Jl passed at the United Nations on April 1966 on
Rhodesia,·· implicit. action was recommended against Rhodesia under
Chapter Vll of the United Nations Charter. The resolution advocated
the use of force under Article 42. The main purpose of the resolution
was to give the British Government United Nation's authority and support to make existing sanctions effective, that government having
preferred to act through the United Nations and to risk every sort of
diplomatic frustration in the attempt
On November· 11, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly's
Trusteeship Committee adopted a resolution calling on Britain to use
force ·to overthrow the one-year old Rhodesian regime. The vote on the
draft - spons<>red by 54 Afro-Asian and East European countries was 94 to 2 with 17 abstentions (Portugal and South Africa cast the
negative votes).
Furthermore, the factual situation in Rhodesia appears to expose the
relatively weak position of the United Kingdo~. This position · was
comprehensively investigated by the Rhodesian Appellate Division in
Madzimba Mut9 v. Lardner-Burke and Another. 33 Beedle, C. J., made
the following findings in this case:
· 'The factual position in Southern Rhodesia today may therefore now
be summed up as follows: The present Government is in complete administrative and legislative control of the country and is continuing to
main~ the existing courts of law, whose orders it is enforcing. None
of the legislative acts of the United Kingdom has been recognized or
enforced in the country since the Declaration of Independence.' 34
'I am satisfied that few well-informed persons living- in Rhodesia at
the moment would disagree with the statement that the territory bas
been effectively governed during the past two years even though some
may disapprove of the form of government. H the territory has been
effectively governed, the question to be asked is: by whom? Certainly

-29. - Starke, op. cit., p. 12$; Wbi~an, op. cit.,_pp. 5~:,-584: Ther~ _are many
acts which may safely be performed without an implica~on of .recognition being
drawn, e.g., giving relief to victims .of disaster, informal calls on officials, iD.formal diplomatic approaches, informal communications, · conduct .o f routine
matters, postal agreements, main~g an agency, prot~g -because- .of all
outrage and dealing with postal orders issued by an unrecognized entitY. Ibid.,
526,529,530,531,532,567,577,578,595.
30. Starke, op cit., p. 127. ·
31. Schwarzenberger, op. cit., p. 64; Whiteman, op. cit., p.:524.

32. The Guardian, April 11, 1966.
33. 1968 (2) S. A. 284; It must be recalled that on September 10th," 1966, two
judges, Justice Lewis and Mr. Justice Goldin, while declaring that the Smith
Government was not the legal government of the country, and that the 1965
'independence' constitution was not lawful, still dismissed the application of two
political detainees Mr. Drmiel Madzimba Muto and Mr. Leo Baron, who sought
their release on the grounds that the government which detained them was illegal.
The Judges baSed their rejection on the ground that Smith's government was the
effective and de facto government in Rhodesia.
34. Ibid., pp. 306-307.
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not by the Government of the United Kingdoll). or anyone purporting
to govern under the 1964 constitution.' 35
_
' ... A conclusion must be reached as to whether the present Government "seems" likely to continue in control or whether one can go
further and say with confidence that it "is" firmly established. On the
evidence, I come without hesitation to the conclusion that the present
Government will continue in · control, because I cannot see that any
other possibility "seems" at all Iikely.'36
In the same case, the Court held, too, that decisions of the Privy
Council would no longer have effect in Rhodesia. n If the facts are such;
then we can state that even. though Britain's 'exploratory talks' with
Rhodesif4. do not imply recognition, nevertheless, the weight of evidence tOtally exposes Britain's inability to bring the crisis to an end
with an honourable settlement acceptable to both the African majority
and the minority white population of Rhodesia.

9.

THE ANGLQ-RHODESIAN AGREEMENT

The Conservative British Government led by its Prime Minister Ed:..
ward Heath made the latest effort to resolve the Rhodesian dispute.
This was through the Angl6-Rhodesian agreement, the provisions of
which were to be put before the Rhodesian people by a high-powered
~mmission set up by the British Government. The Commission was
headed by Lord Pearce. 31 Although the agreement as well a5 its implementation proved abortive, it is considered necessary to reflect on its
nature in view of the arguments which have been advanced from
certain quarters to the effect that the agreement amounted to an implied recognition of the Rhodesain regime by Britain.
After the election of the Conservative Government to power in
BriWn in June 1970, Sir Alec Douglas Home, announced a new attempt to negotiate with Rhodesia under the five pri:ilciples. Lord Good35. Ibid., at p. 321.
36. Ibid., at p. 325.
37. 1968 (2) S.A. 457.
38. Lord Pearce was former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, who after his retirement in 1969 became independent chairman of the Press Council and chairman
of .the Appeal's Committee of the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. His
Commission which consisted of the Chairman, three deputy chairmen · and 11
Commissioners and later increased to 18 was to test whether· the settlement agreement would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia 'as a whole' in terms of the
British Government's 'five principles.".
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man led the first of five talks missions ·to Salisbury to prepare the
grolJ!ld for . an Anglo-Rhodesian summit in April 1971. On november
15, 1971, Sir Alec-Douglas Home and a British team of 27 arrived
in the Rhodesian capital Salisbury for talks.
An agreeme'nt was officially signed in Salisbury on November 24,
1971. In a press statement issued immediately afterwards it was announced that British and Rhodesian delegations had 'reached agreement on proposals designed to bring to an end the constitutional
dispute between the two Countries' and that these proposals would be
'submitted to the Rhodesian people through a test of acceptability .. .' 39
The above. agreement was followed by an exchange of notes on
financial matters concerning Rhodesia's frozed ~sets in London and its
foreign debts. •
As we pointed out before, certain acts exist under international law
which "COuld be carried out without an implication of recognition being
drawn. To deduce from an act the existence of an implied recognition,
it is essential to study th~ conduct of the party in question and to consider ·the ·intentionS of such a party. Let us therefore try ta contrast
the Labour Government's stand on the issue of Rhodesian independence dispute with that of the Conservative Government
It is clear that obvious differences exist in their manner of handling
the slUlle problem. The 'talks' or 'negotiationS' carried out between the
representatives of the Rhodesian Government and the representatives
of the British Labour Government were clearly described as 'exploratory.'.- The intention in this case was to see if the basis of negotiating
a settlement could be found There was no formal agreement reached
on the.settlement pattern.
.Jn the case of. the Conservative Government's initiative the existence
of a basis ·for settling the dispute was not in question. It was on this
basis that an agreement was negotiated by the accredited representatives of both governments, which was later signed by the Prime Minister of Rhodesia and the British Foreign Secretary. It follows that
Britain impliedly recognized the Rhodesian regime as the de facto
39. ·see, Keesing's Contemporary .A.rchlve.r, December 11-18, 1971, p. 24983.
The terms of the Agreement, were embodied in a White Paper entitled: Rhodesia - P.roposau for a settlement, published in London on November 26, 1971.
40. Exchange of notes fall within the term international agreements. Though
they are not a single formal instrument nor usually subject to ratification, yet are
certainly agreements to which law of treaties applies. However, im exchange of
notes, although nomially not subject to ratification, is sometimes made so ·by
express provision in the notes exchanged.
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authority in the country; and ·could have gone ·further to grant· her: de
jure recognition ·if the terms .of the agreement were accepted by the
majoritY of the Rhodesiarrpeople.
·

10. THE'·SCOPE ·OF .PARTICIPATION OF NONRECOGNIZED STAT~ IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
·T he observation we made in the introductory part of this section· of our
discussion- .that the: absence of ·recognition of a state by the .other
subjects or actors of international law results consequently in such a
nonrecognized state :.Jiving its life in a more or less isolation from
others, should not be construed as meaning, ipso facto, that the con:.
cept· of nonrecognition is a passive ·state of affairs. Far from -that. It
does not follow, therefore; that such an unrecognized state is completely inactive.
It should be bome in mind that an unrecognized state or regime is a
political animal irrespeCtive of lack of recognition..It is· not a dormant
organism. Since it is not, it engages upon international relations' and
establishes contacts with ilonrecognizing states (a5 of right). so far as
i.ts situation permits. There is no denying the fact that it represents a
factor ·in international life with the same aspirations and just in the
same way as a fully-recognized state or government does. ·
So far, ·international law has not settled enough as to define ·the
scope of ·contacts which states· are permitted to engage in their relationship with .the unrecognized states and governments.
The subject of treaty (bilateral as well as multilateral) and · other
relations with·· unrecognized states and governments is narrowly interwoven with the doctrine of implied recognition. 41 Though there does not
seem·.to be a general ci>nsensus on the competence of unrecognized
regimes to enter into bilateral treaty-relations, it does appear that the
most recent pronouncement .on this issue with which we are conversant
remains that of the American Law. Institute which stated that unrecognized authorities cannot bind a state internationally. 42 If this assertion
were. to be . true, jt ~ou,14 look as if .states have frequently -sinned
against the rule proposed by the institute. To our mind, the participation of an unrecognized state in a bilateral treaty clearly confirms not
.

.

41.. Bot, B. R., op. eit.~ ·at·p. 29. ·
· '42. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law. The Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. Proposed Official Draft (1962) n. 1, at 377.
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only the de facto status of the authorities there in power,' but also the
existence of a separate entity, responsible for the proper execution of
the· treaty· proYisions within. . its · territory. In our view, nothing precludes· a no~gnized state from actively participating in. intemational·relations'U only the entity hu the capacity to do so. 41
The participation of unrecognized . states in international relations
occur in the following fomis, namely:
~nter· into bilateral
agreements with regimes they do ·not in the least intend to· recognize.
But then, if it·js accepted that a ·bilateral treaty is ·a formal instrument
wJiich acknowledges the capacity of the parties to bind their respective
statest ·the co'nclusion would inevitably be that a nonrecognizirig state
will hardly enter iii.to such ··contacts ·.with· a nonrecogniZed regime
without :'the ··intention to recognize; •either immediately or after a
relatively·short lapse of time.
·
· · , .. ·
··
.

.a. Bilateral treaties: Governments do; in practice

..

~ ~,

..

.

:

b. Multilat~ral treaties: Unrecognized· states also participate .in multilateral' treaties; Egen, though participation in a multilateral treaty· does
not per se mean active intereourse with all the parties thereto, · it .can
hardly be denied that there' exists an implied recognition of the ability
of the unrecog'lfized state to carry out the rights and obligations resulting from ·such· a treaty'. Qn. the other han~ when multilateral treaties
would· require unairlmous approval of the origin~ signatories for acceptance of a new member, and the new member happens· to be a suite
or.:government not recogDized by ·some of the partits~ then co-signature
of .petrirl.ssion to :adhere may amount to reoognition.
·

c: .Othet:relatioru: Relations with unrecognized states and governments
transcend treaty relations. Trade agreements; for example; may result

in ·an. :exchaiige of trade missions or even of consuls. · One may not be
too wrong to interprete the establishment of a trade· mission' and con. sular service 'with ·extensive powers as a first step· towards recognition.
.· One can only conclude from the above that unrecognized· states· are
states and that consequently they have the capacity to enter into
bilateral ·or multilateral treaty ·relations. Above all; they .can participate .in ot11er forms of relations. In short they have international legal
personality.
··
·' · ·
·
·
·
·
·
·

43. The capacity we have in mind here is not necessarily legal capacity.
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11.

CONCLUSION

There is considerable reason to support the thesis that a new state may
come into being without recognition by other states. In general, it is
admitted that an unrecognized state cannot be completely ignored in
international law. It would be incorrect to regard the territory of such
a state as belonging to nobody. Other states have no right to violate the
territory of the unrecognized state, nor would it be right to consider
ships flying its flags as stateless. 44
It is a fact that many states do not recognize the German Demo~ratic Republic. It is also a fact that several states though they do not
bfficially recognize her, accept that it has become a party to the ·Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963, by signing the copy of the treaty deposited with the Government of the Soviet Union, 45
Unrecognized states, therefore, are bound to observe universally
recognized rules of international law just as recognized states. For
example, reference can be made to the statements made by the United
Kingdom and United States Government on occasions when they have
claimed compensation from the Formosa and Peking regimes respectively for damage caused to Britain and United States interests. 46
The American Law Institute, has adequately summed up State practice in this field by providing that a regime which is not recognized as
a state but meets certain requirements as to effective control of a defined territory and population has the rights and also the obligations
of a State under international law. 47
Article 1, paragraph 3 of the resolution of the Institute of International Law of 23 April1963 on recognition of new States and Governments provides: '(that) the existence of the new state with all the legal
effects connected with that existence is not affected by the. refusal of
one or more States to recognize.' 41
The conclusion should be that unrecognized states are states and that
consequently they have the capacity to conclude treaties, in short they
have international legal personality. It follows that Rhodesia ranks
among the entities which are endowed with statehood under interna44. For statements on such questions, see Whiteman, Digest of lnterMtioMl
Law, vol., 2, para. 69, pp. 604.
45. Lauterpacht ed., Brltlsch Practice in lnterMtioMl Law, 1963, 11, p. 90.
46. Whiteman, Digest, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 648-52.
47. The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, the Foreign RelatioM Law of the United State.s (May 1962), pt-11 'Recognition', pp. 385-387,
391-392.
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tionallaw. Therefore, international law should apply to its activities as
it does in the case of other subjects of international law.
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the mere possession
of the essential criteria for statehood under international law does not
necessarily preclude any subject of the law from collective action against
such an entity'in certain circumstances if the World Community thinks
this is desirable in the interest of international peace. Such an action
can be carried out through a competent organ like the United Nations
Organization whose major task includes the preservation of fundamental human rights amongst the nations of the world.
H third states are subjected to material suffering resulting from the
terrorist activities of the Sinith regime, such affected states could
singly or in union intervene somehow. It is known that thousands of
black Rhodesians have fled to nearby African countries like Zambia
and Tanzania to take refuge as a result of the activities of the Rhodestan government. Undoubtedly, the presence of such great number of
refugees in the territories of these states have adverse effect on their
already limited econoinic strength.
Just as India (rightly or wrongly) intervened in the case of Bangladesh, 49 arguing that her economic stability was adversely threatened by
the inflock of refugees from Bangladesh into India, so may be the African countries affected in the case of Rhodesia intervene singly or collectively to check the situation.
·

48. Annuaire, vol. 39, ii, 1936, p. 300.
49. Supra, chapter 8.
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PartE

6. The status and tre~ty-making
capacity of organs of national
liberation movements~

1.

INTllODUCTORY REMARKS

•... The range of subjects of international law is not rigidly and immutably circumscribed by any definition of the nature of international
law but is capable of modification and development in accordance with
the requirements of international intercourse.' 1
The message which Sir Hersch Lauterpacht conveys in the above
observation is clear. It is a call for realism. It calls for a recognition
of the fact of the proliferation of new types of entities which have
been brought about by the nature of modem international relationships. Above all, it is a call for the development of the law applicable
to the emerging multifarious new types of international entities.
The question of National Liberation Movements (i.e.,· nations and
peoples 3 who are fighting to set up independent and sovereign states of
their own) is undoubtedly one of the hard facts of contemporary international life with which international law is concerned. The role of
these movements is slowly but surely on the increase and has significant impact on the whole structure of international law.
But, unfortunately, the issue of their international legal personality
1. By the use of the term 'Organs of National Liberation Movements' in this
context, we mean to cover all titles - mainly provisional in character which
people have often adopted to designate and describe their governmental machinery during the period of their lltruggles to establish sovereign and independent
states. Though these titles, as will be observed, may be different, nevertheless,
they are the same in esseoc:e.
2. Hersch Lauterpacht, lntematioMI Law, Collected papers, Vol. 1, p. 137,
Cambridge University Press, 1970.
3. The notion 'peoples' as used hero should be understood in its broadest
sense to take into account all peoples, large and small and whether living in
colonial territories or not. Other peoples living in an area which was geographically distinct and ethnically or culturally different from the remainder of the
state, should with adequate safeguards be covered by this term.
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and their treaty-making capacity, if any, have not received adequate
attention in legal literature. Leaving aside international organizations and one or two particular institutions such as the Papacy, the view
that entities other than States can be subjects of international law has
been denied by many, and the effects of this position continue to linger,
in some ways, in existing international law.
As we have previously said, this rigid exclusion of parties other than
States from exercising their functional capacities under international
law appears to be a consequence of the traditional concept of international law which seems obsolete and not useful today. An indisputable truth is that international relationships are becoming more than
just covering the activities between the traditional subjects of international law - i.e., sovereign and independent states.
Our main task in this section of our investigation is to direct our
study to those aspects of the matter which· really require to be esta~
lished in order to warrant the conclusion that organs of national liberation movements should or should not be granted personality in international law; the crux of the matter being whether there is a basis in
law and in fact to justify the activities of peoples fighting to establish
their own independent states and to participate in international relations. Have belligerent parties any personality in international law?
What is the State practice with regard to belligerent parties engaged in
liberation struggles to establish their own governmental authorities?
And, to what degree if any, have they treaty-making capacity?
There are principles of international law which form the main fabric
on which the structure of international relations could be said to rest.
They are closely inter-related both conceptually and from the standpoint of their application in international life. It may not be difficult
therefore, to understand why the United Nations General Assembly
gave much thought to the problem of their successful codification by
setting up a Special Committee for this purpose.
These principles, though they are important, do not find any place
for comments here. Apart from the fact that considerations of space
and scope of our study forbid a general analysis of them, and therefore are unnecessary for our immediate purpose. On the other hand, we
shall focus our attention on the discussion of the principle concerning
equal rights and self-determination of peoples with which we are principally concerned. It is hoped that it will be of some use and above all
interesting to trace briefly the legal history of the United Nations
Codification efforts of this principle in the Special Committee. Possibly, this method of approach will help to clarify the problems at
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issue and reflect on the efforts of divergent policies of States on the
establishment of universal internationai.Jegal norms.
2. THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND THE CODIFICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
PRINCIPL~ OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

a. Introductory considerations
The General Assembly at its seventeenth session by resolution 1815
(XVll) recognized 'the paramount importance, in the progressive
development of international law and in the promotion of the rule of
law among nations, of the principles of international law concerning
friendly relations and co-operation among states and the duties deriving
therefrom, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, which is
the fundamental statement of these principles' and resolved to 'undertake, pursuant to Article 13 of the Charter, a study of the principles of
international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter with a view to their
progressive development and codification, as to secure their more effective application'.
Operative paragraph 1 of the same resolution listed seven 'notable'
principles among which was- 'the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples'. Four of the seven principles were studied by
the General Assembly at its eighteenth session, in accordance with
operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1815 (XVll). At that session the
Assembly adopted resolution 1966 (XVlll), whereby it decided to
establish a Special Committee 4 on Principles of International Law concern.i.Qg Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, which was
requested to study four of the principles and to 'draw up a report
containing, for the purpose of the progressive development and codification of the four principles so as to secure their more effective applica4. The 1964 Special Committee was composed of the following twenty-seven
Meniber States: Argentina, Atistralia, Burma, Cameroon Canada, Czechoslovakia,
Dahomey, France, Ghana Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Madagascar,
Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
Burma was appointed to replace Afganistan, one of the states originally chosen to
serve on the Committee, which had resigned from membership before the Committee session (see A/5689 and A/5727).
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tion, the conclusions of its study and its recommendations'. By the
same resolution, the Assembly decided to consider the report of the
Special Committee and its nineteenth session, and also to study at that
session three other principles including the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples.
b. First United Nations efforts to codify the principles of equal rights
and self-determination
1. The 1964 Special Committee: The Special Committee established
under the General Assembly resolution 1966 (XVITI), referred to
hereafter in the present study as the 1964 Special Committee 5 met in
Mexico City at the invitation of the Government of Mexico, from 27
August to 2 October 1964 and adapted a report of the General Assembly.6 The 1964 Special Committee-discussed a number of principles but
could not deliberate on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
2. The 1966 Special Committee: The principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples were discussed by the Special -Committee
at its fortieth and forty-first meetings on 7 and 11 April respectively
and its forty-third and forty-fourth meetings on 12 and 13 April1966.
During the debate all the representatives recognized the importance of
the principle as proclaimed in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter
and the desirability of codifying it. In connexion with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, three written proposals and one amendment 7 were submitted to the Special Committee.
In those proposals it was emphasized that the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples was no longer merely a moral or
polltical postulate, but had become a recognized and universal principle
of contemporary international law. Today, a full respect for the principle was a pre-requisite for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the development of friendly relations among states, and ecoS. It may be well to point out that in addition to the countries originally
appointed to serve under the Special Committee as indicated in footnote 4 above,
Burma was nominated to join it. This was as a result of the resignation of Mganistan
from the membership before the Committee session (see A 5699 and A 5727).
6. Official Recorda of the General A.nembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes,
agenda items 90 and 94, Doc. A/5746.
7. See, Official Recorda of the G.A., Twenty-first session, Doc. A/6230, parai.
457-460.

nomic, social and cultural progress throughout the world. The Special
Committee debate gave considerable weight to the salient developments
connected with this principle. In ~ ,connexion for exmD;ple, the
French Revolution, the Declaration of Independence procl81Dled by
the United States in 1776, and the writings of various philosophers and
thinkers were cited. 1

c. Relevance of the principle of equal rights and self-determination in
the modem world
There was unanimity of opinion in upholding the view that the principle was closely connected with one of the outstanding even~ of the
present age - the emancipation of colonial peoples, and that 1t therefore applied primarily to the peoples which were still struggling for
independence. The realization of the principle _consti~ted the ~p~
tion and the ultimate goal of countries struggling agamst colomalism
and exploitation. However, it was also rightly pointed out that it would
be wrong to limit it to colonial situations, for a genuine principle of
international law should not be subordinated to, or circumscribed by,
certain contemporary political events which by their very nature were
temporary and transistory. 9 The principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples was rooted in justice and law, and particularly in the right of collective exprc:ssion vested in evet;Y ~uman. group.
Other interesting considerations about the pnnaple med m the
Special Committee concerned the problem of translating the concept of
self-determination into a body of legal rules intended to govem relations between sovereign states.
One group of states stressed that any codification of a legal ?rinciple must necessarily indicate what kind of entity (peoples or nations)
enjoyed the-rights and obligations established by the p~ciple, and _the
conditions and manner in which they were to be exerciSed. In the VIew
of others the formulation of the principle consisted mainly in specifying gene:SUy the conditions of its applicability and in prescri~g? in
general terms,. the legal conditions and consequences of its ~lica~on.
It seems to us however that, give~ that a permanent and umversal nght
to self-determination, based on the Charter of the United Nations
Organization and international practice,. was pr~laimed, .it was abs':
lutely essential to specify who should enJOY that nght, agamst whom 1t
could be invoked and what the conditions were for exercising it.
8. Doc. A/6230, paragraph 463.
9. Doc. A/6230, paragraph 465
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However, the 1966 Special Committee ended its Session without
reaching an agreement on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, In concluding its work, the Drafting Committee
submitted to the Special Committee the following observations:
'1. The Drafting Committee regrets that it has been able to present
agreed formulations only on two of the seven principles referred
to it.
2. The debates in the Special Committee as well as in the Drafting
Committee have greatly contributed to clarifying the problems at
issue.
3. The Drafting Committee established small informal working groups,
one or another of which examined at length each of the seven
principles.
4. The intensive discussions in the Drafting Committee and its working
groups have demonstrated that the difficulties between the various
view points have been materially reduced.
S. Among the factors which hampered the achievement by the Drafting Committee of a greater measure of agreement was lack of sufficient time for additional deliberation and negotiation.' 10
d. Further efforts at codifying

1. The 1967 and the 1968 special committees. In 1967, the Special
Committee met three times 11 and considered the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples. It was noted that this principle was
the basis upon which many of the peoples of Asia,· Africa and other
regions of the world had joined the community of nations as sovereign
and independent States, and it continued to be of great importance to
those still under colonial rule. The view was expressed that national
liberation movements were an outstanding feature of present times. A
people striving for independence was, it was argued, a subject of
international law and was entitled to international protection. A violation of the rights of such people in the struggle was said to be an
international crime and contrary to the purpose of the United Nations. u
The relevant provisions of the proposals before the Special Committee differed in the manner in which they gave expression to the
concept of self-determination. These proposals were submitted in 1966
10. Doc. AIAC.12S/8.
11. The Special Committee met at ita 68th, 69th and 70th sessions on 3, 4
and 7 August 1967.
U. Doc. A/6799, para. 186.
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by the following countries: Czechoslovakia, 13 United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 14 joint proposal by 14 non-aligned countries, 15 United States of America. 16
The proposals submitted by Czechoslovakia and by the non-aligned
countries stated the concept as including the right of all peoples to selfdetermination, while the proposal submitted by the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and by the United States of America provided that every State had the duty to respect the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Besides this, the United
Kingdom proposed the introduction of a provision to the effect that
every State had the duty to implement the principle in regard to the
peoples within its jurisdiction, in as much as the subjection of peoples
to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial
of fundamental human rights, was contrary to the Charter and was an
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation; and that
every State had the duty to accord to those peoples the right freely to
determine their political status and to pursue their social, economic and
cultural development without discrimination as to race, creed or colour.
Those who spoke in favour of the formulation in terms of a ·right of
peoples to self-determination contended that the existence of such a
right was recognized as a rule of contemporary international law and
had been affirmed in a number of resolutions of the General Assembly.
On the other hand, those who preferred the formulation of the concept
of self-determination as a principle to be respected and complied wit\1
by all States, as an obligation upon those States to accord a right to
peoples under their jurisdiction, explained that they opposed the formulation of the concept as a right of peoples primarily because of the
almost insuperable difficulty of defining the meaning of a 'people' possessing the right. In any formulation of the rights and duties, they
contended, the basic question was who was the repositary of the right
or duty. It must be observed here, that it would be absurd to consider
that states were the only beneficiaries of the principle. It was also necessary to indicate how far the right went i.e. its content. Since the
principle is a universal one, it should apply to all peoples and places,
although of course, it is of immediate relevance to those who are still
under colonial domination and are struggling for their independence.
It was also noted in the Special Committee debate that, considered
13.
14.
15.
16.

Doc. A/6230, para. 457.
Doc. A/AC.l2SIL.44, part vL
Doc. A/6230, para. 458.
Ibid., para. 459.
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in its broadest sense, the principle should be regarded as a general and
permanent principle of international law, in the same way in particular
as such other fundamental principles as non-intervention in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state and that of the sovereign
equality of states. 17 A subject of some discussion in the Special Committee was the question as to what should be regarded as constituting
full implementation of the principle. The popular view which we share,
was that the principle could be regarded as fully implemented when the
people concerned had attained the status of a sovereign and independent state. This position is quite satisfactory. At the same time, it
would seem to us that there must be another form of implementation
of the principle depending on given specific circumstances. In our view,
there could be other ways through which a sound measure of what is
involved in the principle can be realized, short of full independence.
The essential consideration is whether the demand of a given people or
nation to assert their right of declaring the nature of their socio-political
status is basically recognized and encouraged. The final word on the
form resides on the people or nation concerned. H, for example, a
nation or people decides to remain within a given sovereign state and
freely accepts to enjoy a reasonable quantum of autonomy, or any
other form of accepted constitutional arrangement which satifies their
needs, 18 and which is based on democratic principles, we should consider that a satisfactory form of implementation of the principle.
Questions cot:tceming the implementation of the principle by a state
with respect to peoples within its jurisdiction were also touched upon.
A good number of the representatives drew attention to the close relationship between the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedom
which, they recalled, was made explicit in Article 55 of the Charter.
In their view, an essential element of this latter principle is the duty of
states to accord to peoples within their jurisdiction the right freely to
determine their political status and to pursue their social, economic and
cultural development without discrimination as to race, creed or colour;
but presumably within the state, on a basis analogous to federation,
since governments can hardly be said to be under a legal obligation
to allow secession.
17. In certain circumstances a direct conflict might well arise between the
principle of self-determination and the other principles here mentioned, formulated in a general way, but we shall come back to this point.
18. The recent case of the people of the Southern part of Sudan is a case in
point.
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The inclusion of this proposed element in the formulation of the
principle of respect for human rights would appear to apply primarily
to ethnic minorities within the jurisdiction of a state, but it would also
apply to an ethnic majority which was oppressed by a minority and
sought the exercise of self-determination. An important relationship
exists between the principle under consideration and ·the principle of
representative government, since the question might arise as to whether
the principle was satisfied if a state denied to certain peoples within
its territory representative government, in violation of the spirit of
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Drafting Committee, having referred the principle to a working
group, o submitted the following report to the Special Committee on
18 August 1967:
·
'The Drafting Committee considered the report of the Working
Group on the principle · of equal rights and self-determinati~n. of
peoples. The areas of agreement in that report were hardly suffictent
to justify. transmitting the report to the Special Committee for its information'.
The 1968 Special Committee session continued to discuss the problems that were before them in 1967. There were no new proposals. On
30 September 1968, the Special Committee adopted the report of. the
Drafting Comlnittee on the principle of equal rights and self-detemunation. According to this report, lack of time made it impossible to carry
out a deep study of the proposals concerning this principle. The Committee recoinmended that, in parallel with continuing work on the
principle of the non-use of force, due priority should continue to be
given to consideration of the proposals submitted to the Special Committee concerning the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peopleS.
2. The. 1969 special ~ommittee. At the 1969 session of the Special
Committee anew proposal211 was added to those submitted to the Special
Committee at its 1966 and 1967 sessions. The Drafting Committee
considered all proposals on the same basis. In view of the close relationship between the various components of the principle, it was under19. Members of the Working Group included representatives of Czechoslovakia, United Kingdom and Japan.
20. The proposal was submitted by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Union
of Soviet Soclaliat Republics. For the text of the proposal, sec Official R~corda
of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth session, Suppl. No. 19 (A/7610),
par.145.
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sto~~ that agreement ~n one particular point would not prejudice the

posttion of members wtth regard to other points or to the statement of
the principle as a whole. 21
Agreement was reached that the first paragraph of the declaration of
the P?nciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples should
contain a general statement of that principle, stressing its universality
and that it should be followed by a second paragraph spelling out
several sub-paragraphs the legal consequences deriving from it. There
was no agreement as to whether rights or duties should appear first in
this formulation. :u
There was agreement on the following statements for inclusion
·
among the sub-paragraphs of a second paragraph:
'Every State has the duty to render assistance to the United Nations
in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter
regarding the implementation of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to contribute to the fulfilment of this
principle in order to promote friendly relations and cooperation among
States'.
'Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any
other State or country'.
Other elements agreed for incorporation in the statement of this
principle are as follows:
'The subjection of peoples to the alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nation.S and is an impediment to
the promotion of world peat;e and co-operation'. a
Items on which agreement was not reached in the 1969 deliberatio~
of the Drafting Committee included the right of peoples' defence
against colonial domination and the rights of peoples to request and to
receive assistance in their struggle; the mode of implementation of the
principle; implementation of the principle by a State with respect to
p~pl.es within its jurisdiction and the criteria for applicability of the
pnnctple.
It was generally believed that a solid foundation had been laid for
the future formulation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination.

u;

21. Doc. Supplement No. 19 (A/7619), at page 63.
22. Doc. Supplement No. 19 (A/7619), at page 63.
23. Ibid.
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3. The 1970 Special Committee. The Special Committee on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States met in Geneva from 31 March to 1 May 1970. 24 This
meeting was in fulfilment of resolution 2533 (XXIV) of 8 December
1969 of the General Assembly at its 24th session. The resolution requested the Committee to try and bring its work of codification of the
principles of international law to a successful end so as to enable the
General Assembly to adopt the final instrument during its 25th session marking the 25th anniversary of the inception of the United Nations Organization.
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
drafted by the Special Committee and adopted finally by the General
Assembly at its 25th session, which is hereby reproduced in extensio,
states:
'By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and
to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of
the principles, in order:
a. to promote friendly relations and co-operation among states; and
b. to bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind
that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as denial of
fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
24. Official Records of the General Assembly, 25th session, Supplement
.
No. 18 (A/8018).
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principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible
action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination,
such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has,
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory or
State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the
Charter sJiall exist until the people of the colony or non-self-governing territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, .
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign
and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed
or colour.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any
other State or country."

3. THB QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OP NATIONAL
LmERATION MOVBMENTS: 25 THB SOVIET VIEW
The preceding paragraphs hav~ already, prematurely but unavoidably,
introduced the key elements into the discussion: the principle of selfdetermination, which is accepted by us as the legal comer-stone from
which justification is given to the activities of the national liberation
struggles.
In furthering this debate, we set out in this section to ascertain why
a number of jurists not only question the legality of the principle
from
. which the justifications of the activities of these movements derive
which consequently denies them any measure of personality in international law, and why there are yet others who grant them limited
international personality.

.

25. F. I. Kozhevnikov, Uchebnik Publichnogo Mezhdunarodnogo Prava, Iurizdat
(Moskva), 1947, p. 52.
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In the Soviet literature of international law, a number of leading
Soviet authorities have given much attention to this problem. Professor F. I. Kozhevnikov for example, writes that, 'separate nations or
peoples may show the potentials of being subjects of international law,
and within well-known conditions, the question could arise about the
recognition of this or that nation as having capacity of a transitional
stage to a full recognition as a State (e.g., the Polish nation after
World War 1"). 26
This conclusion in our view only begs the issue, for it does not give
an atiswer to the question as to the conditions which transform or convert nations from 'potential' subjects of international law to 'real' subjects of intemationai law.
Professor S. B. Krylov, went further to emphasize that 'in wellknown stages of the fight for independence, nations may become subjects of international law'; this means recognizing the legal personality
of the nation fighting for independence, but this again fails to show, as
does Koshevnikov's defintion, the concrete conditions or stages of such
recognition.
Professor G. I. Tunkin, who is considered one of the most modem
Soviet theoreticians in international law, also does not seem to provide
an answer to the question. He lays emphasis only on the fact that
'nations fighting for independence and the formation of their own
governments should be counted as subjects of international law'. XI It is
obviously easier to say that they should be regarded as such than
giving answers to the basic questions of why and on what basis they
should be so regarded.
An analogical opinion to that of Tunkin was given by Professor
L. A. Modzhorian, who in 1958 commented that 'nations could be recognized as subjects of international law if such nations are organized
governments or are waging wars for their formation'. 21 In this author's
monograph, she continues to talk of the necessity of recognizing the
international personality of 'nations and peoples defending their independence, forming their organs of resistance, with an allotment of
functions of public power, but which have not yet formed themselves
into governments as a result of counter-action by the powers that
28. Prof. L. A Modhzorian, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo (Moskva, 1964), p. 164.
26. S. B. Krylov and V. N. Durdencvsky, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo (Moskva,
1947), at 52.
27. Prof. G. I. TuDkin, Omovy Sovremenogo Mezlulunarodnogo Prava
(Moskva, 1956), at 17.

121

continue to pretend on the preservation of their sovereignty and rule
over such nations and peoples.'
H Professor Modzhorian had stopped with her first proposition
that governments formed by nations or peoples on the basis of their
right for self-determination ought to be granted a measure of personality under international law, we would have upheld her stand. 29 But for
her to insist on granting such entities recognition as full subjects of
international law, even where it is unpredictable as to how the whole
struggle is going to end does not sound plausible to us. It does not appear to us that the mere formation of certain organs of resistance,
charged with some specific functions of public power is sufficient in itself to merit full international personality for such organs. The position would have been totally different if the organs so formed were
seen to be performing those state functions, no matter the extent in
their relationship with other subjects of international law.
'
While recognizing that all peoples and nations may be subject to the
right of self-determination, Professor D. B. Levin 30 goes on to point out
that the legal forms under which a nation continues to exist after the
exercise of its right of self-determination are not identical and may
relate both to state law and international law. As a result of selfdetermination there may arise new independent states or members of a
federation which will be subjects of both state and international law or
members of a federation and autonomous units which will be subjects
of state law but not of international law. 31
.
Professor I. I. Lukashuk 32 and Professor N. A. Ushakovll seem to
hold similar opinions on this problem. They contend that in contemporary international law, nations are the subjects of the right of selfdetermination of their existence. Lukashuk states that nations and
peoples are not subjects of international law since they are incapable
of participating in inter-state relations governed by international law. 34
He continues to say that in some cases a nation or people rises up in a
stru~e for national liberation and organizes bodies which carry out
public power and represent a nation or people in international law.
They can be considered to have international legal personality, in which
29. Professor Modzhorian must have CODBidcred governmenta which are enjoying 'effective' control of their territory to have attained this status.
30. D. B. Levin, Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 1962, at 46.
31. Ibid.
32. Prof. I. L Lukashuk, International Law, 1968, at p. 9.
33. Prof. N. A Ushakov, Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 1~64-65, p. 74.
·
34. Lukashuk, op. cit., at p. 9.

122

case, that personality means the personality of a new state which is the
process of establishment. 35
On the other hand, N. A. Ushakov teaches that •they (nations) are
thus subjects of definite international legal relations and thereby are
subjects of international law. Naturally, 'Ye speak of a nation as a subject of international law first of all as regards oppressed nations and
peoples under colonial bondage. They have the right to demand political
independence and to strive for it by all means at their disposal, up to

armed struggle for national Uberation.' 36
Continuing, he argues that a nation which has voluntarily become
part of a multinational state and has created its own independent
state is a subject of international law. 37 As in the case of a state being
subject of international law, a nation is a subject of international law,
irrespective of any external reasons - for example, its recognition by
the participants in international intercourse. A nation is a subject of
international law solely by virtue of its existence. 38
What is .in part at stake in Professor Ushakov's submission, is the
vexed question as to whether the right to self-determination includes
a right of secession. We have earlier stated our view on this, but may
only add here that if the right of secession is eliminated, and the
maintenance of the territorial integrity of states takes priority over the
claims of •peoples' to establish their own separate political identity, as
the contemporary customary verdict shows, the room for self-determimination in the sense of the attainment of independent statehood is
very slight.
The various points of view analysed so far should be enough to
illustrate the train of thought of Soviet writers of international law on
the controversial issue of the international personality of national
liberation movements. All the authors cited appear to have been in
agreement on one basic point- that the principle of self-determination
has attained an international legal right.
They are certainly not clear in answering such important questions
as, from what moment nations or peoples fighting for their independence acquire international personality? Is it from the time they declare their intention, or is it from the time it becomes evidently clear
that they are indeed carrying out organized armed struggle to achieve
35. Ibid., at p. 10.
36. Uahakov, N. A, Soviet Yt!lll'book of International Law, 1964-65, at p. 74.
37. Ibid. He implies that all the componenta unita forming the Soviet Republic are subjecta of international law.
38. Ibid.
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this purpose, or from the moment they succeed in the process of this
movement in forming organs of public power supposed to represent
them in international relations, or still later, when such organs are
seen to be participating in international life?
Professor Lukashuk's stand illustrated earlier on, would have offered
sa~fa~ory ~wer~. to some of ow:.questions, but for a slight ambiguity m his notion of mter-state relations governed by international law'.
He rejects the fact that nations and peoples fighting for independence
have personality under international law because according to him,
they have. not th~ capacity to p_articipate in 'inter-state relations gove?Ie_d by mternatio~all~w'. Which elements fall within the concept of
his 'mter-state relations' IS a matter of conjecture.
~t ~evident that. organs f~rmed. I>r nations or peoples fighting for
therr mdependence mter-act (m a limited form) with government and/
or organizations which lend them moral and financial support, even
though these transactions are often kept secret Besides they are known
to have participated, or at least have been observers, in a number of
internatio?al regional conferences (particularly those of the non-aligned countries). Furthermore, customary international law regarding the
conduct of wars extends to the activities of these organs. These are
some of the forms of relations regulated by international law norms
between various. subjects of international law, unless, of course, Professor Lukashuk and his protagonists have in mind the 'traditional' or
'classical' international law, where its subjects are only sovereign independent states.
4.

CONCLUSION

Summarizing this discussion, a number of essential points appear which
need to be re-stated clearly. Even though the declaration on the prin<:iples of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States in general, and that on the principle of equal rights
:md self-determination of peoples in particular, is not a legally binding
mstrument as such, nevertheless some. of its provisions either constitute
general principles of law, or represent elementary considerations of
humanity. The Declaration has considerable indirect legal effect, and
it is regarded by the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization as a part of the law of the United Nations. 39
39. See the Preamble of the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relationa and Cooperation Amongst States.
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It is remarkable that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, w.hich had never been accepted by many states as a
right before, is now recognized as such. The significant implication of
this is that some entities consisting of a 'People' must be the repository of such a right. The subjects of this right, we must add, are principally those groups of peoples or natio~ who, by being conscious of
their common identity in distinction of other groups, strive after realisation of this identity. The question whether some groups are entitled
to the right can only be conclusively answered in the light of concrete
circumstances. We eaniestly submit, therefore, that the bearers of this
right must potentially include all groups of people, large and small,
whether they live within the territory of an already independent and
sovereign State or not This position is consequential upon the principle being a universal one and having been formulated on the basis of
the principle of consensus.
The draft-declaration clearly creates duties for all States with regards
to the .implementation of the provisions of the principle. Thus the last
part of paragraph 1 provides that every State has the duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations'Organization. Another essential element is the obligation placed upon the States whether or not they like it, to promote the
realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
people in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Besides, paragraph 4 places the duty on States to desist from any forcible action
directed towards the deprivation of the people referred to above from
realizing their right to self-determination, freedom and independence.
It is vital to underline, that the declaration clearly stipulates the fact
that the territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has a
status separ~te and distinct from the territory or State administering it 40
On the other hand, the formulation of this principle is not entirely
devoid of a major inconsistency. We find it highly contradictory to
recognize in paragraph one of the text, that the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples is a right of all peoples, while at the
same time, in the concluding two paragraphs, particularly the last
requiring every State to refrain from any action aimed at partial or
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any
other State or country. This last provision is highly detrimental to the
authen~city of the declaration and really defeated the purpose and
40. By this we mean that under no condition is the colonial territory part of
the metropolitan territory. It has a seperate existence which is only and basically
'
one of dependsnce.
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spirit of the declaration. Although, as we have observed earlier on, that
the document has no legally-binding effect on States stricto sensu, and
its shortcomings notwithstanding, one would have expected the UN
and States that comprised it, to take a more positive and clear position
in handling, for example, the Bangladesh conflict which was almost
simultaneous with the endorsement of the Declaration by the. United
Nations General Assembly.
It must be pointed out that one of the important current problems of
the science of contemporary international law has not been mentioned
in the foregoing sections, namely, that of the practical application of
the principles of equal rights and self-determination (i.e. the emergence
of new entities - subjects of international law through the exercise of
this right) in modem international life. For our subject, the review of
this process with current specific examples is important and of great
interest. The discussion of this vital problem has intentionally been
left out to the moment when our views will be explained, because our
ideas can be best developed in the light of the discussion and analysis
of the legal status of organs of national liberation movements, as well
as the principles of international law that have to do with the activities
of these organs.
Now let us carry our investigation further using specific cases to
observe how far this inconsistency is manifested in the practice of
States. For in order to conduct a useful analysis as to whether any
particular governmental machinery or organ formed to lead these
struggles whatever its title, be it a 'Provisional Government', a 'Government-in-exile', a 'revolutionary government', enjoys any measure
of international personality and, as such, is attributed the competence
to act on behalf of a people fighting to organize its own State and
especially to conclude treaties on its behalf - the practice of States
on the whole issue of prospective incumbent, belligerent and nonbelligerent parties who may be directly or indirectly involved in such
struggles, must be examined
Accordingly, the very dissimilar stand of various States on a number
of issues of a relatively similar nature in the two selected cases of
Bangladesh and Bia/ra will be considered. In these two conflicts, the
operation of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples through secession was at issue. At the same time, it wo~d not
be true to say that the two cases were entirely identical. Both peoples
had in the process of the conflict similar experiences, such as an acute
movement of the innocent civilian population, hunger, disease, and lack
of adequate international action to relieve the disaster, to mention a

few. But these two cases, apart from perhaps Vietnam, are prominent
amongst those which have attracted the greatest international interest
recently. Also, the small difference in the time factor of their happening - the incidents taking place at an interval of a little over a year is in itself of some interest
It does not seem unduly optimistic to expect that an examination of
these cases ought to uncover the criteria that are held to be decisive for
the attribution to one party - namely statehood of a standing - that
was denied to the other. These and other related problems will occupy
us in the next sections.

126

127

1...

Part F. Practical application of the
principles of equal rights and
self-determination

7. The case of Bangladesh

The first Europeans arrived, initially as traders, during the late 15th
and early 16th century in the area of the subcontinent which is now
occupied by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which had already been
subjugated. by the Moslem invaders who founded the Mogul Empire in
India about 1525. By the 17th century, the British East India Company had become do~ant. Using local uprisings as a justification, the
British and French in the mid-18th century fought for control of India.
By 1757, Great Britain had established its hold. The Indian National
Congress, a political party founded in 1885, split into two branches in
1907, one committed to complete independence, the other seeking only
dominion status.
The agitation for a separate Moslem state began in 1930 under the
leadership of the poet and philosopher Mohammed Iqbal. In 1947,
Great Britain reluctantly agreed to the formation of such a separate
Moslem state, and India and Pakistan came into being as independent
countries within the Commonwealth of Nations.
A new constitution for Pakistan was established in 1956, but was
abrogated two years later when President lskanda Mirza gave overall
power to General Ayub Khan who ruled by decree, instituted a programme of land reform and promulgated a new constitution in 1962. 2
1. The Retlder'iDigut Almanac, 1966, pp. 852-853.
2. The Awami LCaguo under Sheik Mujibur Rahman won practically every
seat in East Pakistan at the general election, and with a total of 151 seats had an
overall majority in the National Assembly; Mr. Datto's Pakistan People's Party,
with 81 seats, emerged as by far the largest and most important party in West
Pakistan, but without a majority in the Assembly. (One of the two wings of Pakistan,
had more than half the country's total-population with about 73,000,000 inhabitants while West Pakistan had a population of about 60,000,000). As quoted in
Keesing's Contempora, Archlllu, May 1-8, 1971, p. 24567.
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For a long time, the Eastern Province of Pakistan had been demanding gre~;tter autonomy. The general elections held in Pakistan in 19703
which were a tremendous victory for the East Pakistan National
Party, the Awami League, and its leader Sheik Mujibur Rahman were
followed by an extremely tense political situation.
Eventually, when round table talks 4 in Dacca between President
Yahya Khan, Sheik Mujibur Rahman and~. Butta, the West Pakistan
Opposition leader, had ended again in complete deadlock, civil strife
erupted.
Consequently, President Yahya Khan outlawed the Awami League
and banned all political activities throughout the country imposing
complete press censorship. He denounced Sheik Mujibur's non-cooperation movement as an act of treason', described Sheik Mujibur and his
party as 'enemies of Pakistan' who wished to break away from the
country and said that this crime will not go unpunished'.
Sheik Mujibur Rahman, at a press conference in Dacca on 24 February 1971 described as 'utterly false', the allegation that the Awami
·League was seeking to impose its six-point programme on WestPakistan.
The six-point programme, explained Sheik Mujibur, was essentially
designed to safeguard the autonomy of the federating units, and to stop
perpetuation of the •colonial status' and •exploitation' of the 70,000,000
people of East Pakistan by their Moslem compatriots of West Pakistan. s
Addressing half a million demonstrators in Dacca on 7 March, Sheik
Mujibur pur forward four conditions fo:r the Awami League's participation in the Assembly session: ·
1. the withdrawal of martial law;
2. the return of troops to barracks;
3. an inquiry into killings which he alleged had taken place in Pakistan; l
4. transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. 6
An official statement in Dacca on 27 March said that reports of fighting in East Pakistan •as carried by certain foreign news agencies' were
completely without foundation'. The martial law authorities also ap.nounced that Sheik. Mujibur Rahman had been arrested at liis residence on the night of 25-26 March. 7
3. Three notable talks were held to try to resolve the constitutional differences
- the talks were held on 15, 16 and 19 March 1971.
4. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 1-8, 1971, p. 24565.
5. Ibid., p. 24566.
6. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 1-8, 1971, p. 24566.
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On 11 April, the formation 'somewhere in Bangladesh' of a sixmember Cabinet of the 'independent government set up its headquarterS in the village of Chuadanga, where on 17 April, the "Democratic
Republic of Bangladesh' was formally proclaimed.
. It mrist be observed that with the capture on 18 April by. the Pakistan Army of the village of Chuadanga (300 yards from the Indian
border) which had been proclaimed the provisional capital of Bangladesh, and with the Pakistan army in complete control of the Western
frontier area bordering on India, all effective resistance by the Bangladesh 'liberation ~y' had virtually come to a halt by 18-19 April, 1
though it was thought possible that some· units of the liberation army
in remote rural areas might resort to guerilla-type tactics.

2. THE INTERNATIONALLY RESPONSmLE CHARACTER OP THE BANGLADESH
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 9 .
The term •exiled' or «refugee' government is well-known in contemporary international relations and does not call for explanation. At the
time of the Second World War, as well as during earlier wars, the
international scene-witnessed the appearance of groups of persons who
claimed ·to be the governmental authorities of various occupied states
which they had left in order to be able to operate independently of the
enemy occupying power.
Even though these groups of persons were deprived of the administrative control of the territories and peoples, the governments of which
they purported to be, in many cases regular governments entered into
international legal relations with them.
It is noteworthy however that not all such groups received recognition as governments. While some of them were seen as governments,
others, though not so considered, were regarded at least as representing
some kind of controversial subjects of international law. ·For example,
--tow did people .in 1945 know whether the sovereignty of the Baltic
States of Esto~ Latvia and Lithuania was actually represented by
7. It was subsequently reported, although not officially confirmed that Sheik
Mujibur Rahman had been taken to West Pakistan and was under detention.
8. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 1-8, 1971, p. 24566.
9. The formation 'somewhere in Bangladesh' of a six-member Cabinet. of the
independent sovereign republic of Bangladesh was announced on 17 April1971.
This government later moved into exile in India. See, Keesing's Contemporary
Archlve.r, May 1-8, 1971, p. 24564.
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their recognized diplomatic missions, or whether it has been permanently extinguished?
In some recent international law books, the latter group is termed
'authorities in exile' mainly for convenience sake. 10
According to Blix, 11 the reason why the existence of authorities and
governments in exile is possible at all lies in the circumstance that the
international community is reluctant to concede title to a territory
which has been subjugated by means of belligerept occupation; and it
is indeed a well-established rule of international law that such occupation confers per se no ultimate title of right.
There is an unwillingness to sanction positions which have been
attained by acts contrary to international law, and there is a corresponding awareness on the part of belligerent entities that occupation
is an insufficient and insecure basis for any claim to rule permanently
as of right.
This view is supported by the following opinion: ' ... in upholding
the continued legal existence of an occupied State whose premature
annexation has been pronounced by the occupying power, international law does not act on a certainty of its restoration but on an uncertainty of its extinction. ' 12
Further support for the same view is found in the following statement by Professor Kelsen: ' ... as long as the status of the territory is
that of belligerent occupation, and that means as long as there is war
between the occupied state and the occupying state, the control exercised by the latter cannot be considered ·-as "effective". Apart from the
fact that it is restricted by international law, it is not firmly established; for there is war going on the purpose of which is to establish again
the effective control of the government now in exile'. u
The Bangladesh provisional government claimed competence to represent the State of Bangladesh on the international plane: the validity
of this claim can best be ascertained by examining the basis of the
international competence of that government.
·

10. Blix, Hans, Treaty-making power, London, 1960, p. 147.
Oppeuheimer, Governments and Authorities in Exile, 36 American JouTTIIll of
International Law (1962), S68.
11. Blix, Hans, op. dt., at p. 187.
12. Marek, K., Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law,
Qeneva, 1954, p. S66.
13. Kelsen, H., Prlnciplu of International Law, New York, 19S2, pp. 288-289.

3.

THE BASIS OP THB INTERNATIONAL COMPETENCE OP THE PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT OP BANGLADESH

The question arises whether there exist specific conditions necessary
for the attribution of some competence under international law to an
authority before it can be recognized as a government in exile. And if
such conditions exist, did the provisional government of Bangladesh
satisfy them?
We must here go back to the point at which we o~served tha~ the
complete occupation of almost the entire Eastern Provmce of. Pakistan
by the army of President Yahya Khan between 18-19 April, forced
the provisional government of Bangladesh to go underground. At _the
same time, the provisional government was ?o~ ~own to have ~~
drawn its earlier declaration of possessing junsdiction and responsibility over the territory of Bangladesh. The likely position, as it · became
evident afterwards, was that the provisional government continued to
ct&im this right and to reserve it to itself.
..
The·general speculation at the time was that the proVlSlOnal government had moved to India. Governments in exile are, of course, dependent for their functioning in the territory of. a friendly host state
upon a permission to do ~o given by. th~ authonty o~ that ~tate, even
though such a permission does not m ttself automatically Imply any
recognition of a governmental competence upon them. 14
But here a vital distinction must be made between two separate
cases. There is on the one hand the case of a government which, in
time of declared war, leaves its territory in consequence of enemy occupatio~ and obtains refuge in the terri~ry of a StB;te at ~ar with the
same enemy _ in other words, a co-belligerent. This India may have
become later in 1971, but it certainly was not so in April of that year,
when it was formally at peace and in normal diplomatic relations with
Pakistan.
14. There is need here for a distinction between cases where the host state to
a provisional government is simply passive but not friendly to such a gov~
ment. An example is the Provisional Government of the free Polish State m
London. Another similar situation is in the Kingdom of the Netherl~ds where
the government permits the political organ of the so-ca.lled Repubbc of the
South Molucas to bave its headquarters. This pe~ion does not . ipso fa~to
mean that the Government of the Netherlands recogmzes the organ m question
as the true representative of the people of the South Molucas. These examples
would, of course, differ from cases where the host .state ~learly. supports the
efforts or movements of a provisional government in ats temtory eather by commission or. omission.
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On that basis (and this is the second case) international law prescribes as one of its best established rules that members of insurgent
bodies can only be received as refugees on the basis of asylum, 110t as
governments in exile, and must not be allowed to use the territory of
the receiving State as a base of hostile operations against the state with
which the receiving state professes to be at peace and in normal diplomatic relations.
Of course, any state, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, can decide on its own to· accord an insurgent entity, not only asylum but
also the right to operate in that country as a government in exile. However, a state deciding to do this would have to accept the risk (a) that
the receiving State would be deemed to have extended a measure of recognition to the entity in exile - for instance of insurgency or belligerency - though _this would not of course per se amount to recognition of full governmental and international status; and (b) that its
action would be regarded as unfriendly if not illegal by the other state
concerned, and such as to justify reprisals or counter-measures.
If the host state went furth~r than this - for example by a formal
act of recognition on its part - this would signalize the view that the
recognized body had attained a definite degree of competence under
international law as the lawful government of the territory it had come
from, including - and this is of particular interest - the competence
to engage the present and future responsibility of the territory by treaty.
But here again, unless the body in exile was in effective control of
the territory it left, or at least of a substantial part of it (but if so, then
why did it leave?) the host state risks that its recognition will be regarded as premature and legally ineffective, and in any case as amounting to an unfriendly act, if not a hostile one.
The case is of course quite different when what goes into exile is
not a mere insurgent or disaffected group but an already recognized
government which has been driven out or has elected to leave the
country because of enemy occupation or some internal crisis such as a
coup d'6tat. Even here however the host state must exercise considera- ble caution as to the activities it allows the government in exile to
pursue in or from its territory, except in the case already noticed where
it is itself a co-belligerent with that government, at war with a common
enemy, or else where, having been continually in friendly and diplomatic relations with the government in exile, which was and still is
recognized as the lawful government of the country it has left, it is invited by that government to assist it to return, in a situation which is
still sufficiently fluid to make such a return a serious possibility.JS
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There have been many cases where governments in exile have been
allowed to function without these governments having at the time any
control over any part of their national territory. But here again, a
distinction must be made. Firstly, there are those governments whose
heads and/ or entire cabinets move from the national territory temporarily, during a time of crisis, 16 and go to that of a co-belligerent.
This case has already been considered.
The other type of case is that of governments whose original formation took place abroad on friendly foreign soil. 17 Here there can hardly
be any legal connection between the government in exile and the government operating on the national territory at the time. Indeed it must
be doubtful if the term government 'in exile' is properly applicable at
all in this class_ of case. 4. TBB QUESTION OP TREATY-MAKING COMPETENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL
VACUUM AND 'PRINCIPLE OP EPPECTIVBNBSS' IN THB BANGLADESH CASE

There is so far no clear evidence that the provisional government of
Bangladesh purported to conclude any agreements with foreign states
which could bind a future state of Bangladesh. If it did, our assumption would be that any regular goverments which entered into such
15. Even then, this position remains controversial. We highly doubt the correctness of intervention in civil wars. International law of contemporary international relations ahould develop in the direction of neutrality in civil wars,
otherwise, there will soon be 'Vietnama', 'Biafras' or 'Bangladeabes' all over the
world.
16. During·World War n, the governments of the Netherlands, Greece, Norway Poland, Belgium, Yugoslavia and Luxembourg moved fD London. These
gov~rnments prior fD the occupation of their national territories by enemy troops
were the recognized governments of independent and sovereign states. Consequently, they needed no further formal act of recognition because there bad
been no break in their legal continuity. The case of the Bangladesh provisional
government is different from that of the governments enumerated above, for it
was not an established and recognized government but was fighting fD bring about
the independence of a new nation, and its actual position remained an open
question and was being vigouroualy contested.
17. This was the case of the Algerian provisional government established in
Cairo . prior to independence, and of the Angolan provisional government of
Mr. Roberto Holden in Kinshasa. These governments sought or. . claimed recognition ab origine. The case of the war-time Czechoslovakian government in London, though it was initially formed in London, and bad not qua government left
Czechoslovakia, really falla into the 'co-belligerent' category.
.1~7

treaties did so generally in the ·anticipation that the provisional govern~ent w?uld (in their assessment) eventually become competent under
mt~rnational law to assume treaty obligations on behalf of the inter-

,,

national law subject whose interests it claimed to represent But of
course they took the risk that this might not happen as well as the
other risks already noticed. It therefore follows that ~ the conviction
of such regular governments, the treaties so concluded were or could
become binding under international law (at least in so far as they were
concerned).
There is. no duty ~der international law for a State to possess a
tr~~-makin~ autho?-ty even though it is one of the essential charactenstics of mternational . personality. States have in any case no
duty to enter into treaties. Of co~ these conclusions are based on
purely ~eore~cal considerations. In practice, all communities need
and ~~e to mtern~tional intercourse. No one community can afford
to. eXISt ~ complete ~~lation from others. This being so, their relationships With other entities require regulation in a manner universally
accepted under international law.
The competence of authorities in exile to undertake obligations by
w~>: of agree~ent is limited to matters which fall within their apparent
ability of ~ent, and the. reason why sometimes these organs are
not, co~c:s?ondingl~, recogmzed as having competence to engage the
responsibility of theu home states lies in the circumstances that their
future ~tanding and ability to assert themselves in these states seems
uncertain. ·
The issue of constitutional vacuum is as keenly debated as those alr~ady observed. The various efforts aimed at clarifying the controverSial p~blem of whether a government in exile needs to function on
the bas~ of a regul~ constitutional origin may be conveniently catalogued mto ~o maJor categories. A conservative position has maintained that, to be. a~buted the competence of a government, it is ne~sary and suffiaent that the body in exile should be identical
WI~ the ~t government that was established in the State before occupation. This stand generally, could imply a government that has a
regular constitutional origin.
.sir Hersch Lauterpacht appears to hold the view expressed above.
With r~gard to the ~e of the Czechoslovakian government in exile
based m London, Su Hersch accepted the view that the presence in
England of 'the last freely elected Head of State' of Czechoslovakia
'and the government formed under him constituted the requisite link
in legal continuity'. 11
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Sir Hersch also expresses the opinion that one of the reasons why
the Algerian authorities in Cairo were not recognized as a government
lay in the circumstance that they were not 'in a position to rely on
legal continuity as being identical with or the constitutional successor
of a previously recognized government'. 19
Other writers who have similar views to those of Lauterpacht in this
respect include a German author, Dr. Mattern, and also Dr. Marek.
Dr. Marek writes, for example: •... (that the character of a state organ
can only be attributed to governments in exile which have been) constituted in their own countries and simply transferred their activities
abroad, following the total occupation of their territories, with no
break in their legal and actual continuity'. :m
A more progressive and perhaps liberal view, that constitutional
origin is altogether irrelevant in order ·that a body which claims to be
a government in exile should be competent in international law to act
on behalf of a state, has been clearly stated by Professor Kelsen: •Just
as international law does not require constitutionality of a government
established on the territory of its own state, it does not require constitutionality of a government in exile'.~
The conclusion might be therefore that neither constitutional origin,
nor functioning in conformity with a particular constitution are necessarily required in order that a body that claims to be a government in
exile sho~d be competent .in international law to act on behalf of a
state. We do not however mean to suggest that the international community should be completely indifferent to such considerations. On
the contrary, it is certain that international law does and must concern
itself with them. But this is an area in which the law is still in process .
of formation in a situation of some fluidity.
However, in discussing the matter further, Dr. Marek finds it necessary to suggest another important .but arguable element - that of
'effectiveness' which she considers to be an alternative source of
international competence. 22
18. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1947, p. 92, in note.
19. Ibid., p. 16S, in note.
20. Marek, K., Identity and Continuity of Statu in Public International Law,
Geneva 1954, p. 97. The words in brackets are ours.
21. Kelsen, H., op. cit., p. 290. But as already noted, it is doubtful whether the
term 'in exile' is properly applicable to bodies of this kind, since it implies both
a country from which they are exiled and some sort of previous governmental
standing in that country- both of which features are, ex hypothui, lacking in
this class of case.
22. Marek, K., op. dt., p. 314.
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The degree of effectiveness which Dr. Marek has in mind is undoubtedly not without limitations, as it would seem unrealistic to expect from a government in exile whose territory is virtually occupied,
the same measure of effectiveness that is normally required of a territorial government. Two authoritive views on this question are considered to be illustrative of this point; Professor Kelsen states: 'The requirement of exercising effective control of the territory is replaced by the
requirement of making efforts to regain effective control. This requirement, too, is an application of the principle of effectiveness. The effo~ of the gove~ent in exile to regain control of the territory under
belligerent occupation must be «effective" .••
~ey are said to be e!fective ... if they are made by means of war,
that JS to say, by armed forces sufficient to prevent the control of the
occupying power from becoming firmly established'. 23
To the same end, Oppenheim concluded: 'The «effectiveness" which
is usually associated with the exercise of territorial jurisdiction may be
wholly lacking in the case of a government in exile. In this instance
'
its political effectiveness depends upon hazard of war.'»
Another important requirement is that the government in exile
should be seen to be exercising some reasonable measure of political
activity. This indeed really constitutes its effectiveness for the time
being, as its future effectiveness seems, above all, to be highly dependent
upon the support it enjoys, and is expected to enjoy, from the population which it claims to represent.
. The difficulti~ discussed here are problems arising in the application of rules which were found to be established in the practice of
states and accepted by writers. It only remains to restate them as the
conclusion of this section by placing the case of the provisional government of Bangladesh in exile where it properly belongs in the light of
the foregoing discussions and observations.
Bangladesh is a consequence of indefensible methods of suppressing
the _rights -~d aspirations of the peoples of East Pakistan. By placing
Sheik MuJibur Rahman under arrest, President Y ahya Khan forcibly
excluded from political life the leader who had just received a mandate
from an entire people. The provisional government during the crisis
made efforts to carry out its political functions through its political
organ specially designed for this purpose - the Consultative Committee.25
23. Kelsen, H., op. cit., pp. 289-290.
24. Oppenheim, Governments and Authorities in Exile, op. cit., p. 568.
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Besides, the Bangladesh struggle had adequate popular support and
was not a mere putsch, coup d'etat or palace revolution. It was genuinely an internal Pakistan movement, an expression and product of national
economic and political contradictions. It was a spontaneous uprising of
a whole people embodying the national will and it was clear that this
national conscience and will seem to have been involved in the opposition manifested towards it. Above all, there was considerable evidence
of a representative quality, and some assurance as regards the future
authority of the exiled body, manifested by a number of political
leaders whose past or present following in the State was not subject to
doubt. Other Governments had thus some solid basis for recognizing
the provisional government as competent under international law to
conclude treaties on behalf of the state it purported to represent, since
it appeared to wield effective authority; and there seemed to be a high
degree of likelihood that it would in fact be able to fulfil any obligations undertaken on behalf of that state.

25. A Consultative Committee consisting of four representatives of the Awami
League and one representative each of the two factions of the National Awamy
Party, the Communist Party of Bangladesh, and the Bangladesh National Congress, was formed in Calcutta on 8 September 1971 to direct the freedom
struggle.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The weight of evidence. from our discussion of the internationally representative character of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh
led us to reach the conclusion that, on the whole, there was evidence
~at thi~ government satisfied the conditions necessary to qualify as an
mternational person and. as such, had the competence under international law to conclude treaties, since there were all the indications
that it would fulfil its international obligations.
However, as the rampage in Bangladesh progressed, some governments continued to give the Pakistan government both diplomatic and .
military support - some even intensified their military supplies. It has
always been held that, provided belligerent rights have not been
granted to, or recognized in respect of, the insurgent authority (which
would create a situation analogous to war proper), a government commits no 'illegality' by lending assistance to the legitimate government
of the country with which it is in normal relations, if that government,
being faced with insurrection or civil disturbance, requests, or consents
to receive such assistance, if preferred. :z
The continuation of such an assistance may nevertheless tend to become an unjustified intervention where the status of this government is
technically legitimate but appears to be unrepresentative of the people
or nation as a whole and when it is losing ground.
Such assistance may then cease to be justified. If the struggle
amounts, and has all the characteristics of what as between two inde1. The purpose of this section of our investigation is prindpally to describe
the attitude of selected major countries directly or indirectly involved in the
conflicL Our aim is to determine the extent of consistency in State practice shown
on such matters when the practical implementation of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples is at issue.
2. Fitzmaurice, Hague Recuell92 (1957), p. 177.
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pendent countries, would be a state of war, other States must either
recognize the existence of a state of belligerency, with the consequent
duty to observe the rules of neutrality as between the contendants, or
incur the same risks and perils as would be incurred by unneutral conduct in a war on the part of a State, not itself involved in the war. If
insurgents have attained the specific qualifications of belligerents under international law, they must be treated in a legal manner by third
States; and if these decide to join forces with the incumbent party to
suppress the insurgent entity (which in such circumstances would be a
breach of neutrality), the latter has the right to retaliate including the
faculty to request for help from other powers.
It became clear in the Pakistan conflict, after some time, that the
movement had ade~ate popular support embodying the national will.
It is one thing for a government to lend assistance or support to another government threatened with overthrow or destruction by action
of the coup d'etat type, at the hands of a fascist minority or military
junta, having little, or no, representative character, or to assist a government faced with a movement promoted from outside the country.
But it is quite another to give such assistance, even to a technically
legitimate government in order to suppress a spontaneous uprising of
a whole people with a clear brand of national support. The legality
of assisting the government must depend in the last resort on how far
the true national conscience and aspiration seem to be involved in the
opposition shown to it 3
Although in international law there have not been, as yet, any
settled and developed rules whereby the extent of an internal crisis
could be determined and tested, so as to indicate how far it is a spontaneous uprising of a whole people; and to what degree broad national
support is accorded to it; nevertheless we think that the national character of the movement may be seen from the general behaviour over a
reasonable period of time of (a) the people concerned, judged from
their general moral support evidenced from their war efforts, and their
respect for the laws and regulations instituted by the appropriate organ
of the community to protect their lives and property and to keep
general law and order (b) the government representing such a group
of people (provisional as it usually is) should be seen to be exercising
some reasonable measure of political authority. The government's representative quality may be determined from the records of its leaders
if their present and past following were clearly not subject to doubts.
3. Fitzmaurice, Ibid., p.179.
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In any event, the principles of non-intederence, non-intervention,
as well as that of neutrality must be extended to all cases of civil
strifes or wars. The law should be tailored to develop in this direction
if the whole ideas and efforts of building an international community
based on equality of all peoples are to be attained.
In the present section, therefore, we propose to conduct a survey of
the positions taken by selected major states directly or indirectly involved in the crisis. We have chosen the following countries for the
present purpose: India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, People's Republic of
China and United States of America, which will be treated in the above
order.

2.

THB ACTIVITIES OF THB INDIAN AUTHORITIES

India is often accused of having 'fomented' the Bangladesh movement.
How far this accusation is true or false will be seen in the course of
our present discussion.
At the root of the latent instability in the Indian subcontinent during
the last two-and-a-half decades, there lies in the first place the politically unacceptable fact (to India) of the partition of India and Pakistan
on a religious basis; and, secondly, this instability was aggravated by
the establishment of only one state for two territories which are more
than 2000 kilometres apart. But it appears that in any event India was
drawn openly into the vortex of the drama of the East Pakistan people,
not through her own will, but through the simple fact of having become the asylum for an estimated ten million refugees from East Pakistan.
By admitting these refugees, India assumed an enormous burden
which unbalanced her economic and social programme and gave her
the moral right to demand such a solution of the internal situation in
Pakistan as would permit a prompt return of the refugees to their
homes.
The Indian Government's concern at the events in East Pakistan was
first officially expressed in the 'Lok Sabba' on March 26, in statements
by Sandar Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister of India, and by Mrs.
Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister.
Swaran Singh, who accused the Pakistan Army of 'suppressing the
people of East Pakistan' said that 'the government of India cannot but
be gravely concerned at events taking place so close to our borders ...
144

We cannot but take note of the fact that such a large segment of
humanity is involved in a conflict and that many people are suffering in
the process .. .'
Mrs. Gandhi, who followed, said in her statement to the Lok Sabba:
'Something new had happened in East Bengal, democratic action where
the entire people had spoken with almost one voice ... It is not merely suppression of a movement but it is meeting unarmed people with
tanks'.•
Both Houses of the Indian Parliament passed on 31 March a resolution, moved by Mrs. Gandhi, expressing 'whole-hearted sympathy R?d
support'. The resolution went on to say: ' ... This House expresses 1ts
profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people of East Bengal
in their struggle for_ a democratic way of life. This House records its
profound conviction that the historic upsurge of 75 million people of
East Bengal will triumph. The House wishes to assure them that their
struggle and sacrifice will receive the whole-hearted sympathy and support of the people of India'. 5
On 18 April, the Pakistan High Commissioner in Calcutta Mr.
M. V. Hussain Ali, announced his allegiance and that of other Bengali
members of his staff to the 'sovereign democratic republic of Bangladesh', hoisted the Bangladesh flag over the mission, and stated that
the latter would henceforth be known as the 'diplomatic mission of
Bangladesh'. The Indian Government refused Pakistan's demRD:d to
evict Mr. Hussain, who remained in the mission as the self-proclauned
representative of Bangladesh. Mr. Mahdi Masud, who arrived in Calcutta, on the appointment of Pakistan to take over the mission, was
constrained to take up residence in a hotel.
It must be observed that the hoisting of the flag of one country in
the territory of another, if carried out as the official act of the first
country, or by persons representing it, and without the consent of the
local authorities is illegal under international law. It constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the legitimate territorial authority in the
nature of constructive or symbolic intervention. 6 But in this case it
appears that the Indian authorities were consenting parties, although of
course they thereby raised a serious issue between the~nselves and
Pakistan.
4. The 'democratic action' ('m East Bengal) was 'the entire people speaking
with one voice' not the 'meeting of unarmed people with tanks' which was the
action of the other side.
5. Keesing'a Contemporary Archives, May 15-22, 1971, p. 24597.
6. Fitzmaurice, op. clt., at pp. 174-175.
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The Indian Foreign Minister in a speech he delivered in Washington
DC, USA at the National Press Club, spelt out further the policy of hi~
gove~ent when he stated: •... The basic problem is a political one
and 1t calls for a political solution. Without a solution, the atmospher~
of conf~.dence and security, which is necessary for the return of refugees, will not be generated. There are two essential prerequisites: Frrstly, the neces~ary political solution must be found urgently, and secondly, the solution to be effective and enduring must be in accord with
the wishes of the people of East Bengal and their elected leaders. Any
efforts to set up a regime in East Bengal which is not truly representative of the people will only prolong the agony and harde~ attitudes and
pose hazards to the peace of the whole region.' 7 •••• The point has
now been reached where the actions of Pakistan's military government
threaten to engulf our region in a conflict the end of which is not
~ to predict. We have acted with patience, forbearance and restramt But we cannot sit idly by if the edifice of our political stability
and economic well-being is threatened'. •
The full significance of this statement of the Indian position will
~ppear when we come to consider Mrs. Gandhi's subsequent speeches
m a number of public appearances during the crisis and the Indian
military action which soon became clearly evident.
'
A~ this ~~ge of our inquiry, it may be interesting to observe that the
Fore1gn Minister was openly referring to East Pakistan as 'East Bengal'·
in a speech delivered only four months after the hostilities began (17
June 1971).
His answer, when asked if by saying 'India will not sit idly by if
the refugee flow continues', he meant that India would declare war
on P~stan, was: 'There are other ways of enforcing our wish than
decl~~g war .... At ~~ present moment, we are engaged in the task of
mobilizing public opm10n, both governmental and private to focus
attention on the basic issues, the moral issues involved'.11
'
The Prime-Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, during her tour of six Western
European countries, 10 put across the views of her government precisely
but forcefully. Addressing a public meeting in London on 31 October
Mrs. Gandhi said: 'We do not want the destruction of Pakistan or th~
1. . Sw~ Singh, Bang~esh needs a politiCill solution, Speech by the Indian
Foreign Minister at the National Press Club of Washington D.C., USA, on 17 June
1971, p. S. (The speech has been included in the us Congressional Record at the
request of Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher).
8. Ibid., at pp. 11-12.
9. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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destruction of her integrity. At the same time we do not want our freedom or our interests to be threatened, and we are determined to protect them with our strength.'
In a television interview on 8 November in Paris, Mrs. Gandhi said:
'It is perhaps inevitable today that Bangladesh should become independent', 'but I do not think that East Bengal would wish to be associated with the West Bengal, as the latter is industrialized and would
be the dominant partner.'
Nothing could be more explicit, or more illuminating, of the Indian
government's position than these words. At a press conference on 12
November, Mrs. Gandhi said that the Indian government had to
give the Mukti Bahini u a 'minimum of aid', because the Indian people,
especially in West Bengal, demanded this, and also because it was unable to prevent them from using Indian territory for recruitment and
training, as the frontier was too long for effective control.' 12
By 21 November, the Mukti Bahini launched an offensive against
Jessore reportedly with Indian support This fact was substantiated in
thC! 'Daily Telegraph' of 29 November. It was reported beyond doubt
here that Indian troops were involved. Of course, the full Indian military involvement was unequivocally conceded by the Prime Minister,
Mrs. Gandhi, in her speech in the Rajya Sabba on 30 November. She
declared: •... The fighting in Bangladesh was not between equals but
between a fully equipped army and mostly untrained people, and it was
not in India's interest that the entire unarmed population of Bangladesh
should be annihilated. She did not believe that Bangladesh would accept anything less than independence'. u
It is clearly evident from the foregoing analysis of the Indian
Government's attitude to the Pakistan problem, that India's reactions
were incompatible with her previous usual stand on the general and
controversial question of the implementation of the principles of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples. This is best illustrated by an
earlier statement made by an Indian Foreign Minister: 'In the Political
Committee, 14 the Indian Delegation moved that in the first paragraph,
10. Mrs. Gandhi left New Delhi on 24 October for a tour of six Western
capitals making stops as follows: Brussels (24-26 October), Vienna (26 October),
London (29 October), Washington (4 November), Paris (7-10 November) and
Bonn (10-13 November).
11. Mukti Bahini was the official name of the Bangladesh Liberation Army.
12. ltCA, Ibid., op. cit.
13. Ibid., December 18-25 1971, p. 24995.
14. Cairo Conference of States or Governments of non-Aligned Countries,
1964.
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line 1, the words 'under Foreign Domination' may be inserted after
the word •peoples'. This was not accepted by some countries, and so as
not to impede the work of the conference and in a spirit of co-operation, we did not want to press the matter further. The Indian delegation now wishes to state its position in connection with the words
"under Foreign Domination" and their wish to have those words inserted in the text. We wish to make it absolutely clear that all we mean by
the insertion of these words is that the right of self-determination does
not apply to soyereign and independent states or to a section of a people or nation which is the essence of national integrity. Without such
an understanding, the principle would lead to fragmentation, disintegration and dismemberment of sovereign states, and members of the
United Nations. And the .dangers in this context would be particularly
acute in case of states having multi-racial and multi-lingual populations.
We sincerely hope that the distinguished representatives would accept
the statement in the spirit of co-operation in which it is made. It is my
request that this is recorded as a reservation in the report of the Rapporteur'. 15
It may here be recalled in explanation of this attitude that India
contains several disaffected minorities such as the Nagar, and had taken
over more than one of the former Indian States by force. Recently
again, as millions of Indians went to polls in March 1972, to elect new
local governments, undisputed leaders from the state of Kashmir
launched a campaign to prove that the elections in 'their province have
been rigged. They asserted that there had been a blatant and cynical
disregard for the basic tenets of democracy. t6
The Indian government prevented the popular Kashmir leader, Sheik
Abdullah from contesting the election simply by excluding him from
his own home state. In an interview with the Times 17 at his temporary
home in Delhi, the Sheik alleged that the true aspirations of the Khasmiris
had been suppressed by coercion and brute force. He accused Mrs.
Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, of adopting double standards in
Kashmir and Bangladesh. The Sheik declared: 'She {Mrs. Gandhi)
talks of the will of the people of Bangladesh while she has blatantly
15. The above statement was made on behalf of India by its Foreign Minister
during the Political Committee debate at the 1964 Cairo Conference of Heads of
State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries on the 'principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples'. See, Text of International Declarations of
Asian-African States, New Delhi-1, 1965, p. 86 in note.
16. P. Hazelhurst, London Times (Overseas), Friday, March 10, 1972.
17. Peter Hazelhurst, The London Times (Overseas), Friday, March 10, 1972.
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suppressed the aspirations of the people of Kashmir. This is one of the
greatest mistakes of the Government of India. Gandhi is on record for
dolible standards, for while she was campaigning for the people of
East Pakistan, that force will not solve anything and asked the world
powers to understand the aspirations and urges of the people of Bangladesh, she conveqiently forgets these ideals when it comes to the
people of Kashmir.' 11
It is thought essential here to observe that the original instrument of
accession of the province of Kashmir to India envisaged a large measure of autonomy for Kashmir (similar to Bangladesh's earlier demands for autonomy from the government of Pakistan). As the Sheik
and other Kashmir. leaders continue to maintain, their quarrel with the
government of India is not about secession but is about the quantum of
autonomy with residual sovereignty vested in the state of Kashmir.
Looking at the matter as a whole, the conclusion seems permissible
that India's actions amounted to an illegal intervention in contemplation of international law. How far acts of intervention can be justified
on humanitarian grounds is yet another matter and open to much argument. Certainly it falls beyond the terms of reference which we have
set for ourselves, to attempt passing a judgement on the matter. At the
same time, it is essential to observe that international writers recognize that an intervention (military or diplomatic) which is made as a
result of an obvious necessity to save human lives is justifiable in
international law. One excellent statement to illustrate this was made
by a British schol~, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who said that 'Loss
of life and certain kinds of grave physical injury are irremediable. No
subsequent action, remedy, redress or compensation can bring the dead
to life or restore their limbs to the maimed. There is no remedy except
prevention. In this lies the ultimate justification for intervention of this
kind. Its objective is protective. Its humanitarian basis exists and cannot be overlooked'. u
In this connexion, it may be recalled that in the Corfu Channel
case, the International Court of Justice made an important pronouncement according to which humanitarian considerations were given the
status of principle of law. The Court mentioned as giving rise to international obligations •certain general and well-recognized principles'

18. Ibid.
19. Fitzmaurice, Hague Recueil92 (1957), p. 173.
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and among those cited was 'elementary considerations of humanity
even more exacting in peace than in war.' 20
Apart from any humanitarian aspect of the matter, it appears that
the economic-self-defence argument of the Indian authorities was of
prime moment in the final decision to intervene militarily in what was
originally an internal Pakistan conflict This stand is again open to
serious contention. But, in our opinion, we would say that given a
sufficiently strong factual case the use of any necessary force might
be justified as a measure amounting to self defence, especially if
there is as measure of illegitimacy in the acts of the other State. Directly related to this problem is that of refugee issue.
The refugee question is undoubtedly another area, in our opinion,
where international law ought to occupy itself more than ever before.
It must be recognized that the problem of refugees is principally a
humanitarian one, and as such, the principles of international law must
be invoked in its solution.
The roles of international universal law are already represented in
this case by the United Nations Convention of July 29, 1951, modified by the protocol of 1967 - the United Nations Declaration on
Territorial Asylum, of December 14th 1967; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which dates from 1948 .
While we recognize that this could be a useful an.d positive step,
nevertheless, it will be much more realistic and helpful to develop
rules within the framework of international law, whereby the root
causes of refugee migration should be curbed to the minimum if not
completely eradicated.

3.

THE UNION OP SOVIET SOCIAUST REPUBLICS (USSR)

The Soviet government tries to justify its involvement in the Pakistan
conflict by the Indo-Soviet Treatyll hastily signed at the height of the
conflict.
20. IC1 Reports, 1949, p. 22. Thomas M. Frank and Nigel S. Radley discussed
the question of the Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force in a
recent article. Sec A.JIL, Vol. 67, No. 2, April1973, pp. 275-305.
21. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was ratified
in New Delhi on 9 August by the President of India, and in Moscow on 13 August
by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the OSSll. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 18-25 September 1971, p. 24820. For the full text of the treaty
see Ibid., at p. 24773.
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During the visit to New Delhi from August 8-12, 1971 by the Soviet
Foreign Minister Mr. Andrei Gromyko, in the course of which he had
talks with Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Swaran Singh, the two countries signed
on 9 August a treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation concluded
in the first instance for 20 years and automatically renewable thereafter for five-year periods unless either of the parties gave prior notice
of termination. The treaty contained clauses which inter alia provided
for immediate consultations between India and the Soviet Union in the
event of either country being subject to attack by a third country, and
which prohibited either country from entering into a military alliance
which was directed against the other.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty consists of a preamble and 12 articles out of
which Article 9 is of interest and relevant to the present discussion.
This article states:'Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from giving any
assistance to any third party, that engages in an armed conflict with
the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to attack
or threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter
into mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and
taking appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security
of their country'.
It would seem that Mrs. Gandhi's official visit to Moscow between
27-29 September at the Soviet's invitation, during which time she had
talks with President Podgorny, Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breshnev on the
Pakistan question, was in keeping with the provisions of Article 9 of
the treaty quoted above.
Mr. Kosygin said at a luncheon in the Kremlin on 28 September:
'It is impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistan authorities which
compelled over 8,000,000 people to leave their country, land and property ... At this crucial moment we address a call to President Y ahya
Khan to take the most effective steps for the liquidation of the hot-bed
of tension that has emerged'.
Events that came to light months after Mrs. Gandhi's visit tend to
show that the Soviet authorities' position was fast changing in support
of Indian military intervention. It is important to recall that all along,
the Soviet official stand was that of the Soviet Union's respect for the
national unity and integrity of Pakistan. 21 It is even strongly alleged
22. The joint statement inued on 8 October after Mr. Kosygin's visit to Algiers,
declared the Soviet Union's respect for 'the national unity and territorial integrity
of Pakistan'.
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that President Podgorny at his talks with President Yahya Khan and
President Girl of India in Persepolis on 15 October 1971, during the
celebrations of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy, assured President Yahya Khan that the Soviet Union's treaty with India
was not directed against Pakistan and that the Soviet Union would not
encourage 'aggression' by India. 23
However, Soviet criticisms of Pakistan's policy in East Pakistan
greatly increased after Mrs. Gandhi's visit; statements condemning
the trial of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, for example, were issued by the
Soviet Peace Committee on 30 September and by the Soviet Afro-Asian
Committee on 3 October. Pravda commented on 28 November that
'reactionary forces in Pakistan and abroad are doing everything to use
the situation for aggravating Pakistan-Indian relations and for giving
them the character of an international conflict'.
This statement was a clear indication of what the Soviet Union's
stand would be were the case to come to the Security Council of the
UN. And so it came about that the Soviet Unon rejected all attempts
to involve the Security Council and the great powers in the crisis
through the machinery of the world body, while at the same time increasing its shipments of military equipment and personnel to India.
Submitting the Soviet position in the conflict to a closer study, some
interesting points emerge. It seems clear that a double pretension surrounded the so-called Indo-Soviet Treaty. One party made it possible
for the other to launch subversion against a third country, while the
first invoked the Tashkent spirit. By the Indo-Soviet Treaty, euphemistically described as a treaty of friendship and cooperation, the
ussR had articulated a new 'security doctrine' for South East Asia. In
our opinion, the treaty was nothing less than a military alliance. The
proof of this cannot be far to seek. Events have conclusively proved
that.
Immediately after the treaty was signed, a series of military consultations started in Moscow and New Delhi, and supplies of sophisticat- ·
ed armaments such as MIG-23's, tanks and other military equipment
were dispatched post-haste to Calcutta and other Indian ports.l4 Having
thus upset the balance of power in the sub-continent, the Indo-Soviet
Treaty emboldened the Indians to opt for a military invasion of Pakistan.
23. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971, p. 24922.
24. This seems to be a normal Soviet tactic in such a situation as will be
observed in her attitude to the Nigerian conflict which is discussed in the next
section.
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4. THB UNITED KINGDOM OP GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

It seems that the United Kingdom's involvement in the Pakistan conflict, unlike that of the Soviet Union, was clearly geared more to such

a (political) solution of the problem as would bring a halt to human
suffering for the entire population of East Pakistan.
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec DouglasHome, made statements in the House of Commons on 8 and 9 June on
the situation caused by the mass influx into India of refugees from
East Pakistan and on British aid for the refugees.
According to Sir Alec, the British Government was concerned about
three problems which were inter-related: 'First - that of refugees to halt the flow and to arrange their return, which in tum depends on
a political settlement. Secondly, there is the ability of the Pakistan
economy to sustain life throughout the whole country . . . There is
finally, the possibility of widespread starvation later in the year in East
Pakistan by reason of the disruption of communications and of short
fall in the rice harvest •. .' 25
In another statement to the House of Commons on 23 June, Sir
Alec Douglas Home announced that the British Government would
not graiit any further aid to Pakistan unless there was 'firm evidence
of real progress towards a political solution.' 26 The Opposition Labour
Party was in agreement with the Goverment on what must have been
the 'difficult decision not to give further aid to Pakistan until there is
further progress towards a political settlement'. The withdr~wal of
fqreign aid, particularly military, should be encouraged on the part of
third States, where it is clearly seen to be directed towards minimizing
the escalation and expansion of an internal conflict. In the opinion
of Mr. Denis -Healy (Labour), the best way to initiate progress would
be for the Pakistan government to release Sheik Mujibur Rahman from
jail and begin negotiating with him as the elected representative of the
overwhelming majority of the population in East Pakistan.
The first official demand for the British recognition of the 'Provisional Government of Bangladesh' was tabled in a motion in the House on
15 June by 120 Labour MP's. The motion urged in addition that the
UN Security Council must be called urgently to consider the situation both as a threat to international peace and as a contravention of
the Genocide Convention. According to this motion, until order was
25. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 7-14 August 1971, p. 247.59.
26. Ibid.
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restored under UN supervision, the Provisional Government of Bangladesh should be recognized as the vehicle for the expression of selfdetermination of the people of East Bengal. This demand was considered in-opportune by Sir Alec Douglas-Home on the grounds that it
would be premature to involve the United Nations (in that respect) and
besides, the Indian Government had made no such proposal.
In any case, it was considered necessary to despatch a Parliamentary delegation to East Pakistan to assess the situation first-hand. 71 The
confidential reports of the two separate British Parliamentary delegations which went to investigate conditions and the plight of the refugees from East Pakistan were made to Sir Alec Douglas-Home on their
return. Both reports which later appeared in the national papers were
generally in disfavour of the Pakistani authorities. It must be noted
that the Pakistan government protested to the British Government
three times in one week, 28 against Sir Alec Douglas-Home's statement
to the British Parliament in which he said Britain would withhold further
aid to Pakistan until progress was made towards a political settlement
in East Pakistan. In the view of Pakistani officials, Sir Alec's state-ment was considered to have exceeded established diplomatic norms.
They thought that Sir Alec's views on Pakistan's internal affairs ought
not to have been stated publicly but communicated through normal
diplomatic channels.
We may sum up by subuiitting that the above discussion appears to
confirm our earlier suggestion that the British Government's policy
on the conflict in Pakistan was that the Pakistani authorities should
create a political framework within which civil government could be
restored and which would give confidence to the majority of the refugees
to return home.

27. The first British Parliamentary delegation to East Pakistan was between
12-18 June 1971, consisting of Miss Jill Knight {Conservative), Mr. James TiDn
(Labour), and Mr. James Rilfedder (Ulster Unionist). The second was announced
by the Foreign. and Commonwealth Office on 20 June, headed by Mr. Arthur
Bottomly (Labour), who was Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
(1964-66) and Minister of Overseas Development (1966-67) in the Labour Government. Its other members were Mr. James Ramsden {Conservative), a former
Secretary of State for War; Mr. Reginald Prentice (Labour), Miniater of Overseas
Development in 1967-69; and Mr. Toby Jessel {Conservative).
28. The letters of protest were on 29 June, 3 July and S July 1971 respectively.
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5.

THE PEOPLE'S REPtJBLIC OF CHINA

The Chinese government at first adopted a restrained attitude towards
the crisis suggesting that it wished to avoid becoming involved. However,
Chou-En-lai, Prime Minister of the People's Repu~lic of
na, sent a message to President Y ahya Khan on 12 April pledging
China's full support for Pakistan in the situation arising out of the
civil war in East Pakistan. He said: •... The Chinese Government
holds that what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely an internal
affair of Pakistan which can only be settled by the people of Pakistan
themselves and which brooks no foreign interference ... Your Excellency must rest assured that should Indian expansionists dare to laun~h
aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will,
as alwayS, firmly support the Government and people of Pakistan in
29
their struggle to safeguard the nation's sovereign~ and ind~pend~n~e.'
'Ibis stand was reiterated . by the Chinese acting Foretgn Minister,
Mr. Ali Pang-fei, at a banquet in honour of the Pakistan delegation on
7 November. He said: 'The East Pakistan question is the internal affair of Pakistan, a reasonable settlement of which should be sought by
the Pakistani people themselves and it is absolutely unpermissible for
any foreign country to carry out interference and subversion un~er any
pretexts ... The Chinese Government and people, as always, ~ resolutely support the Pakistan government and people should Pakistan be
subjected to foreign aggression'. On returning to Islamabad the following day, Mr. Butto, who led the delegation, said that the mission had
been a co.mplete success and that •concrete and tangible' results had
been achieved.
Chinese official statements attributed the entire responsibility for
the war to ·India, and accused the Soviet Union of encouraging Indian
aggression. The Chinese expressions of support for Pakistan markedly
hardened in tone after a Chinese Government delegation led by Mr.
Li Shui-ching, Minister of the First Ministry of Machine Buil~g,
arrived in Pakistan on a week's visit at the invitation of the Pakistan
government.

Mr:

6.

C!rl-

THE UNITBD STATES OP AMBlliCA

The United States of America had been a 'traditional supplier' of arms
29. Keesillg's Contemporary A.rchivu, 29 May-S June 1971, p. 24629.
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to the Pakistan regime. While events in East Pakistan forced a number
of States which had equally been supplying arms to Pakistan to stop
doing so, the Nixon Administration found it most difficult at first to
put an end to its arms shipments to the military regime of President
YahyaKhan.
The New York Times first reported the persistent continuation of
arms shipments by the us to Pakistan. According to this paper, two
Pakistan ships had sailed from New York in May with cargoes of us
military equipments. The Indian Ambassador in Washington raised the
matter with the State Department on June 22. In reply, the us Administration stated that no fresh foreign military sales to Pakistan had
been authorised or approved, and no export licences for commercial
purchases issued or renewed since March 25, 1971, when the civil war
in East Pakistan began. It admitted, however, that the ships, might
have carried either foreign military sales items which had been approved or commercially purchased, and for which export licences had
been issued before that date.
The Indian Government failed to obtain an assurance 30 from the us
authorities that its military aid to Pakistan would end. Even though
there were strong demands on the us Senate Foreign Relations Committee for immediate suspension of us military aid to Pakistan as early
as May 1971, it was only on November 8, that an announcement was
made that the us Administration had revoked export licences for military equipment for the Pakistan Army valued at more than $ 3.000,000,
although spare parts to the value of $ 16,000,000, which had been
cleared by the customs but were held up by the dock strike, would be
allowed to go through. 31
One can hardly deny that the East Pakistan question was essentially
at least a humanitarian one. Can it therefore be argued that it constituted a violation of the rights of the people of East Pakistan for the
us to remain impervious to their appeals, and indeed encourage the
infringement of the people's interests by diplomatic and military assistance to what may be termed for short, 'the other side' for such a
long period of time, even in the face of mounting international pressure against continuing such an action?
30. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, December 18-25, 1971, p. 24993.
31. For calls on the us Senate Foreign Relations Committee for immediate
suspension of us military aid, see, New York Tm1es, May 7, p. 15, col. 1. For the
House's Action see, Ibid., July 16, 1971 p. 1, col., 3. See alao Crisis in East Pakistan, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Foreign
May 11 and 2S
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If this question is put on the basis of an infringement of human
rights as such, the answer must probably be in the negative. Considered, however, from possible illegal intervention in the internal affairs of
another country, the answer might be different. However, it must be
observed, that later on increased international protests against the
stand of NIXon's Administration in the conflict resulted in the us Government's shift of attitude. The United States Congress decided to suspend economic and military aid to Pakistan until such a time as it had
resolved its internal conflict. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
voted to end all aid- 'military, economic, grants, loans and sales' to Pakistan until President NIXon 'proves to Congress that Pakistan is
helping to bring peace to Indian sub-continent and is letting refugees
to retum to heir homes. 31
The us change of policy towards the settlement of the conflict can
be further evidenced in the statements of Mr. Bush, the United States'
representative at the United Nations Security Council debates on the
matter. The salient points of his contribution were contained in the us
33
draft resolution at the security Council debate on Pakistan. The draft
resolution 34 failed to touch some vital issues in the crisis. It failed to get
the Security Council 'call for a political settlement in East Pakistan
which would inevitably result in a cessation of hostilities; and call upon
the Government of Pakistan to take measures to cease all acts of
violence by Pakistan forces in East Pakistan which have led to the
deterioration of the situation'. On the other hand, the resolution failed
to reprimand India for her open military intervention, nor did it call on
her to desist from a continuation of such an act.
Having eoncluded our analysis of the complicated issues involved in.
the Pakistan conflict including the attitudes of the selected States in
the matter' we· now elect to examine the Nigerian conflict in the next
chapter.

32. See Associated Press report in Denver Post, October 15, 1971, p. 7, col. 1.
33. See the Security Council Debates on the Pakistan Conflict, in the UN
Monthly Chronicle, January 1972, p. 10.
34. For the text of the draft resolution, see the UN Monthly Chronicle,
January 1972. A vote was taken on the draft resolution submitted by th.e United
States- in favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, N1caragua,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States. Against: Poland,
USSR, Abstentions: France, United Kingdom. The draft resolution was not adopted
because of the negative vote of a permanent member of tho Council.
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9. The case of Biafra
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1. BASIS OP THB INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OP THE BIAPRAN
GOVERNMENT

r

...

The Nigerian conflict like the Pakistan question treated earlier started
as a purely internal dispute. In spite of the efforts of the Nigerian
Fe~eral ~tary Government to regard the war against Biafra as
strictly an mtemal Nigerian affair all through, events that followed
~rou~t the matter. within the bounds of international concern, in the
first mstance to Africa and secondly, to the world as a whole.
This view is justified by the following elements of the case which
soon emerged.
1. Supply of arms, including aircraft and heavy guns, by the Governmen~ of the Unite~ ~gdom, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the UAR,
and m small quantities by some other countries to the Federal
Government and ·from officiaiiy undisclosed sources to Biafra.
2. The condition of Biafra's population, which was cut off from the
sea and encircled by the federal troops became of great concern to
the whole world.
3. The recognition of Biafra as an independent State by certain Governments which thus, so far as they were concerned, accorded Biafra th.e status of a full member of the international community (at
least m the formal sense). These were the governments of Tanzania (13 april 1968), Gabon (8 May 1968), Zambia (20 May
1968) and lately Haiti. In a statement by General de Gaulle at a
press conference in September 1968, French moral support was declared, and a decision to recognize in the future could not have
been completely excluded.
4. To these must be added the fact that the Federal Nigerian Government submitted to the pressure of the Organization of African Unity (oAu) to discuss 'her internal dispute' with Biafra. The outbreak
of hostilities resulted in mass movements of the civilian population,
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and starvation was hightened. Since the blockade prevented any
importation of food, a world-wide campaign to save the starving
women and children of Biafra was launched by the ICRC, the Churches and other international humanitarian bodies.
It can be firmly established from the above that the Nigerian conflict
outgrew its national boundaries. We must now a~e~t .a surv~y of
vital legal questions connected with the matter of Btafra s mternational
personality. Such questions would, undoubtedly, include the extent of
Biafra's statehood in the sense of international law to qualify as one of
its subjects. Of equal importance also is the issue of recognition and
her competence to conclude international agreements which would be
binding in international law.

2. TBB BXTBNT OP BIAPRAN STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Doubt has often arisen as to the degree to which, during the conflict,
Biafra attained the status of a State within the meaning of international
law. Could it be said on the basis of any satisfactory reasoning that
Biafra at any, time enjoyed a measure of international personality?
Naturally, to determine the legality of the claim of statehood of
Biafra, one would have to examine whether it had all, or at least the
essential characteristics required by international law, namely, a representative and effective independent government, defined territory,
and a sufficient degree of stability, evidenced by the support of the
majority of the population.
We submit that most of these factors were present in the case of
Biafra, though not completely without some legal queries. These factors are specifically examined below.
A representative organ - the Consultative Assembly, which comprised 300 people drawn from all the areas of Biafra was set up by the
military Government of Eastern Nigeria at the initial stage of the
crisis. This organ had the power to take decisions of any sort in the
best interest of the entire population of the former Eastern Nigeria. It
was this body that mandated General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu on the eve of 30 May 1967 to declare the region an independent
sovereign state at the earliest possible date. The Biafran government
drew its authority for the conduct of the war with Nigeria through this
organ.
Talking of Biafra possessing most of the essential elements of statehood listed above, we must point out that some of them underwent a
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fundamental change after independence was declared on 30 May 1967.
Take for example the question of ascertaining the true wishes of the
population. This posed a difficult problem in the face of hostilities.
With the movement of the population during the war, it became increasingly difficult for the members of the Consultative Assembly to
maintain contacts with those they represented. This, of course, is the
consequence of war. Nothing short of a plebiscite could possibly resolve
the issue of what the people desired. On the other hand, we must
observe that this is not peculiar to Biafra, but is true of every other
war. We may here recall the point we have made earlier to the effect
that during the second World War and during earlier wars, the legitimacy of Provisional Governments and governments in exile was never
questioned on the grounds that such governments had no contacts
whatsoever with the people they claimed to represent. This position is
still recognized in contemp<;>rary international practice.
Biafra officially proposed that a plebiscite be held to determine
whether the people would like to remain Biafrans or be Nigerians on
29 June 1968. A statement said: 'The Government of Biafra offers a
plebiscite to Nigeria as the converse of her insistence on a cease-fire
first in regard to a negotiated settlement. Without asking Nigeria to
drop her quarrel with Biafra, it only asks that this be prosecuted peacefully. It offers honourable peace in place of bloody battles. The Government of Biafra accepts the principle of self-determination ... The
inhabitants of the disputed areas must be given the opportunity to decide by a free plebiscite whether they want to belong to Biafra or to
Nigeria'. This offer was rejected by Nigeria.
For a state to qualify as one under international law, it is fundamental that the government formed to handle its affairs should have a
representative character or at least be in effective control of the 'national' territory. Is the new government entitled to speak in the name
of the state, so that on the one hand it may assert the legal claims of
the state and on the other hand assume responsibility on the part of
the State for its conduct? It would seem that an affirmative answer to
these questions could be given if the available evidence showed that the
new government held office with the assent, or at least with the
acquiescence, of the people. In the Biafran case, it is true that the
Biafran Government could not persuade the Nigerian Government to
accept the holding of a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people
in the disputed areas. However, it is also true that in normal usage
assent or acquiescence is implied from the fact that the new government
is in actual control of the administrative machinery of the state, is
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performing normal governmental functions, and is not meeting with
open resistance to its authority. 1 'Stability' is the word which is often
used to describe the de facto situation, and it is in practical application
the equivalent of 'effective possession of authority'. 2 There can hardly
be any doubt that the Biafran movement had maximum support from
the population concerned. It was not just the affair of a handful of
people, but a national movement of national character and scale in
which the Biafran will was manifested on a national basis. The governmental machinery functioned .reasonably effectively until the end of
the conflict, in so far as the circumstances permitted. There was never
any Distance of a wilful breakdown of law and order during the period
of the twenty-seven months of its existence. In fact a government is
considered to have acquired a reasonable degree of internal stability, if
the government has been enjoying the habitual obedience of the bulk
of the population. 3
International law follows the realistic rule of regarding such de facto
control over a given period as implying the general acquiescence of the
people. We can imagine the government though exercising effective de
facto authority is nevertheless doing so clearly without the assent of
the people it purports to represent. How long third States must wait
before reaching the conclusion that there is general acquiescence is another matter.
We must observe here that the fact that past international law lended
support and recognition to de facto control of a territory over a given
period as ~plying the general acquiescence of the people and as a decisive element justifying the legitimacy of a government is unfortunate.
We submit that this position is highly unsatisfactory and should not be
allowed to _persist. Contemporary international law should no longer be
satisfied with·mere de fact~ control of a given territory as a yard-stick
for determining the right government, but should interest itself how in
actual fact the control is attained and being sustained. The important
issue is whether the government in control enjoys the support of the
people it governs or not.
By this stand, we do not, of course, mean to suggest - and this we
have observed before in the example of the Czechoslovakian Govern1. Fenwick, C. G., The Recognition of New Governments Instituted by Force,
American Journal of International Law, 1944, p. 448.
·
2. Ibid.
3. Sen, A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice, The Hague,
1965, p. 411.
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ment - that in recent times, there do not exist governments which are
factually in de facto control of certain territories, but nevertheless do
not enjoy the support of its people. There is nothing one can do except
to recognize this fact It is lamentable and should be condemned and
discouraged. The other question-of willingness on the part of the
new government to observe the rules of international law and to fulfil
the international engagements of the states-has normally been judged
by its actual pedormance after it has come into power. ·
A discussion of the territorial question of Biafra cannot, in our
opinion, be separated from a discussion of the more general and controversial question of the concept of territorial integrity of States. It can
hardly be disputed that Biafra started its war against Nigeria on a defined territory to which she continued to lay claim throughout the conf1ict. It is clear that the possession of a territory, a population and a
sphere of jurisdiction is seen as a postulate of statehood itself rather
than as a right conferred by international law on the State.
Those opposing the implementation of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, with regard to peoples already
under the jurisdiction of sovereign and independent States, often point
to the fact that it poses a great and continuous danger of conflicting
with other norms of law, e.g., those of non-intederence and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; of the illegality and
possible nullity of territorial changes brought about by force, as well
as of course the illegality of the use of force itself. The case was made
against Biafra to the effect that recognition of her sovereignty would
destroy the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Let us see how far this stand
is correct.
The preservation of the territorial integrity of the State is an idea to
which all States pay at least lip-service. Many international treaties
and conventions contain clauses for the protection of the boundaries
of the signatory powers. The United Nations Charter and the Charter
of the Organization of African Unity are cases in point. But in binding
one another to assist in preserving the existing boundaries, states are
often driven not by any high-minded motives, but by the fear of loosing territory already in their control.
The concept of territorial integrity was designed to discourage the
ambitions of those states which did not adhere to it with regard to the
territories of other states. It did not necessarily protect those states
which regard themselves as bound by it. It has never been designed to
guarantee the states that there will be no uprising from within the state
itself. Moreover, like many international law precepts, it had in the
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last resort only a moral sanction. 4 For international law recognized the
right of states to acquire territory by conquest.
The Organization of African Unity in a Charter reminiscent of
many aspects of the United Nations Charter has embraced the idea of
the sanctity of the territories of member-states. The purpose stated in
Clause (c) of Article 2 of the OAU Charter is to defend the sovereignty
and territorial integrity and independence of member states. This aim
is repeated in Clause (3) of Article 3 in which member-states affirm
their 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State
and for its inalienable right to independent existence.'
When the OAU resolves to defend member's territorial integrity it intends to defend it only under certain circumstances. For, to protect
the territorial integrity of member states at all cost and in any circumstances would inevitably lead to situations of absurdity. For instance, suppose the member-state, in response to internal stresses within it, -decides to break up into two or more states (Mali federation)
- could the oAu go to war to prevent it from ruining its territorial
integrity? Obviously not, because it would lead to the legal absurdity
of intedering in the internal affairs of the other states which clause 2
of Article 3 clearly provides against The intention, it would appear, is
merely to protect the territory of a member state against other states
and not against forces inside the state itself.
Again, could the OAU employ force or diplomatic pressure to compel
a body of citizens of a member state, which has opted for self-determination against the will of that member state, to renounce their independence ·in order to preserve its territorial integrity? It could not because when it disapproves of the action of the breakaway section of
the state it treats the matter as an internal affair, which does not permit of discussion under Clause 2 of Article 3 of its Charter. When it
approves of or is neutral to the action of the new State, the only boundaries left for the OAU to protect are those boundaries of the original
state that remain after the boundaries of the new state shall have been
excluded.
The OAU recognizes the right of a new state to emerge from an existing state through the process of self-determination. The preamble to
the OAU Charter states that the Heads of African States and Governments are 'convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to
4. We must remark that the point is not that it only had a moral sanction
whereas other parts of international law had more than that, but that international law itself legitimized conquest, so only moral sanctions could prevent it.
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control their own destiny'. It is pertinent to note that the OAU Charter
does not limit the application of this principle and does not condemn
secession in any member state, nor has the Charter been amended to
insert this item.
Apart from the legal trip wire which could inevitably bring down the
OAU if it sought to compel a part of a member state to abandon its
claimed independence, there is also a moral and philosophical argument in favour of part of a country breaking away in certain circumstances. This argument is derived from Locke's theory of society and
government. The exercise of political power by the State springs from
the will of the people. The power of the people over government, however, is still not quite as complete in Locke as it came to be in later
and more democratic theories. 5 Rousseau's theory of a social contract
between the State and its citizens has some relevance in the present
question under discussion. The exercise of political power by the State
emanates from . the will of the people by what he called the 'social
contract'. Government exists as a result of a tacit agreement with each
individual governed the State contracting to protect the life and
property of the citizen who, for his part, surrenders the exercise of the
powers of government to the State. Should the State prove unequal to
the duty of protecting the lives and property of the citizens entrusted
to her care, those citizens are justified in regarding the 'social contract'
as at an end. 6
The application of this theory, not directly in relation to cases of
secession, but rather significant as regards the implementation of the
'theory of right of resistance' has freed many nations from the shackles of absolutism and monarchial tyranny. For instance, it led in
England to Cromwell's revolution which swept away the Stuarts and
their 'divine right of Kings' ideas and replaced them by the parliamentary democracy. And in France it led to the people's revolution of
the 1790's and to the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy by republican democracy. In recent times, it has resulted in the birth of a new
nation of Bangladesh as a result of the repressive and ruthless military
rule of President J ahya Khan against its citizens in the Eastern wing of
the country. It must be made clear that the Bangladesh case differs
from the foregoing examples in that the uprising was aimed at secession and the creation of an independent State, while the revolutions in
France and England aimed at changing the 'system' of government.
5. George H. Sabine, A history of political theory, pp. 517-541.
6. Ibid., at pp. 575-596.

164

But the common feature is the crucial element of the right, and aspiration of the people to effect such fundamental changes.
Unfortunately there is still a very weak spot in legal reasoning - the
failure to develop a clear formula in solving the problem of secession.
Legal thoughts up till now have often centred around a nation, a
government or a State.
From what has been said so far, the following conclusions emerge.
Firstly, in breaking away from Nigeria, Biafra was not in breach of
international law, nor of the Charter of the OAU, nor yet of any other
recognized law. Secondly, there is nothing sacred about the concept of
territorial integrity, for the territories of a state alter with the changing
fortunes of the state, and sometimes even disappear altogether.
Before passing on to the special field of the recognition and treatymaking competence of Biafra, let us summarize what has been discussed so far. In carrying out our general analysis of the essential elements of statehood in international law, it has become clear that Biafra
satisfied those minimum conditions. There is no doubt that Biafra met
the requirements of population, government, permanence and a reasonable measure of effectiveness - for the time it lasted. It had a defined
territory, the controversy on this being mainly restricted to the areas
inhabited by the so-called minority groups of the region. The legal
status of this part would have been finally determined through democratic -~eans, in the event of a halt of hostilities, as was proposed by
the Biafran government. The state of Biafra was not in fact subject to
any other government and Nigeria was not in effective control of that
territory which was in effective control of Biafra. The factual conditions constituting the basis of independence and sovereignty (two
categories often used synonymously) are factual conditions which
were present in the case of Biafra.
3.

TBB QUES'FION OP RECOGNITION AND TREATY-MAKING COMPETENCE

OF TBB BIAFRAN REGIME

In present times, the founding of a State on a territory which is res
nulUus, belonging to no one, is such a rare phenomenon that it can
well be left out of account. The modem occurrence is that new international entities originate mostly on or from the territory of existing
States. In most cases they are established as a result of the division of
an existing state or as the result of secession. The new States or entities
start their new legal life side by side with the old state on the internat;ional plane.
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Modem writers on international law hold the view that the question
of recognition has become a political rather than a legal affair. Bot
writes that the granting or withholding of recognition is nowadays
often largely determined by political factors. 7 This may be so, but if this
observation actually represents the present trend of State practice with
regard to recognition, we are inclined to doubt it, if it follows that_
every regime recognized by a certain number of governments would
necessarily be held in strict law to have the characteristics of a state
or government. We have our reservations on this: for political motives
often inspire a course of action not consistent with legal prerequisites.
But if, on the other hand, Bot has in mind the recognition of regimes
or entities which answer all or the essential criteria of statehood in
international law as mentioned above, he will be right. It definitely
does not follow that all regimes or entities so endowed will become
ipso facto recognized states, for recognition may be withheld for
political reasons. (This is one aspect of the opposition between the
declaratory and the constitutive theories of recognition). It would however be incorrect to assert that the fact of a denial of recognition of a
regime that has satisfied the essential elements of statehood suffices in
itself to deprive it of statehood in law.
It should be borne in mind that a secession from an existing state,
although constitutionally a breach of the law and therefore from the
point of view of the parent state illegal, is not on that account contrary to international law. Certain authors maintain that it is a duty of
States to recognize a new State which has come into existence as a
result of secession. For example, according to Lauterpacht, 'although
rebellion is treason in the eyes of municipal law, it results, when
followed by the establishment of an effective government wielding
power over the entity of national territory, with the consent or the
acquiescence of the people (for a reasonable period of time) in a
duty of other States to recognize the change and to treat the new
government as representing the State in international sphere.••
The explanation for Lauterpacht's stand is not far to see. He is a
recognized protagonist of the doctrine by which entities must be ac
cepted as subjects of international law by the mere fact that they
possess the normal characteristics of statehood. Recognition by other
States is a recognition of this situation.
It would, however, seem that the practice of States does not support
7. Bot B. R., Non-Recognition and treaty Relations, Leyden, 1968.
8. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 1947, p. 409. (Italics added.)
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the view that !JeW states like Biafra can have no legal existence prior
to recognition. We consider it unnecessary to go into this any further
here as we have discussed it in much more detail on the Rhodesian
question. 9 Certain quarters have argued that Nigeria recognized Biafra
by accepting to go into peace talks with Biafra.
Without going deeper into the technicalities of the legal effects of
the attitude of not recognizing the independent existence of Biafra,
which was adopted by a large number of the members of the Organization of African Unity (Aou) - an attitude based on political rather
than legal motivations - or the recognition of Biafra by four African
countries and one Latin American country, or the official statement of
support by a European country (France) or the fact that Nigeria herself maintained relations with Biafra at least during the peace talks
under the auspices of both the Commonwealth Secretariat and the
Organization of African Unity, we must not fail to observe that there
can hardly be any force of reasonable argument to deny the fact that
the conflict was internationalized to such an extent that Biafra's
existence was accepted as a fact, even if objected to on the basis of
political and legal queries by her opponents. In the practice of states,
the gap between the elements of the legal maturity of a state regime,
and political acknowledgement of it, widens gradually and in more
and more cases. Even though third states may wait indefinitely before
according recognition to what is happening, nevertheless, the legal facts
or actual state of affairs cannot be denied. The decision of either the
incumbent or third states not to make its recognition of the legal facts
based on the Consideration of the political consequences with regard to
its allies goes to widen the gap between the fact of legal maturity and
political acknowledgement of that fact. But then what explains the fact
that 1he widening of this gap is not consistent in the practice of States?
It is true that in some cases the gap closes. In international practice
recognition is sometimes even given to entities which are not yet in
control of the territory. There are examples to illustrate this. For instance, Cuba and some other states recognized the Provisional Goverment of South Vietnam as opposed to the recognition by other States
of the Republic of South Vietnam which is no longer in full control of
the territory. 10
9. See the section on "The Personality of Unrecognized States in International
Law', Part D, chapterS, infra.
10. But according to the orthodox view such recognitions are considered premature and not justified on the facts - therefore not really legitimate, and a
species of intervention.
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As regards the Biafran case under consideration, it wop.ld be difficult
to deny that Biafra was tacitly recognized as having at least lawful
belligerent status. With regards to the question of Biafra's treaty relations with other subjects of international law, it must be admitted that
there is no evidence of this fact. This is consequential upon the fact
that States are reluctant to make public their dealings with states and
entities whose international personality still remains a matter of open
controversy. Consequently, there is shortage of basic literature in this
field.
In any event, there does not appear, in our opinion, any question of
the right of the new revolutionary government to administer, so far as
it can, the domestic affairs of the territory it purports to represent. It
is the business of foreign diplomatic representatives to decide on which
subjects they are convinced could be treated with the de facto authority. The established practice in this situation is that before a treaty may
be signed with the de facto government, or other commitment entered
into, third states s~k to assure themselves that the government in
question is sufficiently well-established to be taken as spokesman for
the people of the State. To this extent, there is no avoiding some procedure which, if not recognition in form, would be the equivalent to
it and leaves little or no doubt with regard to the fact that the de facto
government is understood to represent an international legal person
and is a subject of nternationallaw.

It was very difficult initially to determine the external forces that were
involved in the conflict. However, on 30 July 1967 (barely two months
after the declaration of the independence of Biafra) Chief Enahoro,
Federal Nigerian Commissioner for Information and Labour and Mr.
Ogbu, Permanent Secretary at the Federal Ministry of External Affairs were alleged by the Biafran authorities to have visited Moscow to
negotiate for arms. 11 This allegation was immediately denied by the
Nigerian Embassy in Moscow on 1 August. u On 19 August a total of
15 Soviet Antonov transport aircraft carrying inter alia six MIG

fighters and six MIG trainers were reported to have landed at Kano
airport with about 170 Russian technicians for assembling the aircraft. 13
Arms did not come only from the Soviet Union but also from other
communist countries in Eastern Europe. Two Czechoslovak-built jet
fighters were reported on 8 August to have left Accra for Lagos; on
16 August a Polish ship was reported to be unlaoding five jet aircraft
and supporting armaments from unknown sources to Lagos. It would
appear that even though the Soviet Union and some other Western
powers, particularly Britain, had at the outbreak of the conflict characterized it as an internal matter, both countries took action which
eventually, and because of the way the situation developed and the
character which the struggle took on, might be considered of an 'interventionary' nature.
In Britain, the grounds for the British position were laid in a message delivered by Mr. Michael Stewart (the then Foreign Secretary)
to the British House of Commons during an emergency debate on
12 June 1968 concerning the Government's policy of continued arms
supplies to the Nigerian Federal Government when he said: 'If Britain
had withheld arms from the Federal Government after Nigeria's independence it would have been tantamount to saying: We have put the
Nigerians in a position where they are -heavily dependent on us. Now
that they are faced with a challenge, we are going to put them at a
heavy disadvantage.' 14 Sir Alec Douglas-Home (the previous Foreign
Secretary) added weight to the argument supporting this policy by
stating: If arms shipments ceased, Britain would lose all influence with
the Federal Government We cannot intervene in the internal affairs of
an independent Commonwealth country. If we tried to do so, the Commonwealth would quickly disintegrate.' 15 There are other statements put
out in defence of this policy which we do not consider necessary to
reproduce here. Since those statements failed to differ substantially
from the two quotations reproduced, they may be taken as endorsing
the British Government's popular and official explanation for her
persistent arms shipments to the Federal Government. It thus became
evident that the British Government became a supporter for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Nigeria. It is perhaps early to
say how consistent the British Government's policy was in this case. 16

11. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 9-16, 1967, p. 22244.
12. An agreement described as dealing with cultural cooperation between
Nigeria and the Soviet Union was signed the following day, August 2nd in Moscow. According to Tass, the official Soviet Government information media, this
agreement was negotiated in Lagos in 1966.

13. XCA., op cit., 1967, p. 22245.
14. The House of Commons Debate on British Arms Supplies to the Federal
Government of Nigeria u quoted in Kccsing's Contemporary Archives, 24-31
August 1968, p. 22875.
15. Ibid.
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It is also doubtful how convincing the arguments advanced in support
of this stand are. For the moment, we may state that there has been
little evidence of British influence with the Nigerian government being
put to the test, if indeed it existed at all. The time it should have been
put to the test was before the Kampala peace talks 17 took place and if
this had been successful these talks might not have been so inconclusive.
The other prophecy of the Commonwealth crumbling just because of
a possible withdrawal of a member country must be rejected as improbable since events have conclusively proved that theory wrong. 18 It
is but fair to note that whilst supplying arms, there were two main
British peace initiatives - one by the Government and the other by an
independent body. Let us survey them briefly. Upon the breakdown
of the Kampala talks, over conditions for a cease-fire, Lord Shepherd,
Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, arrived in Lagos on 20
June and on the two following days had talks with General Gowon and
senior Federal officials. The joint communique issued at the end of the
talks concluded: 'General Gowon reaffirmed that, provided agreement
was reached on ending secession and preserving a united Nigeria, the
Federal Government was agreeable to a cease fire arrangement involving an external observer force as means of giving a sense of security to the Ibo people. He emphasized the responsibility that he
personally, and the Federal Government, felt responsible for the security, safety and well-being of all Nigerians wherever they lived in the
Federation'. However, this mission achieved very little.
The private initiative of Lord Brockway was undoubtedly better
prepared than that of the British Government, through Lord Shepherd.
Lord Brockway went to N"~geria and Biafra in December 1968 .on behalf of the British Commission for Peace in Nigeria." Lord Brockway,
16. If a conflict ia described as internal, and ia clearly so, then by definition
no gov~rnment has the right to intervene or try to influence the coune of events
in any manner. But the British Government tried to influence the Nigerian
Peace moves, which was put to the test when Lord Shephered was in Lagos.
17. The Kampala talks began on 23 May 1968 but broke down on 31 May
over conditions for a cease-fire, the Biafran delegation maintaining that the
armistice must be unconditional, while the Federal Government insisted that it
must be preceded by a renunciation of Biafra's secession.
18. Pakistan's withdrawal from the Commonwealth as a result of the recognition of Bangladesh by some members has produced no such effect.
19. An Organization including leading members of all three British political
parties, all the missionary societies, some ex-Colonial administrators (including
two former Governor-Generals of Nigeria).

170

who was eighty years old, made the trip with James Griffiths, M. P.
-an ex-Colonial Secretary. The initiative resulted in a brief Christmas truce, which it was hoped could be extended to provide an opportunity for further steps towards peace. The decision of the British
Commission for Peace in Nigeria, which commanded much support in
the British Isles, to sponsor an independent peace initiative under
Brockway's leadership, we believe stemmed· from the fact that firstly,
all the former British Government peace moves had failed to achieve
any meaningful results; and secondly, it appeared that any future
· British Government effort at peace must be considered partial by the
Biafran side. Lord Brockway outlined these measures:
1. cease-fire;
2. an international peace-keeping force;
3. negotiation for political settlement;
4. massive relief of hunger and sickness.
However, despite the attention with which Lord Brockway and James
Griffiths were received by both General Gowon and General Ojukwu
no progress was made in the direction of implementing Lord Brockway's peace plans.
An important aspect of the British attitude to the Nigerian crisis
concerned the dispute over payments of rents, royalties and taxes to
the Biafran regime by the British oil company Shell-BP, which was
operating on Biafran territory. 20
General Ojukwu signed a decree on 21 June ordering all oil companies operating in Biafra to supply information on oil revenues payable, under penalty of £5,000 for failure to comply. The Federal
Government, on the other hand, claimed that all revenues were, as
hitherto, payable to the Federal authorities. As a result, Shell-BP was
faced with a ·dilemma of whether to pay the Federal Government
revenue in respect of property over which the latter no longer had de
facto control, or whether to accede to demands by the unrecognized
regime in Enugu (capital of Biafra) which was in physical control of
the Shell-BP assets in Nigeria. The British Government refused to
make any foreign exchange available for payment to Biafra, and in
fact no payment to the Biafran Government was made, although she
proceeded to press her claim.
20. The largest share in N"lgerian oil production ia that of Shell-BP, who in
1966 opened a refinery near Port Harcourt in which the Nigerian Federal Government had a SO per cent share. Other oil companies holding concessions in Nigeria
are Gulf, Agip (a subsidiary of the Italian ENI), American Overseas, Tennessee,
Mobil But in Eastern Nigeria the only company operating besides Shell-BP ia
Safrap (of France).
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The British Government's steps to block payments to the Biafran
regime do not seem to agree with precedents in international law in
general and the British practice in particular. As to whether there is an
obligation on the part of an alien with respect to payment of taxes to
insurgent authorities in de facto control of a territory, it is undisputed
that taxes are properly payable by an alien to insurgents in de facto
control of an area and accordingly in a position to compel payment of
taxes. 21 There have been various incidents in international law, whereby
taxes of the usA and UK were paid by aliens to insurgents in de facto
control of an area and accordingly in a position to compel payment
of taxes. While we do not intend to undertake an elaborate illustration
to prove this, a few examples are considered desirable. The United
States Consul at Chihuahua, Mexico, informed the Department of
State on March 23, 1912 that the Provisional Government of the insurrectionary forces in that place had demanded the mine taxes due to
the Federal Government at the close of the month. The Consul was
instructed by the Department of State on 27 March that such taxes
should be paid under protest, that the protest should be made a matter
of record in each case so far as possible and that properly authenticated receipts should be secured for all taxes paid. Americans were
obligated to pay taxes to persons in de facto authority.n However, the
us Ambassador in Mexico City was instructed to lay the matter before
the Mexican Government, calling attention to the extraction of taxes
by insurrectionary forces and stating that the Government of the
United States of America would regard payments of such taxes to
persons exercising de facto authority as completely relieving American
citizens from further obligation with reference to taxes paid in that
way.
The next incident similar to the one just mentioned provides some
further material of interest to the topic under discussion. On 29 August
1914, General Carranza, as first chief of the constitutionalist army 'in
charge of the Executive' of Mexico issued a decree declaring null and
void all matters transacted or decisions rendered since February 19,
1913 by the Departmento de Fomento and later, during the Huerta
regime by the so-called Departmenta de Agricultura y Colonizaci6n.
The American Consul at Chihuahua reported to the Department of
State on November 21, 1914 that Mr. Louis Lane, an American citizen
had on 26 August 1913 filed claims to 12 perteaencias of mineral land
21. See, Whiteman, Digest of lnterrllltional Law, Vol. 1, June 1963, p. 330.
22. See, Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, 1940, p. 132.
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before the proper office in the city of Chihuahua and he now wished
to know what steps should be taken to protect his titles, in view of the
Carranza decree of 29 August 1914. The Consul pointed out that,
though the mining interests of the Republic of Mexico were exclusively
under the central government, nevertheless, no further relations were
then maintained between the State of Chihuahua and the Central Government
The Department of State replied on December 1914: 'So far as concerns the individual cases of American citizens affected by this decree,
it would seem that the Department could offer them no further advice
than to inform them that if they consider it adviseable to attempt to
comply with the provisions of the decree, under generally accepted
principles of international law, they are entitled to pay taxes to persons in de facto authority.' 23
In March 1915, the Department of State instructed the Consul at
Mexico City to advise American citizens that they were obligated under international law to 'pay taxes upon their property in Mexico to
persons in de facto authority . . . and that . . . they would do well to
consider the matter of the local control of the territory in which their
properties are situated. 24
With respect to British practice, the following appears typical: In
1865 an insurgent group was in possession of a custom house in Peru.
The de jure Peruvian government issued a decree declaring that all
duties collected by the insurgents would be considered as not paid and
the government would require such duties to be paid again to its own
offices as soon as its authority was re-established in the port. The
British Law Officer Phillimore instructed the British Charge at
Lima thus: 'That, according to the universal usage of nations, dues
paid by foreigners who take no part whatsoever in a civil war which
breaks out in the country where they are peacably resident and carrying on trade under the faith of Treaties and general international law,
to a de facto Government which demands and has the power of compelling this payment must be considered to be paid to the Government
of the country.' 25
It seems to us that international law and custom governing the question of payment of taxes and royalties to insurgent authorities in de
facto control of a territory has been so consistent practice that it is
doubtful whether the British Government was acting in accordance
23. Ibid., op. cit.,
24. Ibid., at p. 139.
25. See, Whiteman, Digest of International Law, VoL 1, June 1963.
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with international law when forbidding her S'!Jbjects to pay royalties to
the de facto authority of Biafra.
H the stand of the British Government was based on the consideration of the fact that Biafra was neither recognized as an insurgent nor
as a belligerent by the British Government, it would still appear to
contradict the British practice in such cases. 26 It must be observed that
the British practice in this respect distinguishes belligerency from recognition of either the parent or insurgent governments as the legitimate government. As stated by the British Foreign Secretary in 1937:
'Recognition of belligerency is of course quite distinct fro~ recognizing
any one to whom you give that right as being the legitimate Government of the country. It is a conception simply concerned with granting rights of belligerence which are of convenience to the donor as
much as they are to the recipients.' 27 Thus, in 1937, Britain conceded de
facto recognition to the insurgents in the Spanish Civil War, in regard
to the territory under their control, and also went so far as to exchange
agents.
One would immediately pause to ask: where does the true explanation of the British attitude in the Biafran case actually lie? Was the
Nigerian Federation really so sacrosant when the colonial federations within the Commonwealth had failed to be of any practical
26. The British practice in the matter of belligerent recognition was authoritatively stated by the Law Officers in 1867 (See Smith, Great Britain and the
Lllw of Nations (1932), Vol. 1, at p. 263). According to the terms of this statement tho mere declaration by insurgents that they have constituted a 'Provisional
Government' is insufficient to justify belligerent recognition. Before the grant is
made, consideration should be given to the length of time that the insurrection
has continued; the number, order and discipline of tho insurgent forces; and
whether the newly constituted government is capable of maintaining international
relations with foreign States. It is generally known that tho operations of insurgent
forces may attain such a degree that they are in effective occupation of, and
constitute the de facto authority in a large part of tho territory formerly governed
by the parent government. In this case the problem is at once raised for outside
powers of entering into some contact or intercourse with the insurgents as the
de facto authorities in order to protect their nationals, their commercial interests
and their sea-borne trade in regard to tho territory occupied. We believe that the
actual war between the Federal forces and the Biafran forces reached such dimensions as from 9 August 1967, when the Mid-Western state of Nigeria fell to
the Biafran troops that outside powers were compelled to treat the war between
tho Federal military forces and the Biafran forces as a real war between rival
powers and not as a purely internecine struggle - in other words, recognition of
belligerency.
27. J. G. Stark, Introduction to International Law, 6th edition, London, 1967,
at p. 152.
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value? Could the reason be as certain quarters often tend to explain,
the fact that two different governments handled both cases, BangladeSh and Biafra? Our view is that the government took the wrong decision and this decision was wrongly implemented throughout.
As concerns the position of other governments, the United States
Department disclosed on July 11 1967 that it had refused a request by
the Nigerian Government for military aid on the grounds that the
dispute with.Biafra· was a purely internal matter to be settled by the
Nigerians themselves. 21
The Kingdom of the Netherlands and Belgium supplied arms to the
Federal side for a part of the war. However, Dr. Joseph Luns, the then
Netherland's Foreign Minister, announced in the Lower House of the
States-General on 6 June 1968 that all arms deliveries to the Federal
Government would be immediately suspended and that the Netherland's Government would ask other countries to do the same pending a
cease-fire in the civil war. 29
Mr. Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister, told Parliament in
Brussels on 5 July 1968 that all arms shipments to the Federal Government had been frozen, and on 15 July the Belgian Government an.:
nounced its intention to withdraw licences for the export of arms to
Nigeria following the confirmation of reports that a Sabena aircraft
{the national airline of Belgium) which had crashed near Lagos on
13 July 1968 had been carrying arms ·for the Federal Goverment under
an already existing contract. 30

5.

APPRAISAL OF TBB STATUS AND TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY OF ORGANS

OF NATIONAL LmERATION MOVBMBNTS

The United Nations Charter refers to self-determination as a principle
in Articles 1(2)31 and 55. n Even though the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is silent on the subject, both of the international cove28. a:A, September 9-16, 1967, p. 22243.
29. Ibid., August 24-31, 1968, at p. 22876.
30. Ibid. In our view, these states did the right thing legally by stopping, to
ship arms to tho contending parties, even if their initial supplying of arms may
be said not to have been illegitimate according to traditional international law.
31. One of the UN purposes noted in Art. 1(2) is to 'develop friendly relations
among nations based -on respect for the principles of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace •• .'.
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nants - the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 - provide in identical language in the first article
that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. 33
Six years earlier, in 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 34 acknowledged the 'right'
of 'all peoples' to self-determination. At its 25th session, the Genera]
Assembly unanimously declared that all peoples have the right to determine their political, economic, social and cultural destiny without
any external interference. 15 Concomitantly, it urged all states to promote
the principle of 'self-determination of peoples .. .' 36
H self-determination refers to 'the freedom of a people to choose
their own government and institutions and to control their own resources'37 there seems to be a striking contradiction between the right of
'all peoples' to self-determination and the right of a state to its 'territorial integrity', the latter precluding secession. This contradiction is
also obvious in the UN prescriptions and practice in self-determination
as well as in the practice of States as can be seen from the foregoing
analysis of the Bangladesh and Biafra cases. For example, in the Nigerian conflict only five states recognized the Biafran claim to independence and despite a protracted struggle lasting over two and half
years, neither the United Nations nor the Organization of African
Unity spoke for Biafran self-determination. Earlier during the Congo
crisis, the United Nations had been responsible for offering an organized opposition which prevented the Katangan claim to secession. 38

There are many other instances where the world community has ignored claims for self-determination such as exist in Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Tibet, Kurdistan, Formosa and Guinea-Bessau.
It is submitted that the demands of self-determination must in the
last resort be placed above those of the 'territorial integrity' and 'noninterventionist' stands taken by 'the United Nations. But the question
is largely one of timing. Initially these latter principles must prevail.
Rebellion inside a State, even if it gathers momentum so as to become
a civil war or a. bloody conflict - call it a revolution, should never be
encouraged or exploited by outside forces or powers. No State big,
medium-sjze or small, should try, through a treaty written or unwritten
to exploit such a situation. The tragic position, in which humanitarian,
economic and political problems are mixed in such a way as almost to
defy distinction between them, presents a challenge to the international
community as a whole which must be met. Under certain circumstances
a claim to self-determination, even in a non-colonial setting, may be
valid under international law. Third states must recognize and appreciate the concomitancy of two competing international personalities.
They should refrain from giving support to either of them, precisely
because both of them still enjoy international personality and as such
should be protected by international law. H an insurrectionist movement has acquired sufficient force and stability to call for a recognition
of its character as a movement of genuine self-determination, - which
is not to say recognition of the insurgent authority as a government as
such, other States are entitled, even bound, to recognize that they deal
with the insurgent element qua belligerent not necessarily as a recognized government. It is but essential to recognize the legitimacy of its
aim if it can achieve it, and if its status as a regular belligerent in the
process, and for the purpose of doing so, if the situation warrants this.

32. Art. 55 reads in part: 'With a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, the United Nations shall note ...'.
33. Art. 1 in both Covenants. The Covenants were adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200 (XXI) December 16, 1966, as contained in UN Monthly Chronicl~ (No.2), at pp. 41-72. (February 1967).
34. General Assembly resolution 1564 (XV) GAOR Supp. 16, UN Doc. A/4684,
at p. 66 (1960).
35. General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.
36. Ibid., See also General Assembly resolution 2787 (XXVI) of 6 December
1971.
37. Moore, 'The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict', 9 Va. J.
International Law 205, 247 (1971).
38. See, generally, L. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, 66-166 (1967).
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INTllODUCTION

In looking for the answer to the question whether international organizations are subjects of international law, we should keep in mind the
conclusion reached earlier, that if an entity claims to have international
legal capacity no rule of international law comes into play until the
entity appears and asserts itself. 2 This conclusion was inspired by the
following reasoning.
The question whether the entity is entitled to do so is substantially
the same as whether it has the international capacity which it claims to
have. If the answer is in the affirmative and so recognized, it means
that a series of acts pedormed by that entity in the field of international law and relations are legal acts, and it is admitted to have the
capacity to pedorm them. We must recall here that the subject of any
given legal order means that entity to whom the norms of the legal
order in question apply, and whose conduct this order regulates or
licences by imposing duties or conferring rights.
It must be observed, however, that it is not always correct to assume
that a legal system addresses itself directly to certain entities. Sometimes, a legal order may in certain respects regulate or licence the conduct of some entities indirectly. However, the important issue is that
any subject of law should be capable of ha'ring certain rights and duties
under the given legal system. The degree of this eapacity may vary,
but this is an entirely different matter.
For an entity to be regarded as a subject of international law, that
enti»' must enjoy some measure· of international personality. Thus, th~
· ·1. The term 'international organizations' aa used here refers to organizations
the memberahip of which is c:oafined to governments or governmental authorities -.sometimes called inter- governmental organizations.
2. See, Clapter 1, Subject.r of International Law - TheoretiCill EZimlination.

181

,.

"'
~~tl

.,

:,.l lo
11~: ::

notion of international personality is a juridical concept which is regarded as essential to provide a legal basis for entitling a subject to
rights, and submitting it to obligations under international law.
Whether international organizations are subjects of international law
has been a question of controversy for some time. This was a direct
consequence of the basic premise of the classical view of international
law which denied almost all entities other than states personality in
international law.
This stand-point was evident in international law literature at a time
when the development and expansion of international institutions had
as yet made little impact on international law. Side by side with the
development of international organizations there has been discernible
in international law a trend towards the attribution in some degree of
international personality to them.
The International Law Commission in its commentary to the Draft .
Articles on the Law of TreatieS in 1969, noted, that entities other
than States might possess. international personality, which according to
the Commission's view is a principle of internationallaw. 3 Examples of
such entities are increasing gradually. They include inter-governmental
organizations such as the United Nations, 4 some dependencies and
colonies 5 which are on their way to statehood, and also 'communities'
which have been customarily described as States which as a matter of
internal and constitutional law can be considered States by virtue of
their political cohesion, their internal autonomy and their historical
status. 6 International law writers on this intricate question have shown
four approaches to which we shall now tum. 7

3. Yearbook of lntenuJtloMl Law Comml&rlon (1962-11), p. 37.
4. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN case, ICJ Report1,
1949, p. 185; Whiteman, Direst, 1963, Vol. I, p. 548.
5. Yearbook of International Law Comml.rslon (1965-11), 1, 17.
6. Yearbook of the lnternatioMl Law Comminlon (1953-11), p. 95. The Holy
See, and the constituent unita of some Federal States which belong to the latter
group have been examined.
7. Our classification of these approaches is based on an article by Dr. Manuel
Rama - Montaldo on 'lntemational Legal Personality and Implied Powers of
International Organizations', British Yearbook of "International Law, 1970. It may
be necessary to observe that these approaches arc valid, and it is not so much a
matter of argument as of appreciation and prefercoce.
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MODBS OP APPROACH

L

The inductive approach

1. Existence of personaUty. Those who hold to ·this method of approach express the view that every organization possesses some rights
and duties. These rights and duties are expressly conferred upon the
organization. From this body of rights and duties, the organization derives a general international personality. Framing this in other words,
the international personality of an organization according to the supporters of this position, 1 is a consequence of the expressed or sometimes
implied rights and duties, as can be evidenced from ~e constituent
instrument of such an organization. Bowett writes: 'Whilst, therefore,
specific acknowledgement of the possession of international pe~~ty
is extremely rare, it is permissible to assume that most ~rgamzations
created by a multilateral inter-governmental agreement will, so far as
they are endowed with functions on the international plane, possess
some measures of international personality .. .' 9

b. The objective approach
According to this approach, the structural ~ntent o~ an. org~ation
is considered to be of prime importance. Speaal attention 1S pmd to the
specific elements pertaining to compos~tion, voting procedure, ~ctions
and above all powers of the organization. Once these pre-reqws1tes are
established, then the personality of the organization. is admitt~. It is
further thought that the foundation of the person~ty of ~ mtemational organization is not the will of the States but 1S to be discovered
in general international law. In the opinion of Seyersted, it is the international legal order which ascribes personality to an entity fulfilling certain conditions. 10

c. The formal approach
2. Content of personality if it exists. According to this approach, it
is sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that an organization has specific
8. Bowett, The Law of lnternatfoMl Organization~ (1964), p. 275. Sec Brownlie, Prlndplu of International Law, 1966, p. 520.
9. Bowett, Ibid.
10. Seyerstcd, ObjectiYe lnternatioMl Per1onallty of International Orranlzatiolll, 1963, p. 46.
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rights and duties from the simple premise that such organization is endowed with international personality. In order to ascertain whether an
organization has the capacity which it claims, it is essential to have
recourse to the provisions of the instrument setting up the organization.
Dr. Brownlie observes that 'Particular care should be taken to avoid
automatic implication from the very fact of legal personality of particular powers, such as the power to make treaties with third States, or
the power to deligate powers.' 11 This point of view is held also by other
writers such as Ingrid Detter 12 and O'Connell. 13

d. The material approach
The fact is recognized that legal consequences may vary in their nature and degree, but they, however, possess one essential feature- they
identify a certain category of rights and duties which is considered to
arise from the very personality of the organization constituting an in
ternational person, irrespective in principle of particular provisions of
the constitution. Even though these provisions may be useful indicators of the personality, nevertheless they do not determine its content
Seyersted seems to be a strong supporter of this train of thought He
writes: 'International organizations like states, have an inherent legal
capacity to perform any sovereign or international act which they are
in a practical position to perform. They are, in principle, from a legal
point of view general subjects of international law, in basically the
same manner as states.' 14
Seyersted thinks that the personality of an international organization
is founded on general and customary international law, 15 but that the
inherent powers of an international organization, seen from the international point of view, can be limited if the constitution of such an
organization forbids the organization to perform certain legal acts, 16 or
if the acts within the organization wishes to perform exceed the purposes set down for the organization. 17
e. Assessment of these approaches
We could continue ad infinitum to bring examples of doctrinal pro11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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Brownlie, op. cit., p. 527.
Detter, Law-making by International OrganizatioJU, p. 21.
O'Connell, International Law, Vol.1, p.109.
Seyersted, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
Seyersted, op. cit., p. 100.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 35.

nouncements on the question of international law, but meanwhile, we
might try to analyse some of the definitions already noted above.
It seems to us that the 'material' and 'objective' approaches offer the
best guidelines for focusing the .p roblem of the legal personality of
international organizations. By this we do not mean to imply that the
approaches have in fact offered the answer being sought for. But, at
least a close perusal of these approaches presents us with the following
general picture: there is a recognition of the fact that in the inten;tational sphere several and different subjects of international law extst;
also an admission of the distinct nature of the unidentical subjects of
international law which, consequently, results in their differing rights
and duties. We share Seyersted's view to the effect that the personality of an international organization is founded on general international law. This in tum is proved by international practice.
But, on the other hand, not all his points of view are, in our consideration, free from criticism. For example, he attempts to find in the
practice of an international organization a clear equation of organizations and states. We consider that this is basically wrong in view of the
evident differences in their legal nature. Furthermore, it is not clear
from his attitude whether the 'international acts' and 'capacities' and
the 'activities of international organizations' form a common category
which may be considered as a necessary consequence of personality.
As for the opinions of the three other publicists cited above namely,
Brownlie, Detter and O'Connell, one essential and clear message is
carried; they call for a further examination of the constituent instrument of a given international organization in order to establish its
capacity in law.
3. The Soviet view. Meanwhile we must survey another important body
of literature which has been more cautious and traditional in its approach to finding a solution to the question of international personality
of international organizations. The Soviet jurists who have spoken on
this problem can be conveniently grouped as follows: those of them
who grant a monopoly of international personality to sovereign states
to the complete exclusion of all international organizations, including
the United Nations, and those who, while denying that international
organizations are international perso~, on the ground that. !hey are
fundamentally different from states, still concede to these entities some
degree of international rights. We shall begin with the first group.
Professor L. A. Modzhorian maintains that as long as international
organizations are not sovereign entities, they are ipso facto not sub185
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jects of international law. 18 To her, the attribution of personality to
international organizations would undermine state sovereignty. 19 The
element of sovereignty is in her opinion indispensable as a certain
criterion of personality in international law. V. M. Shurshalow denies
that international organizations are international persons, on the
ground that they are fundamentally different from states. All the same,
he concedes some degree of international rights to these entities. 211
Professor G. P. Zadorozhnyi writes that whereas only 'sovereign entities are subjects of international law, such entities like international
organizations, juridical persons and physical persons, are, at least, only
subjects of international relations and not of internationallaw.' 21
It will be clear that the opinions of the above quoted Soviet international jurists, which in our view, represent a minority position
among Soviet authorities in international law on the subject, still
cling to a traditional view of international law. As a result of our
earlier arguments it will also be clear that this train of thought is unacceptable. It is being overtaken by the course of events. Moreover, it
neither serves a useful and objective purpose, nor is it in agreement
with the realities of contemporary international life.
It is necessary to point out that in a recent article on 'Subjects of
international legal responsibility', Professor Modzhorian gave what
appears to be a modified view of her original stand on the question of
subjects of international law and their international personality. She
states that: 'To bear international legal responsibility means to answer
for one's actions and in certain cases, also for the actions of others,
therefore, to be subjected to international legal capacity, i.e., international personality .. ·. The question of the international legal responsibility of international organizations cannot be decided other than in
close association with their international personality. The highly limited and conditional personality which member states grant to international organizations must serve, in our opinion, as the basis for the
determination of the international legal responsibility of these organizations.'22
18. L.A. Modzhorian, Sub'ekty Mer.hdUIUll'odnogo Prava, Moskva, 1958.
19. lbid.,•at p. 8 See also by the same author '0 sub'ektakh mezhdunarodnogo
prava' in Sovetskoe Gosydarstvo l prava, SOP, 1956, No. 6, at pp. 95-91.
20. V. M. Shurshalov, Omovnonye voporsy teorii mer.hdunarodnogo dogovora,
Moskva, 1959.
21. G. P. Zadorozhnyi, SBMP, 1968, at 364-365.
22. L. A. Modzhorian, 'Sub'ekty MezhdUliarodno-pravovoi Otvestvenosti' in
SOP, No. 12, pp. 122, 124.
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At the other end of the scale, is the next group of Soviet jurists who,
while laying strong emphasis on states as the real subjects of international law, accept that international~;>rganizations possess s~me measure
of international personality, whose derived and non-soverergn character
must be emphasized and should be borne in mind at all times.
R. L. Bobrov writes: •... the United Nations is a secondary, derived
(non-typical) subject of co~temporary intern~ti~nal law, creat~ by
the expressed will of soveretgn states - the pnnctpal and real subJects
of this law. Created as a centre for the co-ordination of the actions of
states in the name of peace and development of international co-operation
on democratic grounds, the UN is granted a certain measure
of international personality which is essential and necessary if it is to
execute its functions properly. The significant characteristics of the
international legal personality of the UN are interdependent and in
their totality constitute a specific legal personality which is based on
legal grounds that are different from those upon which the legal personality of states is founded. The capacity of the UN is strictly to those
23
•
•
•
powers granted under its Charter .. .'
Professor D. B. Levin posed the question whether mternational organizations can rightly be considered subjects of international law. To
this he gave an answer in the affirmative thus: Undoubtedly, they can
be if such organizations, on the basis of their constituent instruments,
po'ssess some measure of individual rights and obligations vis-a-vis states
especially the right to conduct external ~elatio~s inde~endently. ~c
cording to him, the international personality of mternational orgamzations is founded on the fact that these organizations promote the
common interests of member states in the sphere of maintenance of
international peace and security and development of int~r-state cooperation. These organizations, in his view, 'possess the nght to take
independent actions within the limits of these interests.' 24
Professor G. I. Tunkin, a leading Soviet jurist in the theory of international law, states that •there is no generally accepted norm which
defines the legal status of all international organizations . . . At the
same time, international law does not contain any norm which precludes the granting of certain elements of international personality .to
this or that international organization. The scope of such personality
shall be determined - in the case of such organizations, by the provi-

based

23. R. L. Bobrov, 'Iuridicheskaya priroda OON', SEMP, 1959, pp. 239-240.
24. D. B. Levin, Osnovnye problemy teorll mer.hdunarodnogo prava, Moskva,
1958, p. ss.
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sions of the constituent instrument ' 25 This point of view is shared by
G. I. Morozov, 26 R L. Bobrov, 77 E. A Shibaeva 28 and a host of others.
Professor I. I. Lukashuk had -as important conditions for the international personality of international organizations, the fact that members of such an organization must be states,· duly represented by their
governments, and, secondly, that a treaty between States must form the
f?undation of. such an organization. 19 Commenting on the same questio~, E. A. Shibaeva emphasized that: 'From our point of view one can
poi?-t to the fo~o~g fo~ criteria which must be satisfied by an international orgamzation which lays claim to $e status of an international
person: first, the inter-state (inter-governmental) character of the
organization? .secondly! universal membership; ... thirdly, a specific
charter !'ro~1on granting legal capacity for certain international rightS
~d obligations; and fourthly, compatibility of its aims and objectives
With the generally recognized principles and norms of general internationallaw.30
. A close _analysis of s~me of ~ese criteria shows significant inconsiStency With modem mtemational trends. The first requirement,
namely, that the membership of an international organization in order
to claim international personality, must be made up of sovereign states
is doubtful from the standpoint of theory as well as of practice. Theoretically speaking _(and as. we have observed elsewhere) no specific
rules or norms of mtemational law operate as a kind of precondition
for the emergence of an international organization endowed with international personality. It does not seem to us that the ascertainment of
the degree of international personality enjoyed by a given international
organization ought to precede its actual appearance in the international
sp~ere provided it consists of statal or governmental entities. Again, we
~eli~ve tha~ any attempt ~o lay down a body of rigid rules for attributmg mtemational personality to organizations would complicate matters
the more rather than offer the required solution to the problem..
The next point which merits observation in connection with the first
25. G. I. Tunkin, Omovy Sovremenogo Mezhudanarodnogo Prava Moskva,
1956, pp. 17-18.
•
26. G. I. Morozov, Organizatsii Ob'edinenrrykh Natsii, Moskva, 1962, p.198.
27. R. L. Bobrov, Osnovnye problemy teorli mezhdunarodnogo prava Moskva,
1968; and also 'Iuridicbcskaia priroda Organizatsii Ob'adnennykb Na~ SEMI'
1959.
•
28. E. A. Shibacva, Spetsializrovannye Uchrezhdenlia OON M 1966, p 32
29. I. I. Lukashuk, SEMI', 1960, at p. 148.
' '
· ·
30. E. A Shibaeva, op. cit., p. 32.
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requirement is the fact that there exist many international organizations the membership of which is not exclusively restricted to States.
The -organizations of UNESCO, 31 WB0 32 and rru 33 are cases in point,
to mention just a few organizations which grant associate membership
to entities which are not responsible for their international relations. It
would be a matter of guess to what extent the inter-state character of
these organizatioliS remains having regard to the express provisions of
their constitutions. The matter will be different if what is meant by the
specific requirement is that an organization formed initially by governments of sovereign states but later joined by non-sovereign state entities still retains its so-called inter-state character.
Shibaeva's second requirement that an international organization
must be universal in order to lay claim to international personality is
unconvincing to us. There exists today a good number of international
regional organizations which cannot be described as being universal
in the strict sense of the word. Take for example, the BEe and the
COMECON. These are clearly international organizations which are by no
means universal. It will be hard to deny them international personality
outright. The Soviet Union is a member of the COMECON and it does
not seem to us that any Soviet scholar would deny the COMECON the
attribute of international personality.
We feel convinced that the whole Soviet attitude towards the question of the legal nature of international organizations is connected with
the general history of the participation of the Soviet state in international organizations. Commenting on this is beyond the scope we have
set for ourselves on the present occasion. 34 The denial of international
personality to international organizationS by Soviet writers seems to us
to be based more on political than legal considerations. One can only
hope that the apparent shift from the original traditional stand of
Soviet international lawyers on the legal status of international organizations will continue to make substantial progress in view of the remarkable changes which are taking place in international law since the
Second World War.
31. Article 11, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of DNESco grants associate
membership to 'territories or groupinp of territories which arc not respollSlble
for the conduct of their international relations'.
32. Article 8 of tho WHo Constitution.
33. Article 1, pi.!'L 3, of the 1TU ConStitution.
34. For a clear and detailed analysis (historically approached) of the Soviet
eiqleriences in selected international organizations, see, Chris Osakwe, The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal International Organizations, Leyden,
1972.
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CONCLUSION

A further examination of the literature and Court decisions on the subject of the international personality of international organizations confirms that these organizations possess a degree of international personality.
The status of the League of Nations in international law was the
subject of guarded appraisal in the fourth edition of Oppenheim: 'The
League appears to be a subject of international law and an international person side by side with several States ... not being a State, and
neither owing territories nor ruling over citizens, the League does not
possess sovereignty in the sense of state sovereignty. However, being
an international person sui generis, the League is the subject of many
rights which as a rule can be exercised by sovereign States.' 35
The contemporary trend towards granting a measure of international
personality to international organizations, was strengthened by the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reparations
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations. 36 The request
for the Opinion arose out of the assassination of the United Nations
Mediator, Count Bernadette, in Palestine. The Court found it necessary, first to affirm the international personality of the United Nations
and then to consider whether the Organization had capacity to bring
an international claim. In the opinion of the Court, the functions and
rights attributed to the United Nations could only be explained on the
basis of the possession of a measure of international personality. The
Court continued: 'That it is not the same thing as saying that it is a
State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights
and duties are the same as those of a State. Still less is the same thing
as saying that it is a 'super State', whatever that expression may
mean ... what it does mean is that it is a subject of international law
and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it
has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.' n
From the foregoing discussion a number of points have become apparent First, the fact that the concept of international personality

seems to be firmly established; also, the general picture flowing from
our analysis is that international organizations are international persons, thoqgh not on exactly the same footing as sovereign states. Various consequences and attributes flow from the concept of international
personality, but the basis of what makes the law binding upon them
may vary from organization to organization.

35. Oppenheim-McNair, International Law, Vol. 1, 4th edition. p. 361.
36. JCJ Reports (1949), p. 174.
37. Ibid. For more examples from municipal c:ourts on the question of the
international personality of international organizations, eg. of the European Economic Communities, See, Detter, Law-Making by International Organizations,
Stockholm 1965, under the section 'Delegation of Law - Making Powers to the
European Communities,' pp. 271-318.
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11. The basis of the treaty-making
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Treaty-making is a common method of establishing a relationship with,
or creating rights and duties under international law for, public international organizations. In fact, in the years after the second World
War, the practice of international organizations in the field of the law
of treaties has grown extensively. There has been in the past (as well
as in the present) a considerable amount of controversy on the question of whether international organizations possess the capacity to
make treaties. Writers have sought different bases for the treatymaking capacity of international organizations and have in the process
advanced various theories in an effort to establish the correct
grounds. We may observe at this point that once we accept that international organizations have international personality and are therefore
subjects of international law, it would be absurd, in our view, not to
recognize the fact that they also enjoy some capacity to inter-act with
other subjects of international law including sovereign states. This right
of interaction automatically means the capacity to engage in certain
international legal acts which will be binding and should be juridically
determinable.
The increasing number of agreements concluded by international
organizations particularly since 1945 has been described as an •agreement explosion' by Professor Reuter 1 in his remarkable first report on
the question of Treaties Concluded between States and International
1. The Sub-Committee on treaties concluded between States and international
organizations or between two or more international organizations was set up by
the International Law Commission (n.c) at its twenty-third session. During the
1069th meeting in June 1970, Professor Reuter was elected its Chairman. On
July S, 1971 (A/CN.4/SR.1129) he was appointed a Special Rapporteur. He presented his first report to the II.(: at its twenty-fourth session - May 2 to July 4
1972 (A/CN.4/2S8).
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Organizations or between two or more International Organizations. It
is also worth recalling that during the 1965 session of the International
Commission, one of its members, Mr. Briggs, stated that there
were about 200 agreements concluded between international organizations, and over a thousand between international organizations and
states. 1 Hungdah Chin 3 in his work on agreements concluded by international organizations also restated this point of fact to the effect that
a review of the UN Treaty Series reveals that about one thousand
treaties have been concluded by international organizations. 4 Professor
Reuter gives interesting statistical information in his report regarding
the amount of treaties concluded by international organizations. According to him, a count through volumes 1-598 of the United Nations
Treaty Series gives, for the period 1 January 1946 to 31 December
1965, a total of 1,686 agreements, 1,317 of which were bilateral with
one State, 176 between organizations, 47 between States and one organization and 10 between one State and two organizations. 5
In order to obtain a proper insight into what the prevailing views in
doctrine are and how far these are supported by the jurisprudence and
practice of international organizations on the question of the basis of
the treaty-making capacity of international organizations, we propose
to break down our analysis into three sections, namely:
a. Doctrinal pronouncements and authoritative opinions of writers and
publicists on the treaty-making capacity of international organizations,
b. Judicial decisions on the subject; and,
c. The work of the International Law Commission (the Sub-Committee on Treaties concluded between Two or More International Organizations).

Law

2. DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AND AUTHORITATIVE OPINIONS OP
WlliTERS AND -PUBLICISTS ON THE TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY OP INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Proceeding on the assumption that capacity to conclude treaties is an
2. Yearbook of the lntenuztlonal Law Commluion, 1965, Vol. 1, 777 meetin&
para. 7.

3: Hungdah arln, The Capadty of International Organizations to Conclude
treaties and the Special Legal Aspects of the Treaties Concluded, Tho Hague,
1966, p. 17.
4. lbltl.
S. A/CN.4/2S8, para 7, footnote 16.

193

a~bu~ of so~ereignty, which is not possessed by international org~tions, wnten: have sought different bases for their treaty-making
~paat>:. Some wnters consider the possession of this capacity by an
I?ternational o~ganization as a test of the recognition of its interna-

tional. personality. 6 Others take a different position which considers
capaCity a co~sequence of international personality. 7 This position does
not seem to differ from the former in essence but in the matter of form.
Another gro~p of writers separates the concepts, and believes that
the treaty~making capacity of an international organization is to be
deduCC:d, if at aJ!• ?ot from the mere fact of its •personality', but from
the eVIdence pomting to its having that sort of personality which in·
volves the capacity to make treaties. •
Yet another group of writers takes a somewhat narrower view that
su~h a tre~ty m~g power must be conferred expressly. Kelsen
~tes that. the U~ted Nations has legally only the power to enter
mto .~ose mternational agreements which it is authorized by special
proVISions of the Charter to conclude.'' In any event it seems that as a
matter of _principle an organization cannot make all kinds of treaties.
~e ~Ctional. test requires that organizations can only conclude treaties which are m the context of their aims and functions whether ex'
pressly or impliedly attributed.
'J'!tere has ~een s~g suggestion that the recurrence of past contro~erstes ~d difficul~es. on the issue of the treaty-making capacity of
m.te~ational org~tions can be avoided by including in the constitutions of. ne~ mte~ational organizations provisions conferring on
these orgamzations etther full legal personality or some measure of
legal capacity with a defined content 10 This has been done in several
recc:nt ~es. Thus the. Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Orgamzation of the Umted Nations provides that 'The Organization
shall ~ve th~ capacity of a legal person to perform any legal act appropnate to 1ts purpose which is not beyond the powers granted to it
6. Clive Parry, Treaty-making Power of the United Natloru 26 BYIL, 108
(1949); Bowett, The Law of International l11stitutioru, Lond~n 1964 . p. 278:
0 Connel, International Law (1st edn.), Vol. 1.
'
'
7. G. L Tunkin, The Legal Nature of the United Nations, 119 Hague Academy
Recuell des Cours 31, 32, (1966, 111).
8. L A. Modzhorian 'Sub'ekty Mezhdunarodno pravovoi Otveststvennoati'
SOP No. 12, (1969), pp. 122, 124.
'
9. Kelsen, The Law of the United Natioru, p. 330.
10. Jenks, C. W., The Legal Personality of International Organizations BYIL
(1945), p. 269.
•
,
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by this Constitution.' 11 The Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development provide that the· Bank and the Fund respectively •shall
possess full juridical personality, and in particular, the capacity: (a)
to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable
property; (c) to institute legal proceedings.'lZ The International avil
Aviation Convention provides that the International avil Aviation
Organization 'shall enjoy in the territory of each contracting State
such legal personality as may be necessary for the performance of its
function. Full juridical personality shall be granted wherever com13
patible with the constitution and laws of the State concerned.' The
agreement concerning the establishment of the European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO) provides that the organization
shall have the capacity to perform any legal act appropriate to its
object and purposes, including the power to acquire, hold and convey
property, to enter into contracts and undertake obligations, to designate or create subordinate organs and to review their activity, subject
to a limitation in respect to the ownership of transport equipment and'
material,' 1• and embodies undertaking by member governments to
•recognize the international personality and legal capacity which the
Organization possesses.' 15 The Charter of the United Nations provides
that, 'The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulfilment of its purposes'. 16
The United Nations has limited treaty-making power provided for
in Articles 43, 57, 63, 77-83 and 105. Certainly the agreements entered into under these Articles are capable of being contracts in international law sense since some of them, particularly the Convention on
17
Privileges under Article 105, are entered into with non-members, which
takes them out of the category of acts merely internal to the organization.
While recognizing that the Charter of the United Nations contains
provisions expressly authorizing certain agreements, Brwonlie emphasizes that the existence of legal personality does not of itself support a
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Article XV (1).
Fund Agreement Art. IX, Sec. 2; Bank Agreement Art.
Article 47.
Article IV (1).
Article vm (13).
Article 104.
O'Connell, International Law (1st edn.), Vol. 1, p. 115.

vm.
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power to make treaties. According to him, everything depends on the
terms of the constituent instrument of the organization which needs to
be further interpreted by resorting to the doctrine of implied powers to
establish the degree of its treaty-making power. 18 In our opinion the
matter can properly be given an even wider basis - see Schneider's
view cited below.
_
There is little doubt that the inclusion of provisions conferring either
full legal personality or some measure of legal capacity with a defined
content into the constituent instrument of international organizations
is a very useful contribution to test the treaty-making capaciy of any
given international organization. On the other hand, this certainly·does
not provide a conclusive solution to the problem. Schnclder points out
that 'constitutions have by no means adequate provisions to authorize
the actual treaty-practice that is, by and large, uniform. The treatymaking power of international organizations cannot be completely
traced back to their constitutions (only). ' 19 'There are a number of
agreements by which organizations define more in detail their resp~
tive competence which the constitutions either do not at all or not sufficiently delimit.' 211
Schne~der also introduced another important view in his argument
which we fully share. He writes that, 'the organizational movement
after the ~ast war has precisely gained such momentum through the
steadily developing cooperation which does not permit that some of the
interested agencies are lagging behind and cannot ~ their part for
reasons of insufficient capacities. Because organizations really form a
unity in respect of their external cooperation the problem of their external capacities cannot be approached but by taking a general view
which founds itself on the uniform practice that has developed in this
very field of external relations.' 21
It is of interest that in certain cases in which the instrument constituting an international organization does not specify that the organization will enjoy legal personality it has been found necessary for
the organization to recommend governments to take any action required under their law to enable it to discharge its functipns effectively,
and governments have found it convenient to take such action in a
18. Brownlie, 'Principles of Public International Law', Oxford, 1966, p. 522.
See also Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, 1964, p. 278.
19. Schneider, Treaty-making power of International Organizations, Geneva,
1.959, p. 135.
20. Ibid., at p. 136.
21. Ibid.
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form tantamount to the recognition of the legal personality of the international organization.2Z Thus the Council of the U~te~ Natio~ Relief and Rehabilitation Administration adopted at 1ts first sess1on a
resolution recommending member governments to take any steps that
they might consider necessary to enable UNRRA to exercise within their
jurisdiction the powers. confet;ed by Article 1, .P:Ua~ph. 1, of the
lJN1lRA Agreement, which proVIded that the Administration shall have
power to acquire, hold and convey property, to en~r into contra~ts and
·undertake obligations, to designate or create agenaes and to r~Vlew the
activities of agencies so created, to manage undertakings, and m gener23
al to perform any legal act appropriate to its objects and purposes.'.
The SoViet attitude to the question of treaty-making power of mternational organizations is that in exercising treaty-making cap~ci~, international organizations must not exceed the sphere of therr nght as
. provided for in their respective consti~tive ~trum~nts. <;ln.~ or two
observations by Soviet jurists of authonty on this subJect will illustrate
this position.
.
. .
Writing on the treaty-making powers of international orgamzations,
Kozhevnikov states that, 'the subjects of an international treaty are,
first and foremost, states. International organs can conclude international agreements within the limits of their powers ~ prescrib~d ~y
their constituent instruments. However, in these treaties expresston 1s
given to powers delegated by States themselves, representing the principal subjects of internationallaw.' 24
· This stand is more or less re-affirmed and summarized by Tunkin
who observes: 'It is well-known that many international organizations
are endowed on the basis of their constituent instruments, with the
right to conciude agreements with other interna~on.al org~atio~s as
well as with States ... These agreements establish mternational nghts
and obligations ... However, the granting to international organizations of this capacity to enter into international agreements ~ be
placed on an equal footing with agreemen~ concluded by States znter
nor does it mean that we can automatically extend to the former
th~ application of norms of international law which are intended to
regulate inter-state agreements.' 25

se

· 22. Jenks, The Legal Personality of International Organizations, BYIL, (1945),
p.271.
'
ted
23. Resolution No. 32 of the First Session of the Council, para. 2, as quo
in Jenks, ibid.,· op. cit., at p~ 272.
·
24. Mez;hdunarodnoe Pravo - Uchebnik dlia luridichelklkh Vuzov, Moskva,
1966, p. 327.
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3. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
It may be recalled that the Advisory Opinio~ of the International

')

2

'"'
r;:

Court of Justice of April 1949 concerning Reparations for Iniuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations affirmed the international personality of the United Nations and found evidence of that
personali~, i?ter alia, in the· treaty-making powers conferred upon
the Orgamzation under the Charter. Having cited specifically the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 1946, the Court concluded that
•it ~ diffi~t to see how such a convention could. operate except upon
the mternational pl~e and as between parties possessing international
personality.' 26 Further the Court stated that, 'under international law
the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though
not ~xprc:ssl~ provid~ in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary ID1plication as betng essential to the performance of its duties.•ZI
In its opinion of Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, the ICJ pointed out that the
Cha.rter contains •no express provision for the establishment of juridical
bodi~ or organs and no indication to the contrary, but held that the
c:apaaty to establish a tribunal to do justice as between the Organization and the staff members arises by necessary intendment out of the
Charter.' 28

organizations was included by the International Law Commission in its
general progranime of work. 30 In its work on treaties, the definition of
a treaty adopted by the Commission has been framed broadly enough
to allow recognition of the new development in international law - the
increase role of international organizations in the field of the law. of
treaties. 31 This recognition was ag!lffi emphatically reaffirmed when the
Commission held that, ~temational organizations may possess a certain capacity to enter into international agreements and that these
agreements fall within the scope of the Law of Treaties. •31
Moreover, in Article 1(a) of part 1, it defined the ·term 'treaty' as
used in the draft articles, to mean •any international agreement in a
written form •.. concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international law', and in the commentary upon this definition»
it explained that the term 'other subjects of international law' was designed to provide for treaties concluded by:
a. international organizations
b. the Holy See, which enters into treaties on the same basis as States,
and;
c. other international entities such as insurgents, which may in some
circumstances enter into treaties.

5.
4.

THE WORK OF THE SUB-<X>MMITTEB 29 OF THE ILC ON TREATIES
CONCLUDED BETWEEN STATBS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR
BETWEEN TWO OR MORB INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The question of treaties concluded between two or more international
25. G. L Tonkin, Yoprozy T11orii M11zluJil1Ull'odnogo Prava, Moskva, 1962,
p. 82. See also the 8801e author, Teorila MllzluJUIIIlrodnogo prava, Moskva, 1970.
See also Lukashuk, 'An international organization as a party to international
treaties (1960), YBIL, p. 144.
26. ICJ Reports, 1949, at p. 179.
27. Ibid., at p. 182.
28. ICJ Reports (1954), pp. 56-51.
29. • ~e Sub-Committee on treaties concluded between States and international
orgamzations or between two or more international organizations was set up by
the International Law Commission (n.c) at its 1069th meeting on 12 June 1970.
The members are Mr. Reuter (chairman) and Messrs. Alclvar, Castren. Bl-Erian,
Nagendra Singh, Ramangasoovina, Roseune, Sette Camara, Tabibi, 1biam, Touruoka, Ustor, and Sir Humphrey Waldock.
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TBB WOU OF TBB INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

Before the setting up of a special committee (officially called the SubCommittee) on treaties concluded between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations, the
30. See R11port of the ILC for 1971, Supp. 10 (A/8410, Rev. 1), p. 72.
31. See Report of thll ILC covering the work of its eleventh session 1959
(A/4169).
.
See also the Report by Lauterpacht (A/CN/4164) 1953, commenting on Article 1.
32. At Its 14th session, the n.c in reaffirming decisions which it bad taken in
1951 and 1959 to defer examination of treaties entered into by international
organizations until it bad made further progress with its draft on treaties concluded by States, however, upheld this view. See Official Records of the General
Assembly, 17th Session Supplement No. 9 (A-5209), para 21.
·
33. Ibid., para 8 of the commentary to Article 1. ·
34. The n.c session for 1972 met in Geneva during the month of Aprll when
the first report of the special rapporteur must have been tended on the topic of
treaties concluded between States and international organizations or between two
or more international organizations.
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International Law Commission discussed widely the question of the
treaty-making capacity of international organizations. In Sir Humphrey Waldock's draft articles on the Law of Treaties adopted by the
ILC at its fourteenth session (24 April-29 June 1962) it is provided in
Article 3, that: '(the) capacity in international law {of international
organization) {hereafter referred to as international capacity) to become a party to treaties is possessed by every independent State,
whether a unitary State, a federation or other form of Union of States,
and by other subjects of internationallaw 35 invested with such capacity
by treaty or by international custom ...'
In the Commission's commentary to Article 3, paragraph 3, it is
stated that the term 'constitution' had been deliberately used in preference to constituent instrument'. For the treaty-making capacity of
an international organization does not depend exclusively on the terms
of the constituent instrument of the organization but also on the decisions and rules of its competent organs. Comparatively few constituent instruments of international organizations contain provisions concerning the conclusion of treaties by the organizations. Our understanding of the ILC's commentary is that an international organization can
be a ?arty to treaties in the sense of international law: in other words,
that It has the capacity to conclude treaties. The important caveat is
that such a capacity is not unlimited, as in the case of sovereign States,
for example, but is subject to such limitations as result from its constituent instrument and from the decision or rules made in accordance
with il
The earlier sessions of the ILC at which there was discussion of the
35. The Commission's commentaries to the set of draft articles on the law of
tr~ties provisionally adopted in 1962, and the commentaries to the final draft
articles on that topic adopted in 1966. contain some indications of what the Commission had in mind when referring to 'other subjects of international law'.
Paragraph 8 of the commentary to article 1 of the 1962 preliminary draft states:
'!he phrase "other subjects of international law'' is designed to provide for trea~es concl?ded by (a) international organizations, (b) the Holy See, which enters
10to treaties on the same basis as States and (c) other international entities such
as insurgents, which may in some circumstances enter into treaties. The phrase is
not intended to include individuals or COJ"pOrations created under national law
for they do not possess capacity to enter into treaties nor to enter into agreemen~
gove~cd by public international law'. Further, paragraph 2 of this commentary
to article 3 of the same set of draft articles indicates: 'The phrase "other subj~cts of international law'' is primarily intended to cover international organizations, to remove any doubt about the Holy See, and to leave room for more
special cases such as insurgent community to which a measure of recognition has
been accorded'.
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p}flce of agreements concluded by intemational organizations in the
different draft articles on the law of treaties presented by four eminent
British scholars, namely: Brierly, 36 Lauterpacht, 37 Fitzmaurice 38 and
Waldock 39 were characterized by sharp argument centred around
whether to include or exclude such agreements. Professor Reuter in a
precise and lucid manner analyses these 'shifts' in emphasis between
'inclusion' and •exclusion' of agreements concluded by international
organizations. 40
We do not intend to go into details of these debates here, save to
observe that the various formulations used in the Commission reflected
an attempt to describe a situation which, in the view of all members,
was characterized by two elements: the competence of an international
organization to conclude international agreements was limited in principle by its constitutional practice and this competence was not necessarily limited by its written constitution. 41 The menbers of the Commission could not agree on the precise wording. However, the version
which was finally adopted and justified by the Special Rapporteur
read: 'The expression "the constitution of the organization concerned"
had been chosen because it was broader than "constituent instrument";
it covered also the rules in force in the organization. In most organizations, the treaty-making capacity had been limited by the practice instituted by those who had operated the organization under its constitution.'41 j
The final position of the Commission on the subject was summarized
in the following terms: 'Accordingly, important although the provisions
36. For Brierly's first Report, see Yearbook of International Law Commis-

sion, 1950, Vol. 11, document A/CN.4/23, p. 233. His second Report is contained in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, Vol. 11,
document A/CN.4/43).
37. For Lauterpachfa Report, see Yearbook of the International Law Commission; 1953, VoL 11, document A/CN.4/63.
38. For Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's Report, see Yearbook of the International
Law. Commission, 1956, VoL 11, document A/CN.4/101.
39. Sir Humphrey Waldeck made four Reports Contained in Yearbook of the
International lAw Commission, 1962, Vol. 11, document A/CN.4/144; Ibid, 1962,
A/CN.4/L.161; Ibid, 1966, VoL ll, Document A/6309/Rev. 1, part ll, annex,
pp. 291, 313 and Officilll Recordl of the Gmeral .A.nembly, XVUth Session,
Sixth Committee.
40. See Professor Reuter's Report; Ibid., op. dt., at pp. 12-15. n.c Report,
tiN General Asacmbly, Official Records, 17th session, Supp. 9 at 7 (A/520, 1962).
41. Ibid., at p. 19.
42. Yearbook of the International Law Commiulon, VoL 1, 666th meeting.
para. 39.
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of the constituent treaty of an organization may be in determining the
proper limits of its treaty-making activity, it is the constitution as a
whole - the constituent treaty together with the rules in force in the
organization - that determine the capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties.' 43
The observations made by two Governments in 1965 in relation to
the question of the treaty-making capacity of international organizations require attention. Austria took a position in favour of very broad
competence for international organizations. In the Austrian opinion:
' ... capacity to conclude treaties must be an inherent right of any
international organization, if it is at the same time a subject of international law ... the constitutions of many international organizations
do not mention the question of the capacity of the organization in
question to conclude treaties. In most of these cases, however, the
organs of the organization in question have considered themselves competent to conclude treaties on behalf of the organization ... If, on the
other hand, the constitutions do contain provisions concerning the conclusion of treaties, they either relate to the questions which organs are
competent for the purpose - in which case they are of procedural
nature - or limit the extent of freedom to conclude treaties, which in
principle is all-embracing by stipulating that only treaties on certain
subjects are permitted.' 44
The United States, having quoted the 1949 opinion of the International Court of Justice, called mainly for the replacement of the word
constitution' by a less limiting word, for example 'authority'. 45 There
was general support for the deletion of the article on capacity to conclude treaties. 46
Nevertheless, in concluding his report, 47 Professor Reuter, while
recognizing the capacity of international organizations to conclude
agreements, cautioned that just as it was easy to declare that States
have the capacity to conclude treaties (1969 Convention, Article 6),
because that capacity is merely the expression of their 'sovereign equality' so it is difficult to deal with the same question in relation to inter-

43. Ibid., 1962, Vol. ll, document A/S'JJJ9, p. 164, para. 4.
44. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. ll, document
A/6309, Rev. 1, part ll, annex, p. 28.
45. Ibid., 1966, Vol. ll, document A/6309, Rev. 1, part ll, annex, pp. 346-347.
46. Ibid., 1965, Vol. ll, document A/CN.4/177 and Add. 1 and 2, p. 18 and
Vol. 1, 779th meeting, paras 3 and 7.
47. A/CN.4/258, p. 56, para 82 (1972).
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national organizations, which are characterized by a fundamental inequality as between themselves and States.

6. CONCLUSION

The following propositions are tentatively advanced by way of a sum-

~~ appears

that the prevailing view in doctrine, as supported by
jurisprudence and the p!actice of inte~ati~nal ~rganizations is that
the treaty-making capaCity of such bodies IS denved not only from
specific provisions in their constituent instruments, but also by implication therefrom. 48
2. One point which should deserve detailed study is the one concerned
with the organs through which the treaty-making power of international
organizations is exercisable. ~m~ writers have rightly con;ended that
'the law of international orgamzations does not as yet contain any clear
rules for determining where the treaty-making power of international
organizations resides.' 49 It is most difficult to trace what Detter calls the
'whereabouts of the treaty-making power within the organization.' 50
3. In order to establish the basis of the so-called jus contrabendl - capacity to make treaties of international organizations, it would be appropriate to study the clauses in international organization constitutions, from which treaty-making power derives, trying to establi_sh their
nature and the circumstances in which they occur so as to arnve at a
theory of the sources of the capacitr of international organiza~ons to
conclude treaties. It is important to find out whether such capaCity may
spring from tacit authorization or if it will always call for express
provisions.
4. Since it is widely accepted that treaties are means of devel~ping
peaceful co-operation among n~tio~ as th~ preamble ?f the V1enna
Convention clearly states, and smce mternational law will be only enhanced by the widest possible acceptance of the future rules to regulate
48. Clive parry, in Sj6rensen, Manual of Public International Law, New York,

1968, p. 183.
. . th · T ty
49. Detter, The Organs of International Organizations Exerc11mg err rea Making Power, in BYIL, Vol. XXXVlli, 1962, p. 421.
SO. Ibid., p. 444.
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treaty-making practice between States and international organizatiogs
or between two or more international organizations and other nongovernmental international organizations or even between international
organizations and other subjects of international law, we dare to suggest that organizations such as the Organization of American States
and the Organization of African Unity or other similar regional organizations may accept those rules that may be drafted and finally adopted
by the ILC's Sub-Committee if they choose to do so.

5. In general, it would seem possible to conclude that once an international organization has asserted itself and therefore has international
personality, it must be deemed, unless expressly denied, to have the
capacity to enter into agreements, which are appropriate to its purpose.

12. Non-govellliUental organizations•
and private corporations as subjects of
international law

A state-centric view .of international relations has prevailed for a very
long time. Even though the difference between public law and private
law seems to be less absolute in recent times, nevertheless, public law
still forms the basic aspect of the structure of contemporary international relations and law.2 Students and practitioners of international politics have traditionally concentrated their attention on relationship between states. Thus, the state is regarded as the basic unit of action
whose agents are the diplomat and soldier.
On the other hand, few would question that the advancement of
technology in various fields and better means of communication have
dramatically altered the nature of twentieth century international relations. Today, a good deal of inter-societal intercourse takes place. In
addition, there exists a wide variety of transnational phenomena: multinational business enterprises, trade unions and scientific research networks, international air transport cartels and communications activities
in outer-space. These constitute a proof of continuous growth in world
integration.
True, the destinies of the international society are still being shaped
largely by the community of states and therefore, entities which are not
sovereign States are still far from having a significant share in any one
of the three basic attributes of sovereignty: international legislation,
international administration, international judical authority - although
they are admitted to have, in each one of these spheres, some say, and

1. The term 'non-governmental organizations' is derived from the official
United Nations usage as set down in the ECOSOC Resolution 288 (X) and 1296
(XLIV). The classification of such organizations under this resolution appears
to be based purely on functional considerations rather than from the point of
view of their composition, for it is known that governments or branches of
governments are membC!rs of many non-governmental organizations.
2. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of lntemlltionallAw, 1964, at p. 222.
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though always limited still of varying, but never negligible degree. 3 .
This development was brought about through the political power of
some NGOS. Important among such NGOS are the Churches, Trade .
Unions and Humanitarian Organizations proper, on the one hand, and
by the totality of NGOS on the other hand. Though non-governmental
organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and the World Council of Churches (wee) have no recognized international status as subjects of international law, and may not be said to
have international treaty-making capacity, there is a growing number of
international transactions between governments of sovereign states anc:l
non-governmental international organizations which are humanitarian
in character like the two institutions mentioned above. Both of them
and a lot of others in that category contribute to mutual understanding amongst peoples.
The ICRC's role since the last war in the international humanitarian
front has tremendously increased. It includes agreements with governments in relation to questions of relief in distressed areas or war
situations. It also works for the proper treatment of prisoners of war
in the letter and spirit of the internationally recognized conventions on
war. 4 As a result of the atrocities of the Second World War and the
surge of the movements for the international protection of human
rights, there was a strong feeling that a minimum of humanitarian.
legal regulation should apply in all armed conflicts, regardless of their
internal or inter-state character. 5 It must be observed also that within
the framework of the ICRC, the UN and other bodies are making efforts
to re-examine and update the law of armed conflicts. 6 It is important to
3. Laderer-Lador J. J., International Non-governmental Organhatlons and
Economic Entitles, Leyden 1963, p. 11.
4. Tho four Geneva Conventions of 1949 deal respectively in a series of
detailed provisions, with the amelioration of the condition of the wounded
and sick in armed forces in the field, with the amelioration of the condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea, with the treatment of prisoners of war, and with the protection of civilian persons in time of
war.
5. The Stockholm Conference of the l{;li.C llt its XVll session formulated the
fourth paragraph of common article 2 in its Draft Article of the Convention for the
Protection of War victims. See, Pictet (ed.), Commentary of the Geneva Conventions, 1949, Ill, Geneva, ICBC, 1960, p. 31.
6. Sec the works of ICRC, Preliminary Report on the Consultation of experts
Concerning non-international Conflict and Guerrilla Warfare, Geneva, 1970. Also
the three reports by tho UN Secretary General on Respect of Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. A/77']J) 1969; A/8052 (1970); A/8370, 1971.
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add that many of these non-governmental organizations participate in
the work of public international organizations actively.

1.

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

7

In the arena of modern international relations, there are such big
crimbines like Unilever concern, Royal Dutch Shell, General Motors
Corporation, and a number of other giagantic private Companies.
8
These are clearly commercial combines which in the words of Tinberg,
'have to a large extent wrested the substance of sovereignty from the
so-called sovereign state.'
Many of the l~ge companies get their capital from ~erent co~
tries and often have subsidiaries or associates in foreign countries.
The ~vate non-profit institutions 9 that make grants for public purposes
depend for their existence on the private accumulation of wealth and
of fiscal and moral incentives for its philantropic use.
Again, though in terms of international expenditures they do ?ot
approach states in importance, nonetheless, the resources and attenti~n
of the larger philantropic foundations, especially such as Carnegie,
Ford, Rockefeller Foundations, can be critically important in specific
sectors of other societies.
In comparing the international position of all these entities with that
of international governmental organizations, one must start with the
fact .that they are in strict legal theory, subjects of private law.
But, however, the very fact that private coxporations like those j~st
named, and hundreds of others, are engag~ m v~t and complex ~
ternational operations, which involve them.m manifol~ ~ntacts .With
different governments and in many cases With the pub~c ~tema~onal
financial agencies, suggests that the problem of therr mternational
status cannot t?e so simply dismissed.
1. Here tho notion 'private corporations' is employed in the .most general sense
to designate all combines of non-governmental character which operate on the
international sphere and play a more or less active role in re-shaping tho structure of the contemporary international community.
B. Tinborg, 'International Combines and National Sovereigns,' 95 U.Pa. Law
Review, 581 (1947).
•
9. For a recent and detailed discnssion of tho economic strength and influence
of these foundations on 1he international plane, see, Peter B. Boll, 'The Ford
Foundation as a Transnational ActDr,' in International Organization, Vol. XXV,
No. 3, Summer 1971, at 465.
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Arnold Wolfers noted more than a decade ago that, 'the Vatican, the
Arabian-American Oil Company, and a host of other non-state entities
are able on occasion to affect the course of international events. When
this happens, the entities become actors in the international arena
and competitors of the nation state. Their ability to operate as international or transnational actors may be traced tc;> the fact that men idenify themselves and their interests with corporate bodies other than the
nation state.' 10 Long before Wolfers, Eugene A. Korovin, a leading Soviet
jurist and one of the founders of Soviet doctrine of international law
had written in the same vein, challenging the notion of the state as
the sole and executive subject of international law. He accorded recognition to the international personality of the World Trade Union Federation whose membership he reckoned neared 65 million, without,
however, drawing the legal consequences this recognition should have ·
in law.
It will be useful to examine further what major international transactions these private corporations engage in with States. How are
disputes between the parties arising out of such transactions resolved?
What law is applicable in such contractual relationships?

2. SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS AND STATES AND THEIR NATURE
a. concession agreements: The transactions between private corporations and governments are in many cases this type of agreements. To
explain what we mean by this sort <?f agreement, we choose to adopt
for our present purpose the working definition proposed by Fatouros.
According to him, 'a concession agreement is an instrument concluded between a state and a private person and providing for the grant
by the state to the individual of certain rights or powers which normal10. Arnold Wolfcrs, 'The Actors in World Politics', in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore, Md: Johns
Hopkins Press 1962), p. 23. This essay was first published in 1959 in William
T. R. Fox ed. Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959). Other writers who have departed
from the state-centric paradigm are John W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy
and Rules, (Cambridge University Press, 1968); James N. Rosenau, ed. Linkage
Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New
York: Free Press, 1969).
11. For Korovin's observation, see Infra, Chapter 1.
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ly would belong to and be exercised by the state.' u The~ ~y involve
the permission given to a foreign company by the ter~tonal g~~ern
ment to exploit certain natural resourCes under specific conditions.
Usually these conditions include normal rights and obligations of commercial transactions: time limits for delivery of goods or performances
of ~ervices, obligations to proceed with proper care, the app~~onm~t
of profits, stipulations as to the manner and extent of permtsstble unports, the employment quota of foreign .and local pe~~nnel and the
repatriation of earnings and capjtal. Typtcal charactenstics of concession agreements are that they relate to mineral ~d ~~er n~~al resources or to the operation of enterprises of public utility. It 1S vttal to
add that concessions may vary in their object, type and leg~ nature,
and therefore, may involve basically different legal transactions and
relationships.
b. instruments of approval: A good example of such an instrw_nent is
the one issued in May 1956 by the Greek Government concermng the
importation of capital for the exploitation of Greek asbestos by an
American Corporation. 13
· The decree starts with a statement of approval of the importation of
capital up to the sum of $ 8,350,000, to be used by the investing company for exploration, research and mining of asbestos, and fo~ i~ p~oduc
tion and sale. The use of the capital for the purpose specified m the
initial statement is an essential condition of the continued validity of
the whole instrument. The form in which the capital is to be imported
is clearly stipulated- namely, in the form of machinery and foreign
exchange in equal parts, over a period of ~lightly more lh:~ fo~ years.
Should the need arise the implementation of the proVISions IS to be
ascertained by the Ministry of Industry of Greece whose report ~ subject to a review by a special Committee composed of representatives of
two other ministries and of the investor, if the investor contests the
accuracy of the Ministry of Industry's report. The investing corp~ra
tion is allowed to transfer abroad, without limitation, the capital 1mported and profits. The investing Corporation is granted exemptions
from import duties and other charges on the machinery imported by it
during the initial period of ten years.
12. Fatouros, Govemment GUJUantees to Foreign Investors, New York, 1962,

~~
13. Royal Decree of May 30/June 23, 1956, concerning the approvalfth
o
e
importation of capital from abroad, by virtue of Legislative Decree No. 2687/
1953, by the Kounecott Copper ~rporation.
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During the same period, it is also exempted from all city and other
local taxes and charges. The employment of foreign personnel up to
the number of twenty-five persons is permitted, and such personnel are
allowed to export part of their salaries. Fmally, the instrument contains detailed provisions for arbitration in case of dispute.
c. guarantee contracts: By this agreement a state gives an investor
under certain ~nditions, a number of guarantees or privileges, in th~
absence of spectal statutes regulating the granting of such guarantees.
It must be pointed out, that though these three types of instrum~nts
appear similar in many ways, they are not identical.
They often differ in form as well as in content. While instruments
of approval usually take the form of administrative acts, ~ncession
~eements and guarantee contracts often assume the form· of legislation. In content they differ from the point of view of the fact that con-.
cession .~eements cover a wider range of issues of a legal, economic
and political character, than either guarantee contracts or instruments
of approvaJ.14
d economic development agreements: The modem economic
development agreements made by developing countries with foreign
corporations include: Ghana- Valco Agreement 1960,15 India_ Vacuum Oil Agreement 1952, 16 and the Iran Consortium Agreement,
1954. 17 Each of these agreements contains provisions for the submission
of disputes to arbitration which will form the central point of the next
question of our discussion.
14. Sec Berte, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution, 1954; Schwarzenberger,lntematlonal Law, vol. 1, (3rd. ed. 1957), p. 146.
15. This agreement was concluded on 17 November 1960, between the Government of Ghana and the Volta Aluminium Company (a Consortium of American
and Canadian Companies) for the construction and operation of an aluminium
smelter to utilize electric power produced from the dam to be constructed on the
Volta river. For a detailed discussion of this agreement see, Nwogugu, The Legal
Problems of Foreign Investment In Developing Countries, Manchester University
Press, 1965, pp. 170-173.
16. This took the form of exchange of notes between the Government of India
and. the Standard Vacuum Oil Company for the construction of oil refineries in
India.
17. The agreement was between the Government of Iran and the National
Iranian Oil Company on the one hand, and a consortium of American, British,
French and Dutch companies on the other, granting the consortium the right to
prospect and produce oil for a period of twenty-five years, with provision for
renewal.

3.

ARBITllATION

The ·settlement of disputes between individuals appear to be the oldest
form of judicial practice. It has preceeded the creation of judicial courts
and tribunals. However, the settlement of disputes between states and individuals is a very recent phenomenon. The concept of the settlement
of contractual disputes by means of an arbitration agr~ed upon ~ect
ly between a State and an individual or corporation Wltho~t lh:_e mterposition of the state of which the individual or a corporation 1s a national, is a fairly recent development. 18 What explains this n~w tren~ one
ask? As we have observed above, coi?-tempo~ary mtemattonal
relationships have witnessed more effo~ at mtegration between peoples, than perhaps at any other time in human history. 'f?e need ~or
the settlement of contractual disputes between states and pnvate parties
is consequent upon the fact of the increase in foreign inv~tme~ts,
concession as well as economic development agreements. mvolvmg
foreign capital and the expansion of ~terna~onal ~~erci~ transactions. Besides, a state's trading or mdustrial actiVJ.ties earned out
under the shield of the state's jurisdictional immunities no longer produce maximum result.
.
Nwogugu 19 has rightly remarked that arbitration pr~vides fle:n~le
and important machinery not only for the settl~m~t of mvestment disputes but also for the settlement of commerCial disputes. Such a proced~e will help to limit the claim of sovereign immunity which constitutes a hindrance in suing a foreign state. 211
An arbitral tribunal could be national (i.e. local) or international,
whose special characteristic is that the arbitrate~ are s~lected ~om
different countries. Other important feature of an mtemational arb1tral

may

18. Henry Cattan, The Law of Oil ConcesnoM In the Middle East and North
Africa, 1967, Oceana Publications, New York, p. 69.
•
•
19. Nwogugu, Legal problems of foreign investments m developmg countries,
Manchester 1965, p. 240.
·20. Ibid., at 241. In the Lena Gold Field Case of September 2, 1930 which }n·
volved a BritiBh private company and the Soviet Government, the arbitration
tribunal found in favour of the company without making any reference to the
sovereignty of the state of Russia. The tribunal held that, the Lena Company w~
entitled 'to be compensated in money for the value of the benefits of which 1t
had been wrongfully deprived. On ordinary legal princi~les, this constitutes. a
right of action or damages, but the court prefers to base 1ts a~ard on the pnn·
ciple of 'unjust enrichment' in its opinion, the money result 1s the same'· See,
Lauterpacht, Annual Dige.rt of Public lnteTJIIItlonal Law Cases, 1920-30, at PP· 3-4.
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tribunal is that it may be either permanent or ad hoc. 21 Nowadays, it is
co~on to obs.erve that arbitral machinery in contractual and com~erCial transactions between states and private corporations are found
m a n~~er of state contracts relating to oil concessions. A few examples will illustrate the nature of such provisions.
22
Herur Cattan quotes the Middle East Oil concession of 191 o granted to D. Arcy by th~ Persian Government as, perhaps, the first of such
concesstons to provtde that disputes between the parties which are not
s~ttled by ne~otiation ~r mutual agreement shall be resolved by arbitration. Accor~g to Article 17 of the concession agreement, any disputes
tha! 1_11ay ans~ between the parties with regards to its interpretation or
de~g the nghts and duties of the parties shall be submitted to two
arbi~ators at Teheran, one of whom shall be named by each of the
parties, and to an umpire, who shall be appointed by the arbitratorS
before they proceed to arbitrate. 23 The decision of the arbitrators or in
the event of the~ disagreement, that of the umpire, shall be final.
~uch concesSl~nal arbitration agreements and similar types of interna~onal. transa~ons have been characterised by some writers as being
~ to mt~~ational treaties. 24 This may be because in such transactions, pubhc mtemational law rather than the national system of Ia
of any of the ~arties may be expressly, or by implication, indicated
!he law govemmg the co!l~ct. Besides, certain arbitration agreements
mcorpora~ clauses. proVIding for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator as chmrman, and two arbitrators chosen by the parties which
places th~ government and foreign private party or parties on the same
legal footing, at least for purposes of the interpretation and adjudication
of the agreement. 25 But this 'equality' is anything but perfect, as the
gove~en~ party, invoking its sovereign powers, can in practice defy
the arbitration clause as much as it can cancel or dishonour the agreement as a whole. 2111

=

It must ~e poin~ out that even though there is a progressive trend
whereby oil concessiOns between states and private corporations pro21. The Permanent Court of Arbitration bas its seat in the Peace Palace at the
Hague. It was created as a result of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 29 July 1899 which was revised and later replaced by the 1907 Hague Convention.
22. Henry Cattan, supi'a, at 143.
23. Ibid.
24. Friedmann, op. cit., at 223.
25. Ibltl.
26. Ibid., at footnote S.

vide that disputes between the parties which are not settled by negotiation or mutual agreement shall be resolved by arbitration, there seems
to bC limited use being made of arbitration in practice. It does not appear that states wish to arbitrate such disputes. For public relations
purposes, states opt for settlement through negotiations or mutual
agreement rather than by arbitration as no state would like to be on
record for failing to carry out its international obligations resulting
from the decision of an international arbitration tribunal.
Sometimes the parties choose to invoke the so-called re-negotiation
clause provided for in the contractual agreements between the state
and private persons. According to this clause, any of the contracting
parties reserves the right to call for a re-examination of the entire contract. But this must be -requested in the manner agreed upon by the
parties and within the time limit stipulated in the agreement. However,
it is never certain what would result from such an exercise. The chances are even that the position of the party requesting a re-negotiation
may become worse than at first. One reason why this system of settlement of disputes should be encouraged is that it leaves the door open
for the parties to maintain constant contact with a view to assessing
the progress of the implementation of their various undertakings. Above
all, disagreements are contained within the circles of the contracting
parties without much publicity which may throw the parties into an
open embarrassment or loss of face.

4. THE LAW APPLICABLE IN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BBTWBBN A
STATE AND A PRIVATE PAllTY
Just as no uniformity exists in the law applicable to state contracts
generally, so also no uniformity exists in the law applicable to disputes
arising from contracts between a state and a private person. However,
modem contracts between a state and a private person usually include
clauses indicating by what law they are to be governed. This principle
is one of the important elements in contracts concerning more than
one legal system.
Some writers 27 have the view that public international law is not to be
applied to contracts between a state and private party. This position
which we find unacceptable has also been strongly criticised. 28 Nothing
27. McNair, 33 BYIL (1957), p. 10; Cattan, supra, at 68.
28. See Nwogugu, op. dt., pp. 249-250.
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responsibility of states for the violation of its international obligati~ns.'
Again, the Iranian Petroleum Act (195!) has defined.'force maJeure'
in article· 13 as meaning 'occurrences which are recogmzed as such by
the principles of internationallaw.' 33
•
F'mally, in contractual relationships between a state and. a pnvate
corporation, the parties may expressly choose the general p~Clples of
taw recognized by civilized nations as the proper law of therr contract.
A case in point is article 46 of the .Iran Con~orti~ Agreement of
1054 provides· In view of the diverse nationalities of the parties of this A~eement, it shall be governed by and interpreted and
applied in accordance with principles of. law co~on to Iran and ~e
several nations in which the other parties to this Agreement are m.corporated, and in the absence of such common prin~~l~, then ~Y ~d
in accordance with principles of law recognized by Clvilized nations. 1D.
general, including such of those principles as may have been applied
by international tribunals. 34
Again, the comment made above, just before the reference to the
Serbian Loans case is equally applicable here.
32

prevents the parties, if they so desire to apply such principles of public
international law as are capable of being applied to their agreements. a
The contracting parties are not restricted by any legal system in the
choice of the proper law of their contract. This choice generally may
be a particular municipal law system, 30 international law, or general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Naturally the mere
fact that the parties by agreement make their contract to be governed
by international law does not make the private entity concerned a
subject of international law. It merely subjects the contract to that law.
In the Serbian Loans Case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice held that, 'Any contract which is not a contract between
states in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the
municipal law of some country.' 31 There are cases to support the view
that this pronouncement would be totally invalid in contemporary international transactions.
The arbitration clause included in Article 22 of the AIOC's conceSsion agreement (1933} provided that, 'The award shall be based on
the juridical principles contained in article 38 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court.'
The Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 was ammended on November
25, 1965 to provide that the oil concessions granted in Libya shall be
governed by, and interpreted in accordance with, the principles of
international law, and in their absence, in accordance with the general
principles of law including those applied by international tribunals.
Furthermore, in the award of the arbitration between Saudi Arabia and
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) of 1958, the tribunal came
to the conclusion that: 'Public international law should be applied to
the effects of the concession, when objective reasons lead it to conclude
that certain matte~ cannot be governed by any rule of the municipal
law of any state, as is the case in all matters relating to transport by
sea, to the sovereignty of the state on its territorial waters and to the
29. F. A. Mann, The Proper Law of Contracts Concluded by International
Persons, BYIL (1959), p. 34.
.
30. Article 16 of the Refinery Agreement between Nigeria and Shell-BP dated
25 July 1962 refers to Nigerian law as the proper law of the Agreement. The
same is applicable to the Ghana - Valco Agreement of 1961 whose article 49
stipulates that the contract is to be governed by the law of Ghana as it existed on
the date of execution.
31. PCD Series A., Nos. 20/21, at p. 41. On April 19, 1928, the French and
Serbian Governments agreed to submit to the Court, by Special Agreement, a
difference which had arisen regarding the payment of certain Serbian loans issued
in France between 1895 and 1913.
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Conclusions. The foregoing inquiry into the place of non-governmental
organizations and private corporatio~ in . interna~onal law s~gests
that, though they cannot be said to enJOY m.temational personality as
ascribed to international governmental organizatio~, nonethe~es~, .they
conduct activities on the international plane wtth often s1gnific~t
political importance and with little or no governmental ~ntr?l. 'fh:~lr
status is different from that of public international org~ations. (t.e.
organizations formed by states), which are formed by m.ternational
.
treaties conclUded between sovereign States.
International law made only by States could be exclUSl~e law o~y
under the assumption that there are no trans-national relations outstde

32. The Award. P· 65.
f
33 By Article 37(2) of the Iran - Pan-American Oil Company Agreement. o
958' the term 'force majeure' as used in the agreement means 'occurences whic~
1
arc ccognized as such by the principles of international law.' This agreement 1S
~ed further by Ramazani, ll International and Comperative Law Quarterly,

~~ P~~le

38 (1c) of the Statute of ~e ~CJ auth~rizes the Court to apply
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. It is al~o usual that
h
th contracting parties are not clear on the law to govern thetr contractu~
;~:ons~ the arbitral tribunals apply general principles of law as was the case m
the una Gold Field CtiSe cited above.
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the State i.e., that the State was the only social community in which
the individual is living.
But it is true that a good number of trade unions take part in an
organization which transcends the state territories. The Liberal state
is transcended by a multitude of non-state, transnational communities,
and particularly in the economic field. While international law was
once a law of inter-state relations only, it is now seen to have become
the law of all those relations which, not being localized nationally an4
functionally within the boundaries of specific State, and of one State
only, involve intercourse among nations and organizations created by
them, as well as with organizations created independently of States. In
dealing with characteristic features of such entities and/ or relationships
which are specifically international, this law becomes more and more
transnational, transorganizational, interorganizational. 35

35. Laderer-Lador J. J., op. clt., at. 15.
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13. The impact of the proliferation of
new actors in international relations
on international law

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

International legal relations could not reasonably be understood if divorced from material relationships. International relations are animating factors of international law. They provide factual basis of the
law. 1 The concept of international relations, as we understand it, includes the inter:-action between all its participants. 2 This presupposes all
the main international legal entities operating in the international arena
irrespective of the differences in the extent of their rights.
Stated in another way, the very nature of international life is determined by the activities of its actors". They exert much influence on
one another, sometimes directly, and at other times medially. Thus,
international relations based on the realities of life determine the
character and content of international legal rules. There can hardly be
any international legal rules for which there is no objective premise or
basis in international relations. It regulates political, economic, cultural
and other kinds of relations. The whole system of international law
aims at guaranteeing international peace and cooperation among
peoples of the world. A peaceful international society is only possible
when it is based upon the law and such a basis must be established in
conformity wi,th factual reality. Therefore, if international law failed to
influen~ and to regulate adequately the course of international relations, it would have lost its value.
The circle of objects of international relations is almost unlimited.
The central link in forming rules of international law highly necessary
for this regulation consists of the treaty. Many important kinds of
1. Lukashuk L L, International Law (Summary of Lectures), Kiev, 1968, p. 12.
2. C. W'Jlfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind; Shabatai Rosenne, The
Law of Treaties: A Guide to the Legislative History of the Vienna Convention,
Leyden, 1970.

.
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international relations are difficult to regulate without a treaty. There
are, for example, such vital problems as disarmament and control of
its implementation, as well as economic, scientific, technical and other
forms of specialized cooperation. The law of treaties, the law of contracts, to use the common law term, constitutes and essential part of
any coherent legal system. 3 A very large part of the day-to-day international legal relations is now governed by the treaty rather than by
customary law. This is so both for bilateral relations and for multilateral relations. •
In the foregoing parts of this study, we have directed our efforts
towards describing the legal nature of the emerging new subjects of
inte~tional ~w, their inte~ational personality, and their treatymaking capacxty. We recogmzed that they play an important role in
the evolution of contemporary international law. The considerable measure of international personality they possess, though not as fully as that
of sovereign States, enables them to take part in the making and shaping
of international agreements. In our discussions, we have not denied the
fact that sovereign States, above all, by definition have full international personality, consequent upon which they exercise general treatymaking capacity, subject only to such restrictions as might be imposed
by generally accepted norms of international law or by the state itself
on the exercise of such powers.
On the international plane organizations and entities which are not
of the characteristics of a State in the ordinary sense are on the increas~. Even though these entities do not have full international personality, and full power to make agreements as they like, there is no
denying the fact that they have made agreements amongst themselves
and sometimes with States if not for any other reasons, for the purpos~
of carrying out their .functions. The participation of new subjects of
international law in multilateral treaties is no longer a novel phenomenon and such a participation does not appear to alter the essential
nature of such treaties.
Granted that these new subjects of international law make treaties,
what is the nature of such agreements? Where does one have to look
for the answer as regards their legal nature? Finally, to what degree
does the treaty law of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties apply
to transactions in which entities with limited international personality
3. Shabatai Rosenne, op. cit., at p. 46.
4. Rohn, •Institutionalism on the Law of Treaties: A Case of Combining
Teaching and Research', Am Soc. In( Law Prou. 93 (1965).
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are parties? We have tried to grapple with these problems in a general
way, sometimes in lesser or greater detail, in the foregoing treatment
of the selected entities falling within the terms of reference of our
investigation. It now remains to sum up our views in this final concluding chapter.
.
In discussing these questions we shall not concern ourselves Wtth the
delimitation of the terms 'treaty' and 'agreement', for apart from the
fact that there exists no generally accepted definition of them, such an
exercise will not advance matters as far as our immediate task is concerned. For our present purpose, we understand them to cover agreements concluded between subjects of international law, whether they
possess full or limited international personality. But here we raise another vital and debatable question: Are all agreements between subjects of international law intemationalagreements? 5 JudgeLauterpacht's
report on the Law of Treaties, is of the opinion that in the last resort
all agreements between subjects of international law are governed by
international law. He wrote:
'It is not the subjection of an agreement to international law which
makes it a treaty. It is the quality as a treaty which causes it to be
regulated by international law. This is so even if ... the parties stipulate that it shall be governed by the municipal law of one of them. For
in that case the specific law thus agreed upon is the consequence of the
will of the parties. As the result of some such provision the law applicable is transformed into conventional intern~ti~nallaw ... U~y,
however such transactions are governed by pnnCiples of law applicable to them and the rules relating to the il;lterpretation of treaties. For
this reason, provided that the instrument othe~e ~s the r~uire
ments of a treaty, it establishes ip$0
facto
a relationship
under
mtern•
• •
• •
•
•
7
tionallaw.'6 Judge Lauterpacht's VlCW 1S m our op1D.lon convmCIUg.

s. For a discussion of this question, See Brocbes, International Legal Aspects
of the Operations of the World Bank, 98 Recueil de Cours, 1959- Ill, at 301,
33, - 343 (1960).
6. Lauterpacht, in his report on the Law of Treaties, UN (AC/4/163). In ~e
commentary that follows his definition of a 'treaty' the learned author explams
that the object of the article is not so much a definition as a statement of .a
treaty's essential requirements and characteristics (p. 16). The whole report ts
intended to be a formulation of the existing law (p. 3). The term 'treaty', ~
been used in that connection as a general and generic term and not as a specific
denomination of a certain type of solemn agreement. International usage, does
indeed appear, to sanction the use of the term 'treaty' in a ~d of. generic term.
1. For convenience sake we must note that another Vtew exists. In Jud~e
Fitzmaurice's report on the Law of Treaties, he excludes, for the purposes of his
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Since therefore their situation is a fluid one, it would be a mistake to
be either too positive or too negative as regards the nature of agreements made by subjects of international law endowed with limited
international personality. On the other hand, the fact that an agreement has been made by full international persons ~y not automatically qualify it as an international agreement to be regulated by international law. As Lauterpacht rightly observed, much depends on the
legal content of sue~ an instrument. That means that its quality as an international agreement falls within the purview and regulation of
international law. 8
It is important here to restate an observation we have repeatedly
made in various parts of the pr~ent study to the effect that international law itself does not, and scarcely can, prescribe with any precision
what entities are to be endowed with international personality. In the
same way it does not stipulate the same quantum of rights for every
entity which has something to do with international relations. As a
matter of fact, nothing in the theory of international. law, at least, precludes limited subjects of international law from making agreements to
be regulated by the law. Thus, we have illustrated in our discussion
that such entities like the Holy See, insurgent or belligerent parties,
non-governmental organizations, or even international private corporations enter into internationally binding legal acts.
Needless to remark that in principle the personality and treaty-making
capacity of governmental organizations is almost unchallengeable
nowadays. At present the International Law Commission of the UN is
busy with questions relating to treaties of this class.
Besides, this new trend in contemporary international relations has
been recognized by modem writers as well. 9 Taking Lauterpachfs ob- .
J

Draft Code, agreements between subjects of international law both immediately
and in the last resort. Vide, VN DOC.A/CN.4/101 (1956).
8. The question will be treated in greater detail under the constituent elements
of an international agreements.
9. For example, see Johannes W. Sclm.eider, Tretlly-making Power of International Organization&, Oeneve, 1959. He writes that 'growth of tho treatymaking power is the consequence of the impotence of States to fully organize
the movement they have called into being. Tho organizations and other mbject1
of international law (italics added), cannot be blamed for having availed themselves of tho possibilities left to them . . . Opposition of States to tho conclusion
of a considerable number of agreements between organizations does not immediately affect the treaty-making power of tho latter, but should bo conaidered
as a mainly political question .. .' Ibid., pp. 141-142. Similarly in his recent
publication on the Law of Treaties. Ambassador Rosenno observed that as in tho
case of all international law, tho international law of treaties developed from tho
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servation quoted above as a basis for further discussion on this issue,
provided that an international instrument otherwise fulfils the requirements of a treaty, it establishes per se a relationship under international law. For an act to be considered as being such in international
law, it is highly desirable that any disputes arising from it shall be
juridically determinable. This immediately touches on the necessary
elements of an international agreement which leads us to the next question in our investigation.
To a major extent, treaty law as it operates today on the international plane is already largely a transformation of the municipal law of
contract. The general principles of obligation in law are basically the
same whether in municipal or international law. According to the
principle of 'Ex consensu advenit viculum', the foundation of treaty
obligation is consent, coupled with the fundamental principle of law
that consent gives rise to obligation.
In all legal agreements it is necessary that there must be a meeting
of the minds of the parties concerned. This is an indispensable element
of an international agreement as well. But the meeting of the minds is
not automaticaUy sufficient to justify the conclusion that a legal obligation has been created between the parties. It is of vital importance that
this should have been their actual intention. The common factor is an
understanding by the parties that the formulated provisions amQunt to
rules of conduct, susceptible of juridical interpretation, which they are
laying down for themselves. Any internatio~al agreement t;Jtat does. not
lead to legal obligations between the parties does not, m our vtew,
qualify as an act in international law.
.
The channel of consent is essential. Mere intention to be bound
does not make an instrument an agreement or treaty if the intention is
not mutual. The instrument is not an agreement if the governing law is
municipal law and not internationallaw. 10 Even when the governing law
is international law, the agreement must be made by persons duly
authorised by their entities to enter into treaties. 11
practice of states. and until very recently the only type of treaty which would be
conceived was a treaty concluded between States. But starting with the League
of Nations, and intensified by the United Nations, a new type of international
agreement has become common, one to which at least a non-State entity is a
party. Seo Rosenne, op. cit., at p. 44.
10. Memorandum ·of tho Secretary General, League of Nations, Treaty Series
(LNTS), vol. 1, p. 9.
·
11. VN Doc. A/64, Add. 1, Rea. 97 /(1). In 1950 tho International Law Commission debated Brierly's inclusion of Exchanges of Notes in his draft convention on tho Law of Treaties, VN Doc. A/CN.4/23.
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Given· that the first elements are· satisfied, the next pOint to ascertain
is if the object of the treaty is legal and whether it is validly contracted. u In order that a treaty shall be validly contracted, the parties to
it must have and, if possible and necessary, prove their capacity to conclude it.
Validity is the condition necessary to give a treaty operative force·
and effect in law, and consists in the fulfilment of the aggregate of
these requirements prescribed by the law in order that a treaty may
have such force and effect. So long as international law does not stipulate for its subjects any specific form 13 for making binding agreements
under it, it may be concluded that the choice of a particular form is a
matter of convenience. However, it is necessary to observe that certain
constitutions of States or organizations make their position on this
question clear. We therefore submit that the satisfaction of a totality
of the above described elements, leads to an international agreement
susceptible of being subject to international law.
Our last question is to what extent the treaty law of the 1969
Vienna Convention on Treaties applies to transactions in which
entities of the sort we have discussed in this study are parties. We are
convinced that whereas the Vienna Convention itself clearly concerns
treaties concluded between States, 14 there is however a general reservation to the effect that its articles do not relate to international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of international law,
or between such other subjects of international law, but should not affect
the legal force of such agreements or the application to them of any of
the rules set forth in the Convention to which they would be subject
independently of its provisions. 15 Customary international law provides
the background for this written law. 16 Even though the convention embodies (for the most part) generally accepted rules of customary
12. In the present context it would be pointless to pursue that question, which
covers a wide range of treaty law, Vide, Fitzmaurice's report on the Law of
Treaties of 14th Match 1956, Doc. A/CN.4/101, Art. 10-1.
13. However, States as well as other subjects of international law resort to
various nomenclatures to designate treaties concluded by them, namely, treaty,
agreement, convention, protocol, final act, general act, arrangement, statute,
covenant, pact, concordat, unilateral declaration accepted by other States, etc.
14. See Vienna Convention 1969, Art. 1.
15. For a more detailed discussion on this question, see Chris Okeke, The
Conclusion of Treaties with SpeciDl Reference to CoiiSent to be Bound by a
Treaty and ReservatioiiS, an unpublished Resea~·ch Paper presented at the 1970
session of the Hague Academy Centre for Studies and Research in International
Law and International Relations.
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international law, it would seem that not only States, parties .to the
Convention, but also those which had not become actual parties, mcluding other subjects of international law, would nevertheless be bound
by its provisions - not as such, but as refle.cting custo~ary law - ~x
cept in so far as it could be shown that particular proVlSlons embodied
something definitely new.17
By way of summary, what we have tried to do in this study is to show
how far the substance of International Law must be re-defined in order to
bring the facts and the law ubi .societas, ibi ius - in. a harmo~ous
relationship. Contemporary writers, scholars and practioners of mternationallaw should learn to keep themselves in constant awareness of
.the increasing phenomenon of Non-State law existing parallel to Statemade Iaw. 18 International autonomous entities are a necessary factor
without which no realistic equilibrium is possible in present and future
international relations. Perhaps, the best way to bring out our ideas
clearly to light is to quote the wise observation of one Sir John
Fischer Williams in connection with the Bank for International Settlements. He wrote: 'We theorists have to take heed to build our doctrines
on tendencies rather than on "facts"; otherwise, when we have finished
constructing our systems, it may happen that the facts are no· longer
what they were when we began building, and the system is out ·of date
before it is established.' u

16. Cf. Vienna Convention art. 43. The tremendous growth in international
treaty-making can be seen when a comparison is mad.e betwCC:n the 205 vol~es
of the League of Nations Treaty Series and the Uruted Nations Treaty Senes,
already over 650 volumes. See Rosenne, op. cit., at 47.
17. Chris Okeke, op. cit.
18. Lador-Lederer, J. J., International Non-Governmental OrganizatioiiS and
Economic Entitie.r, A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1963, at p. 11.
19. As quoted in Lador-Ledercr, Ibid., op. cit.
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Summary

We have tried throughout our investigation to stress the caution that
the times are changed and changing, and that the laws are to be changed with them. We may be accused of just stating an obvious fact, 1n
other words, confirming a truism. We do not deny the imputation- but
may point out that in carrying out this exercise, we have tried to analyse
the problems we chose to look into in a novel manner so as to illustrate
that there is room in various fields of modem international law where
fresh insights and adjustments are inevitable.
The study analyses, in their relative degrees of importance, the
remarkable changes that have affected and continue to affect contemporary international law, with particular reference to th~ proliferation of its new actors as evidenced by their treaty-making capacity. In
Chapter 1 we undertook a theoretical examination, in a general sort of
way, of the doctrine of subjects of international law. Our belief that the
question of who are the subjects of international law is basically related
with the whole concept of international law led us to review the various
definitions of international law. To our mind, these definitions reflect
the changing concept of contemporary international law. The stand of
leading authorities of international law of both West Europe and East
Europe (led by the Soviet Union) was considered. We came to the conclusion that no rule of international law operates in respect of an entity
which claims to possess international legal personality until such an
entity appears and asserts itself. Whether or not that entity has the
legal capacity which it claims depends upon the way it functions in
international society. H the entity concerned is fo~d to have the
capacity which it claims to have, then the conclusion would be that a
series· of acts performed by that entity in the field of international relations are legal acts and it is admitted to have the capacity to perform
them. The element of personality is not invested by international law
but by the facts of international life itself.
In Chapter 2 the concept of the notion of States as the principal
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subjects of international law was introduced. A p~agraph ~as de~oted
to the discussion of the sovereign state as a subJect of mternational
law. This approach was based on the reasoning that sover~ignty f?rms
a fundamental basis upon which the whole sn:ucture of ~temational
law as it stands today is built. We did not consider a detailed study of
the doctrine of sovereignty desirable. We limited ?ur discussions. to
those aspects of sovereignty that have a direct be~g ~n our subject
of investigation. Three considerations guided this attitude namely·
(i) the recognition that the principle of state-sovereignty is a.~orner
stone on which the whole structure of international law res~;(~) o.ther
principles of international law seem to revolve around ~ p~aple;
(ill) the principle of sovereignty can be used as a good starting pomt for
the consideration of the legal status and tieaty-m~g powers of s"?bjects of international law other than ~e state which ~o~ a VItal
motivation of our study. Our investigation led us to a rejection of the
principle of absolute sovereignty. This we consider totally unuseful for
the purpose of modem international relations.
.
Chapter 3 treated the question of the international legal person~ty
·of states which are members of a federation. A ~easonably de~ed
discussion of the theoretical aspects of the international perso~ality of
component parts of a federation was ~dertak~n. In orde~ to illus~ate
how the theoretical position agrees Wlth practice, we reVIewed brie~y
the constitutional stipulations of a number of Federal States, ~e mm
being to establish the stands of ~ese Feder~ . States on ~e ISsue of
participation in international rel~tions by theu. member s~tes. ~o~g
the Federal States considered ·mclude - Umon of SoVIet Soa~t
Republics, Switzerland, Canada, The C?mmonwealth of Austr~a,
United States of.America, Federal Republic of Germany.~ exammation of the treaty-making capacity of the component umts of these
states was attempted.
.
In Chapter 4 we discussed the legal pos~tion ~f the ~eba~able subject
of international law - The Holy See, starting Wlth a ~tone~ persp~
tive. The present attitude towards the Holy See was mvestigated ~t
by analysing the views of Western eountries and second ~~ SoVIet
doctrine and diplomatic practice. Thus, we c.ame to ~e opwon ~at
there is no reason to withhold recognition of internatio~al ~tson~I~
from other non-state entities proper merely because the~ clmm to I! 1S
not based on possession of the full attributes of an ordinary sovereign
state, still less so seeing that in view of-theit .greater numb~rs today the
case is no longer exceptional. The fact that ~e Hoi! See 1S not only a
subject of international law, but does also enJOY a Wide range of treaty22.5

making exercise is illustrated by an attached appendix showing bilateral
as well as general international agreements to which the Holy See is a
party.
Chapter S studied the personality of unrecognized states in international law using the Rhodesian question as the principal illustration of
our views. The following issues were treated - a brief historical survey,
unilateral declaration of independence - its legal character, Is Rhodesia a state?, Rhodesia and the problem of recognition, duty to
recognize, the international personality of Rhodesia, and finally, a
general discussion of the British Government's position on the matter
up to and including the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement of November 24,
1971.
Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, are fully devoted to the question of the status
and treaty-making capacity of organs of National Liberation Movements. Chapter 6 traces the legal history of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of nations and peoples as developed by the
United Nations Organization through its effort to codify the principles
of international law by the Special Committee formed for this purpose.
We recognize this principle as the legal basis justifying the struggles of
peoples and nations to independent life by the formation of a state.
Two recent and familiar cases - Bangladesh and Biafra in which this
principle was put to the test were used to illustrate the practical application of this principle in international life. These two cases formed the
central point of our discussion in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
We considered the international responsible character of both the
Government of Bangladesh and Biafra; the basis of their international
competence; the question of treaty-making competence; constitutional
vacuum and principle of effectiveness as well as the attitudes of some
selected powers of international community directly or indirectly involved in the conflicts. Also of interest was the discussion of the extent
of Biafran statehood in international law, its question of recognition
and treaty-making powers. It is submitted that the demand of selfdetermination must in the last resort be placed above those of the
'territorial integrity' and •non-interventionist' stands of the United
Nations Organization. Rebellion inside a state, even if it gathers
momentum so as to become a civil war or a bloody conflict - call it a
revolution, should never be encouraged or exploited by outside forces
or powers.
No state big, medium-size or small, should try, through a treaty
written or unwritten to exploit such a situation. The tragic position, in
which humanitarian, economic and political problems are mixed in
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such a way as almost to defy distinction between them, presents a
challenge to the international community as a whole which must be
met. A plea was made to the effect that under certain circumstances
a claim to self-determination, even in a non-colonial setting, may be
valid under international law.
Chapter 10 reappraised international organizations as subjects of
international law while Chapter 11 proceeds to discuss the basis of the
treaty-making capacity of international organizations. From our discussions it seemed possible to conclude that once an international organization has asserted itself and therefore has international personality, it
must be deemed, ~ess expressly denied, to have the capacity to enter
into agreements, which are appropriate to its purpose.
Chapter 12 looks into the issue of non-governmental organizations
and private corporations as subjects of international law. Whereas they
cannot be said to enjoy international personality as ascribed to international governmental organizations, nonetheless, they conduct activities on the international plane with often significant political importance and with little or no governmental control. While international
law was once a law of inter-state relations only, it is now seen to have
become the law of all relations which, not being localised nationally
·and functionally within the boundaries of specific state or states, and
of one state only, involve intercourse among nations and organizations
created by them as well as with organizations create independently of
states. In dealing with characteristic features of such entities and/ or
relationships which are specifically inte~a~onal,. this law .bec:omes
more and more transnational, transorgamzational, mterorgamzational.
The conclusive part of the study is Chapter 13 which accesses the
impact of the expanding new actors in international relations on international law itself. The substance of international law must be redefined in order to bring the facts and the law in a harmonious relationship. International autonomous entities are a necessary factor without which no realistic equilibrium is possible in present and future
international relations.

227

Bibliography

I. Anglo-American, West European and other Sources
Alting von Geusau, F. A. M., Beyond the European Community Siithoff Leiden,
1969.
• '
•
Anzilotti, Dionisio, Cours de droit international 1er. vol. French ed. Paris, 1929.
Bell, P ..B., The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor, In International
Orgamzatlon, vol., XXV, No. 3, 1971.
B~mer, 1., International Legal Aspects of Federalism, Longmans, London, 1973.
Blix, Hans., Treaty-making Power, Stevens, London, 1960,
Bos, M., Intervention and International law, in International Spectator No. 1
1971.
'
'
Bot, B. R., Non-recognition and treaty relations, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1968.
B~wett. D. W., The Law of International Innitutions, Stevens, London, 1964.
Bnerly, J. L., The Outlook for International Law, 1944.
-,The bam of obligation In International law, 2nd. ed., Oxford University Press,
1959.
.
-, T_he Law of Nations: An Introduction to the international law of peace, ed.,
SU' Humphrey Waldock. 6th. ed., Oxford University Press, 1963.
·
Briggs, H. W., Recognition of States, some reflections on doctrine and practice,
in AJIL, 1949.
-, The Law of Nations, 2nd. ed., New York. 1952.
Brownlie, 1., International law and the use of force by states, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1963.
-,Principles of International law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966.
Burton, J. W., Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules, Cambridge University
Press, 1968.
Cattan, H., The Law of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa
Oceana Publications, New York. 1967.
. '
Chen, Lungchu, The International Law of Recognition, 1967.
Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals, Stevens, London, 1953.
Chin, Hungdah., The capacity of International Organizations to conclude treaties
and the special legal aspects of the treaties concluded, Martinus Nijhoff, The
Hague, 1966.
Detter, Ingrid., The organs of International Organizations excercising their treatymaking powers, in BYIL, 1962.

228

-,Law-making by International Organizations, Stockholm, 196S,
Docker, G., The treaty-making power in the Commonwealth of ..fustralia Marlinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966.
'
Draper, G. I. A. D., Implementation of international law in Armed Conflicts
in International AftaiTI, vol., 48, No. 1, 1972.
'
Edward, H., De Ia compltance des Cantons Suisse de conclude de traith lnternationaw: - Spedalement concernant Ia double impo1ition, Brussels, 1869
Bhler, Sidney Z., J. B. Morral, Church and State through the centuries A ~ol
lection of historical documents with commentaries, Westminster, 19SS.
El-Ayouty, Y., The United Nations and Decolonlzation: the role of A/To-Asia.
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1971.
Bsiemokai. E. 0., The Organization of African Unity and the Councll of Europe·
an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Univ~ty of Cologne, 1971.
'
Patouros, A. A., Government quarantees to foreign Investment•, New York,

. 1962.
-, Participation of the new States in the international legal order of the future,
in Trend11 and Patterns, 1969.
Fawcett. J. E. S., The Law of Nations, New York, 1968.
-,Federalism, Mature and Emergent, ed., Arthur W. Macmahon, New York,
1955.
Fitzmaurice, G. G. (Sir) The juridical clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73 Hague
Recueil 259, 1948.
-,The definition of Agression, In International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
137, 1952.
-,The law and procedure of the International Court of Justice, In BYIL, 1952,
and 1953.
-, The foundations of the authority of International law and the problem of enforcement, 19 Modem Law Review, 1, 5, 1956.
-, The General Principles of International Law, considered from the standpoint of the Rule of Law, Hague Recueil, 92, 1957.
-, Some results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. Part 1 - The
territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and Related topics, 8 Int. and Comp.
Law Q., 73 1959.
-, Hersch Lanterpacht - The Scholar as Judge; Two Parts, Reprinted from BYIL
1961 and 1962 respectively.
-, The future of Public International Law and of the Internatio1111l Legal System
In the Circumstances of Today, Geneva, 1973.
Prank. T. M., Rodlcy, N.S., Law of humanitarian intervention by military force,
in AIIL vol., 67 No. 2, 1973.
Friedmann, W., Law In a changing 110clety, 2nd., ed., Stevens, London, 1959.
-,G. Kalmanoff, Joint Bullines11 Ventures, New York, 1961.
-, The Changing Structure of International Law, Stevens, London, 1964.
Gaiter, A., The Red Book of the persecuted Church, (tranalated), Westminster,
1954.
Graham, R. A., The rise of the double diplomatic corps in Rome: A 11tudy In
diplomatic practice (1870-1875) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1952.
Grotius, H., De jure belli ac padll libri tres, ed., Classics of International Law,
OxfordfLondon, 1913-1935.

229

Grzybowsky, K., Soviet Public International Law - Doctrines and Diplomatic
Practice, Leiden/Durham N.C. 1970.
Gurian, W., Fitzsimons, M. A., The Catholic Church In World Affairs, Notre
Dame University Press, 1954.
Hall, W. B., A treatise on International law, ilth ed., by A. P. Higgins, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1924.
Hawtry, R. G., Economic Aspects of Sovereignty, London, 1952.
Hertling, L., A histfJry of the Catholic Church (tr), Westminster, 1957.
Higgins, R., The development of International Law through the Political Organs
-of the United Nations, London, Oxford University Press, 1963.
Hoyt, B. C., The unanimity rule in the revision of treaties, The Hague, 1959.
Huber, H., How Switzerland is governed, Zurich, 1946.
Hyde, C. C., International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States, 3 vols., 2nd ed., Boston, Little Brown, 1945.
-,International Law In a Changing World, Oceana Publications, 1963. (Published in Cooperation with the United Nations).
Jenks, C. W., The Legal Personality of International Organizations in BYIL,
1945.
-, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedoms, London, 1957.
-, The Common Law of Mankind, London, 1958.
-,Law, Welfare and Freedom, London, 1963.
-,Law In the World Community, London, Longmans, 1967.
Jessup, P. C., Responsibility of States for injuries to individuals in Columbia
Law Review, 46, 1946.
-, Law of International Contractual Agreements, in AJIL, 41, 1947.
-,The subjects of a modem law of nations in Michigan Law Review, 45, 1947.
-,A modern law of nations, New York, 1948, 2nd. ed.
-,Transnational Law, New York, 1956.
Jones, John Walter, Historical introduction to the theory of law, Oxford, 1940.
Joyce, J. A., Red Cross and the Strategy of Peace, London, 1959.
Judge, A. J. N., Multinational BuSiness Enterprises, 12 YIO, 1968-1969.
Kalshoven, F., Belligerent Reprisals, Leiden, Sijthoff 1971.
Kelsen, H., General Theory of Law and State, Harvard University Press, 1945.
-,Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., New York, 1956.
Knott, J. M. Jr., Freidom of Association: a study of the role of NGOs in the
development process of emerging countries, Brussels, UIA, 1962.
Knubben, Rolf, Die Subjekte des YOlke"echts, Band n, Abt. 1, Stuttgart, 1928.
Kooijmans, P. H., The doctrine of legal equality of States, A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden,
1964.
Korowicz, M., Introduction to International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,
1959.
Kunz, J. L., Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's Recognition in International Law,
in 44 AJIL, 1950.
-,The status of the Holy See in international law, AJIL, XIVll, 1952.
Lador-Lederer, J. J., International Non-Governmental Organization, Sijthoff,
Leiden, 1963.
Laslett, P ., The English Revolution and Locke's Two Treatises of Government,
Camb. Hist. Journal Xll, 1956.

230

Lauterpacht, B., The contemporary practice of the United Kingdom in the field
of international law, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 5, 1956.
Lauterpacht, H., Private law sources and analogies of International law, Longmans, London, 1927.
-, Annual digest of Public International Law Cases, 1929-1930.
-, The function of law In the International community, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1933.
.
-,The sUbjects of the law of nations, in Law Quarterly Review 63, 1947.
-,Recognition in International law, 1947.
-, The development of International law by the International Court, Stevens,
London, 1958.
-,British Practice In International law, 1963.
-,International law collected papers, vol, 1., Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Lima, F. X. de, Intervention In International law, The Hague, 1971.
McNair A. D. (Lord), The law of treaties, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.
Mann,
A., The proper law of contracts concluded by international persons,
BYIL, 1959.
Marek, K., Identity and continuity of States In public International law, Geneva,

F.

1954.
Mario, F., The legal position of the Holy See before and after the Lateran
Agreements, 1935.
Marriot, J. A. R., (Sir) Federallam and the problem of small Statu, London,
1943.
Molen, Gesina, H. J. van der, Subjecten van volkenrecht, (Detailed SUIJllll8lY
in English), The Hague, 1949.
Moore, J. B., Digest of International law, Washington, 1906.
Morral, J. B., Church and State through the centuries, London, 1954.
Mousley, Edward, The meaning of federalism in 'The federal Union' ed., M.
Charning Pearce, London, 1940.
Nwogugu, B. I., The legal problems of foreign Investment In developing countries, Manchester University Press, 1965.
O'Connel, D. P.,lnternatlonallaw, 2 vols., London, 1965.
Oglesby, R. R., Internal War and Search for normative order, The Hague, 1971.
Okeke, C. N., International treaty as the main source of conte'!"porary .International law, unpublished Master's degree thesis, State Univemty of Kiev Law
School, June 1969, (in Russian).
-, The conclusion of treaties with special reference to consent to be bound by a
treaty and reservations. Research paper presented at the Hague Academy
Centre for Studies and Research in international Law and international Relations, September, 1970.
-,Africa and the Military, in The Review of International A/fairs, No. 514, 1971.
OppCDheim, L, International law, ed., H. Lauterpacht, vol, .1. 8th ed., vol. 2,
7th ed., London, Longmans, Green, 1955 and 1952, respectively• .
Osakwe, C. 0., The concept and forms of treaties concluded by international
organizations, in Agreements ·of International organizations and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, ed., Prof. Karl Zemaneck, New York/
Vienna, 1971.

231

-, Con~p?rary. Soviet doctrine on ·the juridical nature of nnivenal intemational
orgamzatious m 6S AJIL, No. 3, July 1971.
-, Th.e participation of the Soviet Union in universal intertllltional organizations
Le1den 1972.
'
P~, ~ve,

Treaty-making power of the United Nations. in 26 BYIL, 1949.
Politis, Nicolas, The new aspects of international law, 1927.
Pound, Roscoe, Interpretations of legal history, Cambridge Mass., 1946.
Ransome, P~trick, Federation and international law in 'The fethral Union', ed.,
M. Chaming Pearce, London, 1945.
Roling, B. V. A, International Law in an expanded world, Amsterdam, 1960.
Rosene, S., The law of treaties,· A guide to the legislative history of the Vienna
Convention, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1970.
Ro~eau, Olarles, Droit international public, Paris, 1953.
-, Lm/cage Politics, ed., Rosenau, James, N.,: Essays on the convergence. of
National and International Systems, New York, Free Press, 1969.
Sabin«:> G. H., A history of political theory, Harrap, London, 1964.
Schnmder,J. W.,Treaty-ma/cing power of international organizations, Geneva 1959.
Schermers, H. G., International institutional law, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1972.
'
Schwarzenberger, G., Elements of power politics, 1951.
-,A manual of international law, vol., 1, 1960.
-, The inductive approach to international law, London, 1965.
-,International law and order, London, Stevens, 1971.
-,Federalism and Supranationalism in the European Communities, 1973.
Scott, I., Th~ Roman question and the powers, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969.
Sen, B., A drplomat's handbook of international law and practice, Nijhoff The
Hague, 1965.
'
Seyersted, F., Objective international personality of international organizations 1963
Shep~d, Max, A., Sovereignty at The Crosstrads: A study of Bodin in th~ Pol:
Scrence Quart, vol., XIV 1930.
Sinha, P., New nations and the law of nations, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1967.
-,Manual of public international law, ed., Max Sf/lrensen, New York 1968.
Starke, J., An introduction to international law, London, Butterworth, 1963.
Stuyt, A M., Survey of international arbitrations, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972.
Suarez, F., Selections from three works, ed., Classics of international law Oxford/London, 1944.
'
Syatauw, J. J. G., Some newly established Asian States and the development of
international law, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961.
Sziszy, I., International civil Procedure, Budapest, 1967.
.
-, The actors in world politics, ed., by Arnold Wolfers, in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on international politics, Baltimore, Md, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962.
-, Theoretical aspects of international relations, ed., by W. T. R. Fox, Notre
.Dame, Indiana; University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.
Tmbergen, S., International combines and national sovereigns, 95 U Pa Law
Review, 1947.
-, International economic integration, 1954.
Uys, S., Verwoerd's high stakes, in Spectator, April 15, 1966.

232

Vaughams, C. E., The political writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1915.
Vwcher, C. de, Theory and reality in international law, (Tr.) by P. H. Corbett,
1957.
Vitoria, F. de, De Indis et de iure belli relectiones, ed., Classics of international
law, Washington, 1917.
Westlake, John, International law, Cambridge, 1904.
-, Collected papers on public international law, ed., L. Oppenheim, London, 1914.
White, L. C., International Non-governmental organizations,· their purposes,
methods, and accomplishments, New York, 1968.

II. Soviet Sources
Akbarov, T: B., The realization by the Tajik SSR of its sovereign rights in the
sphere of international cultural contacts, Moscow, 1964 (in Russian).
Askerov, E. 1., The theoretical and practical problems of participation of the
Azerbaijan SSR in international legal relations, Baku, 1970 (in Russian).
Bobrov, R. L., The legal status of the United Nations Organization in SYIL,
1959 (in Russian).
-, Osnovnye problemu teorii mezhdunarodnogo prava, Moskva, 1968.
-,Contemporary international law, ed., Tunkin, 0. I., Moscow, 1969.
Durdenevskii, V. N., S. B. Kriloy, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo- Uchebnik vipusk 1,
Moskva, 1946.
Feldman, D. I., G. I. Kurdjukov, The concept of international legal personality,
Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).
\

lgnatenko, G. B., International personality of ·nations struggling for their independence, international legal personality, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).
Korastarenko, M. K., International law, part 1, Kharkov University Press, 1962
(in Russian).
Krutalevich, V. A., Avakov, M. M., International obligations and the principle
of sovereignty, the Academy of Sciences of the Byelorusslan Soviet Socialist
Republic, 1956, No. 3 (in Russian).
Krylov, S. B., Materials for the history of the United Nations, Moscow, 1949.
Levin, D. B., Omovnoye problemu teorli mezhdunarodnogo prava, Moskva,
1958.
Lukashuk, I. I., On the participation of Soviet Union Republics in international
treaties, SYIL, 1958 (m Russian).
-, An international organization as a party to international treaties, in SYIL,
1960.
.
-,Parties to international treaties, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).
-,International law (Summary of lectures in English), Kiev, 1968.
Lukin, P. P., Istochniki mezhdunarodnogo prava, Moskva, 1960.

233

Mironov, H., Soviet legal gystem and internationol law, Moscow, 1968.
Modzhorian, L. A., Sub'ektu mezhdunarodnogo prava, Moskva, 1958.
Morozov, 0. 1., Organizatsii Ob'edlnennykh Natsli, Moskva, 1962.
Nedbilo, P. E., Vasilenko, V. A., Soviet union republics as subjects of international law, in SYIL, 1963.
Shibaeva, E. A., Spetslalizrovannye Uchrezhdeniia OON, Moskva, 1966.
Shurshalov, V. M., Omovnoye voprosu teorii mezhdunarodnogo dogovora,
Moskva, 1959.

~.

Ii
,

!

.
!

Talalaev, A. N., JudidJll feature of International treaties, Moscow, 1963 (m
Russian).
Tunkin, G. 1., Osnovu Sovremenogo mezhdunorodnogo prava, Moskva, 1956.
-, Voprosu Teorii mezhdUllllrodnogo prava, Moskva, 1962.
-,The legal nature of the United Nations, 119 Hague Recueil, 1966, m
Ushakov, N. A., Sovereignty in contemporary internationol law, Moscow, 1963
(in Russian).
-, Subjects of contemporary international law, SYIL, 1964.
Visinik, A. N., Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1954.

Hackworth's digest of international law, vol. 1, Washington, 1940.
Hague Rec1,1eil.
Keeslng's contemporary archives.
Manuel de droit interMtionol public, Paris, 1948.
Moore's digest of international law.
Permanent Court of international Justice, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1939.
Readers digest almanoc, 1966.
Security Council Official Records.
UNGA Official Records.
U.N. Documents.
U.N. Treaty Series.
U.N. Yearbook.
Whiteman's digest of International law, vol. 1, Wuhington, 1963.
Yearbook of international law Comml.rsion:
1950, vol., 11, Doc. A/CN.4/23
1951, vol., 11, Doc. A/CN.4/43
1953, vol., 11, Doc. A/CN.4/63
1956, vol., 11, Doc. A/CN.4/101
1962, vol., 11, Doc. A/CN.4/144
1962, vol., 11, Doc. A/CN.4/L161
1962, vol., 11, Doc. A/6309/Rev.1

Yanovaki, M. V., The sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR as the equal member of
the Soviet Federation - USSR and its intematioMl legal personality, Tashkent, 1962, No. 1.

III. Some selected basic documents
American Bar A~Jociatlon Journal, XVI, 1930.
Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
Charter of the United Nations Organization.
Constitutions:
A. Countries:
Australia
Canada
Federal Republic of Germany
Switzerland
United States of America
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
B. Organizations:
I1U

OAU
UNESCO

WHO

Diplomatic dictionary, 3 volumes (in Russian).
DictioMry of international relations and politics.
Encyclopaedia Juridique, French cd., Paris, 1888.

234

235

Indices

SVBJEcr INDEX

Act of Mediation, 1803, 48
Adelaide Draft, 1897, 56
Advisory Opinion, 1, 18, 190, 198
Africa, 20, 114
African Nationalist
Organizations, 85
Algeria, 139
American Law Institute, 104
American Revolution, 27
Anglo-Dutch Convention, 1856, 56
Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement, 1971,
100, 101
Anglo-Rbodesian Constitutional
set-up, 86
Anglo-Rhodesian Talks, 84, 97, 98,
101
Arabian-American Oil
Company, 208, 214
Arbitration, 211
Asia, 20, 114
Australia, 36, 55, 56
Commonwealth Government,
56, 51
National Convention, 1891, 56
Austria, 28, 202
Austria-Hungary, 20
Austro-German Customs Union
Case, 1931, 29
Authorities in exile, 134
Awami League, 131, 132, 141
Baltic State!, 133
Bangladesh, 30, 105, 131-137,
140-157, 176
Consultative Committee, 141
Bank For International

236

Settlements, 223
Basutoland, 95
Battle of Chaeronea, 388 B.C., 26
Bavaria, 44
Belgium, 28, 29, 137, 175
Belligerent Nations, 13, 110, 126,
174, 171
Belligerent Recognition, 142 174
Biafra, 30, 126, 158-162, 165-176
Statehood, 159
Treaty-making competence 165
Bill of Human Rights, 1948,
117,
150, 175
Brazil, 29
British Commission for Peace in
Nigeria, 171
British Commonwealth, 29, 56 51
'
British Crown Colony, 85
British East India Company 131
British North America Act, '1867 52
British Oil Company Shell-BP 71
2U
'
'
British South Africa Company, 84
Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge
Authority, 58
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, 44, 47

2:

i

Cairo Conference of States or
Governments of Non-Aligned
Countries, 1964, 147, 148
Calcutta, 152
Canada, 36, 52, 59
House of Commons
Debates, 54
Treaty Practice, 52, 53
Caritas International, 71
Carnegie Foundation, 207

Catholic Missions in Russia, 71
Chad, 177
China, ·82, 93, 144, 155
Christian Kings, 26
Christian States, 26, 66
Chuadanga, 133
Church and State, 66, 67
Churches, 159, 206
Co-Belligerent, 135-137
Colonial Conference, Australia Great Britain, 1907, 57
Colonial Federations, 49
Comecon, 189
Commonwealth Secretariat, 167
Communist party:·of Bangladesh, 141
Component· members of a federal
state, 5
Concession Agreements, 208
Concordat, 1929, 69
Confederation, 36, 47
Confederation of the Rhine, 18061815, 37
Congress of Berlin, 1878, 29
Constitution (definition), 36
Constitutional law, 26
Constitutional vacuum, 137, 138
Constitutive School, 89
Contracts between states and private
p~es, 213
Convention relating to the status of
stateless persons, 1954, 69
Corfu Channel Case, 149
Council of the UN Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration, 197
Criteria of Statehood, 87, 88
Cuba, 167
Czechoslovakia, 115, 117, 137, 138,
1S8, 161
DDR, 82, 93, 104
De facto Government/Authority, 94,
168, 173
Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, 1960, 176
Declaration on principles of international. law concerning friendly
relations and cooperation amongst
States, 1970, 124, 12S, 126
Declaration on Territorial

Asylum, 1967, 1SO
Declaratory School, 90, 92
Denmark, 29
Dictum Rectae Rationalis, 2S
Diminutive States, 92
Divine Law, 2S
Doctrinal Pronouncements, 193
East-Pakistan, 152-156
East-Pakistan National Party, 132
Eastern Nigeria, 159
Economic Development
Agreements, 210
Economic- Self-Defence, 150
Effectiveness of Government, 139,

140
Equal Rights of Nations and
Peoples, 6, 111
Estonia, 133
Ethiopia, 177
European Central Inland Transport
Organization (ECTTO), 195
European Concert, 67
European Economic Community
(EEC), 3, 189
Ex Consensu Advenit VicuJum, 221
Exchange of Notes, 101
Federal Central Authority, 44
Federal Constitutions, 38, 51, 52, 62
Federal States, SO, 51, 52, 62
Federal Structures, 61
Federation, 35-40, 61, 200
First World War, 43, 68
Food and Agricultural Organization
- Constitution, 194
Ford Foundation, 207
Formosa, 177
France, 53, S4
Free Cities, 92
Free Polish State, 135
French Revolution, 27, 113
Gabon, 158
General Motors Corporation, 207
General Notion, 20
Genocide Convention, 1S3
German Doctrine of Sovereignty, 27
Germany, Federal Republic, 30, 37,
43, 44

237

Constitution, 43
Ghana, 29
Ghana-Valco Agreement, 1960, 210,
214
Government-in-exile, 126, 133-139,
160
Great Britain, 29, 44, 53, 54, 57, 86,
93, 94, 97-102, 115, 131, 144, 153,
154, 158, 169, 17~174
Greece, 29, 137, 209
Ancient, 26
Guarantee Contracts, 210
Haiti, 158
Helvetic Confederation, 48
Holy See, 3, 5, 19, 21, 36, 44, 6673, 92, 199, 200, 220
Diplomatic Representation, 69,
70
Honduras, 37
Humanitarian Organizations, 206
Iceland, 29
Incumbent Party, 143
Independent States, 26, 27, 28, 89,
109, 113~ 125, 148, 155, 158, 162,
200
India, 36, 105, 131, 144-149, 156
National Congress, 131
India-Vacuum Oil Agreement, 1952,
210
Indo-soviet Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Cooperation, 1971,
15~152

Injuries Case, "1949, 41, -42
Institute of State and Law of tho
Soviet Academy of Sciences, 16
Insurgent Entity, 143, 173, -174, 200
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 195
International Civil Aviation
Convention, 195
International Commission of
American Jurists, 22
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), 3, 71, 159, 206
International Court of Justice (ICJ),
14, 18, 21, 41, 149; 190, 198, 202
Statutes, 11
International Law Commission, 36,

238

61, 90; 182, 192-3, 198-201, 220
Sub-Committee on Treaties
Concluded between States, 1923, 198-9, 204
International Monetary Fund, 195
International Organizations, 181-3
Modes of Approach in
Classifications, 183-5
International Transport Union, 189
Intervention on Humanitarian
Grounds, 149, 150
Iran Consortium
Agreement, 1954, 210, 215
Iran-Pan-American Oil Company
Agreement, 1958, 215
Iranian Petroleum Act, 1957, 215
Island of Palmas Arbitral
Award, 1928, 29
Israel, 93
Judicial Decisions, 193, 198
Jus Cogens, 25, 70
Kampala Peace Talks, 1968, 170
Kashmir, 148-9
Kiel Canal, 30
Kurdistan, 177
Lagos (Nigeria), 170
Lateran Agreements, 1929, 66, 68, 69
Latin America, 20, 167
Latvia, 133
League "of Nations, 68, 190
League of Swiss Roman Catholic
Cantons, 48
Legal Scholars
Soviet, 12, 16, 121-124, 185-9
Western, 12, 67, 91
Liberation Struggles, 110, 121
Libyan Petroleum Law, 1955, 214
Lithuania, 133
Locke's Theory of Society, 164
London, 135, 137
Luxembourg, 137
Madzimba Muto v. Lardner-Burke
and Another; Rhodesian Appellate
Division, 1968, 99
Malawi, 84
Mali Federation, 163

Manitoba, 58
Mashonaland, 84
Matabeleland, 84
Mexico
Dqjartemento. de Fomento, 172
Dcpartementa de Agrlcultura y
Colonizaci6n, 172
Provisional Government of the
Insurrectionary forces, 172
Middle East Oil Concession, 1910,
212
Minnesota, 58
Mogul Empire, 131
Monaco, _21
Montevideo COnvention, 1933, 28,
87-89
Morocco Case, 1925, 41, 42
Moscow, 151, 152
Mukti Bahini, 147
Multilateral Inter-Governmental
Agreement, 183
Multi-lingual Populations, 148
Multi-Racial Populations, 148
Nagar, 148
Napoleonic Empire, 66
Napoleonic Wars, 68
National Awami Party, 141
National Ll'beration Movements, 6,
13, 16, 19, 109, 110, 120, 175
National Press Club-Washington DC,

146
Nations Fighting for their Ll"beration, 16, 121-124
Natural Law, 25
Netherlands, 37, 135, 137, 175
New Delhi, 151, 152
New York State, 58
Nicaragua, 37
Nigeria, 30, 36, 158, 160, 165, 167,
168, 170, 171, 174, 175
Federal Government, 158, 170,
171, "172
Mid-Western State, 174
Shell-BP, 171
Nigeria-Shell-BP Refinery Agreement, 214
Non-Governmental Organizations,
6, 205, 206, 220
Non-intervention, 116, 144, 162

Non-recognition, 91-93
.
Non-self-governing territory, 125
North Dakota, 58
North Korea, 82, 93
North Vietnam, 82
Northern Ireland, 115, 144, 153
Northern Rhodesia, 84
Norway, 29, 137
Notion of States as subjects of International law, 4
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963, 104
Nyasaland, 36, 84
Ontario, 53
Organization of African Unity, 158,
163, 167, 176, 204
Charter, 162-164
Organization of American States, 204
Chartec, 91
Oxfam, 71
Pacta Sunt Servanda, 25
Pakistan, 30, 131, 144, 150, 152-8
Palestine, 190
Pan American Oil Company, 215
Papal States, 67
Peace Settlement of Paris (1919), 29
Peace Settlement of Vienna, 1815, 29
Permanent Court of International
Justice, 30, 214
Statutes; 11
Persepolis, 1971, 152
Persia, 212
Poland, 117, 137
Partition, 1795, 20
Portugal. 29, 95
Postal Convention, USA-New South
Wales, 1874, 56
Principles of Effectiveness, 137
Private Corporations, 6, 207, 220
Protected States, 41
Provisional Government, 126, 133135, 138, 140, 142, 160, 174
Quebec, 53, 54
Rainy River, 58
Recognition, Theories, 91-93, 166
Red Cross, International Committee,
3, 71, 159, 206

239

Reichstag, 44
Re-negotiation clause, 213
Reparation for injuries to UN Servants, 1, 18, 190, 198
Republic of Central America, 37
Revolutionary Government, 126
Rhodesia, 29, 36, 81-89, 93-102, lOS
Constitution, 1962, 85
Franchise, 85
Rhodesian Front, 85
Rockefeller Foundation, 207
Roman Catholic Church, 15, 66, 67
Roman Question, 66
Rome, Ancient, 26
Rousseau's theory of a social contract, 164
Royal Dutch Shell, 207
Rumania, 29, 117
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic. 44
SS Wunbledon Case, 1923, 30
San Francisco Conference, 1945, 44
San Salvador, 37
Saudi Arabia, 214
Secession, 123, 164
Bangladesh from Pakistan, 1971,
30
Biafra from Nigeria, 1967, 30
Norway from Sweden, 1905, 29
Second World War, 16, 133, 160,
192, 206
Security Council, 15, 22, 88, 152, 157
Self-determination, 6, 26, 88, 110126, 147-148, 154, 160, 162, 163,
175-177
Semi-sovereign States, 42, 65
Separation
Brazil from Portugal, 1825, 29
Iceland from Denmark, 1928, 29
Serbia, 29
Serbian Loans Case, 1928, 214-215
Shell-BP, 171, 214
Social and Economic Counct1, 15
Sonderbund, 48
South Africa, 89
Attitude towards Rhodesia, 94-97
South Molucas, 135
Sovereign States, S, 23, 26, 27, 28,
30, 89, 109, 122, 148, 155, 162, 185,

240

200
Soviet Doctrine, 12, 16, 71
Spain
Civil War, 174
South American Colonies, 93
Special Committee on Principles of
International law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 110-119
Drafting Committee, 114, 117,
118
Sudan, 177
Supranational law, 25
Supreme Court of North Dakota, 58
Supreme Soviet, 45
Sweden, 29
Switzerland, 28, 36, 37, 43, 44, 48,
49, 59, 60
Cantons, 48, 49, 59, 60
Constitution, 48, 59, 60
Federal Act, 48
Sydney Draft, 1891, 56
Tanzania, lOS, 158
Tashkent, 152
Theory of Right of Resistance, 1M
Tibet, 177
Trade Unions, 206
Transactions between Private Corporations and Governments, 208-210
Transcaucasian Federation, 44
Transnational Relations, 215
Treaty of Versailles, 1919, 30
Treaty of Vienna, 1815, 48
Trusteeship Council, 15
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic.
44, 47
UNESCO, 189
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 29, 85, 86, 89, 99
Unilever Concern, 207
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
43-47, 72, 104, 117, 144, 150-152,
157, 158, 168
Constitution, 47, 52, 53
Legal System, 51
Unitary State, 200
United Arab Republic. 158
United Nations International Law

Commission, 16
United Nations Organization, 3, 2022, 59, 65, 68, 85, 99, 110-120, 150,
176, 182, 185, 187, 194, 220
Charter, 21, 89, 99, 111-120, 125,
162, 187, 195, 198
General Assembly, 21, 22, 89,
99, 110-115, 124, 176
United States of America, 36, 37,
43, 45, 54, 58, 59, 93, 115, 144,
1SS, 1S6, 202
Congress, 1S7
Declaration of Independence,
1776, 113
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 2, 117, 150, 175
Unrecognized States, 3, 19, 1!1, 103,
104, lOS
Participation in international
relations, 104, lOS
Vatican, 69, 70
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, 1961, 72
Vienna Convention on Treaties, 1969,
218, 222
Vietnam, 127
South, Provisional Government,
167
Weimar Constitution, 1919, 44
Western Christendom, 1
West Indies, 36
World Council of Churches, 206
World Health Organization, 189
World Trade Union Federation, 15,
208
Yalta Conference Agreement, 194S,
44
Yugoslavia, 137

Alcivar, G., 198
Ali Pang-fei, 155
Anzilotti, D., 10, 29
Baron, L., 99
Barlos, M., 61
Blix, H., 134
Bobrov, R. L., 187, 188
Bodin, J., 24
Borchard, E. M., 94
Bot, B. R., 81, 102, 166
Bottomly, A., 154
Bowett, D. W., 183, 196
Bresbnev, L. 1., 151
Brierly, J. L., 12, 23, 81, 91, 201, 221
Briggs, H. W., 87, 93, 193
Brockway, Lord (Archibald Fenner),
170, 171
Brownlie, Ian, 1, 68, 87, 88, 184, 185,
195,196
Burton, J. W., 208
Butto, Ali, 131, 132, lSS
Carranza, v., 172
Cattan, H., 211, 212
Chamberlain, A. N., 56
Chen-Ti-cbiang, 82, 83, 93
Chin, Hungdah, 193
Cbou-En-lai, 155
Corbett, P. E., 92
Crandall, S. B., 51
Detter, Ingrid, 184, 185, 190, 203
Durdenevskii, V. N., 14
Edward, H., 60
Ehler, S. Z., 66
Elgin, Lord (Victor Alexander Bruce),
57
Enahoro, A. (Chief), 168
Eriane, Abdallah el, 198
Eugeniev, V. U., 14

Zambia, 84, 9S, lOS, 1S8

NAME INDEX

Abdullah, Mohammad, 148
Adrian I, Pope, 66
Ahrens, Heinrich, 10

Falco, M., 68
Fatouros, A. A., 209
Fauchille, P., 10
Fenwick, C. G., 11, 161
Fitzmaurice, 0. G., 41, 42, 70, 87,
142, 143, 145, 149, 201, 219
Fox, W. T. R., 208

241

Frank, Thomas M., 150
Friedmann, W., 2, 205, 212
Gandhi, Shrimati Indira, 144-149, 151
Giffard, H. S., Earl of Halsbury, 51
Goldin, justice, 99
Gowon, Y., 170, 171
Green, L. C., 82
Griffiths, James, 171
Gromyko, A., 72, 151
Grotius, H., 17, 25, 26
Grzybowsky, K., 67, 71,93
Hackworth, G. H., 92,172
Hall, W. B., 92
Halsbury, H. S., Earl of, 51
Harmel, P., 175
Hazelhurst, P., 148
Healy, Denis, 153
Heath, E., 100
Hegel, G. W., 27
Bertling, L., 66
Hertslet, E., 28
Hobbes, T., 23, 24
Holden, Roberto, 137
Holland, T. B., 9
Home, A. D., 101, 153, 154, 169
Huber, H., 61
Hussain Ali, M. V., 145
Hyde, C. C., 11, 43, 92
lnovsky, M. V., 46
Iqbal, Mohammed, 131
Jenks, C. W., 2, 194, 197, 217
Jessel, T., 154
Jessup, P. C., 2
Jones, John Walter, 23
Kelsen, H., 9, 51, 87, 134, 139, 140,
194
KeiWedy, J. F., 40
Khan, Yahya, 131, 132, 140, 152, 155,
156
Knight, Jill, 154
Ko1etsky, V. M., 46, 90
Korostarenko, M. B., 46
Korovin, E. B., 15, 208
Korowicz, M. s:, 40
Kosygin, A. N., 151

242

Kozhevnikov, F. 1., 14, 15, 120, 197
Krtlov, S. B., 14, 15, 121
Kunz, J. L., 66, 93
Lador-Lederer, J. J., 206, 216, 223
Laslett, P ., 27
Lauterpacht, H., 2, 17, 28, 40, 43, 82,
88, 91, 93, 104, 109, 138, 139, 166,
201,219
Levin, D. B., 14, 15, 122, 187
Lewis, Justice, 99
Li Sbui-ching, 155
Locke, J., 27
Losovski, V. L, 46
Lukashuk, L L, 46, 122, 124, 188, 198,
217
Luns, J. M.A. H., 175
Macauley, C., 11
Macmahon, A. W., 39
McNair, A. D., 190, 213
Madzimba Muto, D., 99
Mann, F. A., 214
Marek, K., 134, 139, 140
Marriott, J. A. R., 48
Masud, Mahdi. 145
Miller, L., 177
Mirza, lskanda, 131
Moazhorian, L. A., 13, 71, 121, 122,
185, 186, 194
Moore, J. B., 94, 176
Morozov, G. I., 188
Morrall, J. B., 66
Mousley, B., 39
Mugerwa, N., 19, 69
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French,
48
Nedbilo, P. B., 44,46
Nixon, R., 156, 157
Nwogugu, B. I., 210, 211, 213

Pearce, B. H., 100
Pearce,M.C.,39,40
Pepin-le-Bref, 66
Phillimore, R. J., 173
Podgomy, N., 72, 151
Politis, N., 2, 12
Pound, R., 27
Prentice, R., 154
Price, T., 57
Rahman, Mujibur, 131, 132, 140, 152
Rama-Montaldo, M., 1~2
Ramangasoavina, Alfred, 198
Ramsden, J ., 154 ·
Ransome, P., 40
Renault, L., 10
Reuter, P., 192, 198, 201
Rhodes, Cecil, 84
Rilfedder, J., 154
Rodley, Nigel S., 150
Rosenau, J. N., 208
Rosenne, S., 198,217,218, 221
Rousseau, J. J., 27, 45
Russell, Lord (Edward Frederick
Langley), 10
Sabine, G. H., 164
Schneider, J. W., 196, 220
Schwarzenberger, G., 52, 83, 86, 92,
98,210
Scott, J. B., 11
Sen, B., 161
Sette Camara, Jos6, 198
Seyersted, F., 183-185
Shepard, M. A., 2S
Shepherd, Lord (Malcolm Newton),
170
Shibaeva, B. A., 188

Shurshalov, V. M., 13 186
Singh, Nagendra, 198'
Sin~ Sandar Swaran, 144, 146 151
'
Smtth, Ian, 85
Sfllrensen, M., 69
Soule, C. C., 11
Spiropolous, J ., 9
Stl.>.rke, J. G., 91, 98
Stephen II, pope, 66
SWirez, F., 17
Ta~ibi, Abdul Hakim, 198
Thiam, Doudou, 198
Tmn, J.,154
Tomke, J., 23
Tunkin, G. 1., 13, 90, 121, 187, 188,
194, 197, 198

Ushakov, N. A., 16, 122, 123
Uys, S., 95
Vasilenko, V. A., 44, 46
Vattel, Emmerich de, 27
Vaughan, C. B., 27
Verwoerd, H. F., 95,96
Visnik, A. N., 46
Visscher, C. de, 28, 92
Vitoria, F. de, 17
Vorster, B. J., 95
Waldock, H., 198
Westlake, J., 10
Whiteman, M. M., 87, 92, 98, 104,
172, 173, 182
Willoughby, W. W., 58
Wolters, A., 208
Zadorozhnyi, G. P., 186

O'Connell, D. P ., 184, 185, 195
Ogbu, E. 0., 168
Ojukwu, C. 0., 171
Okeke, C. N., 222,223
Oppenheim, L., 10, 40, 43, 87, 92,
140,190
Osakwe, C. 0., 13, 14
Parry, C., 194, 203

243

cases are less of interest to us than the trends or
attitudes they represent and illustrate.
Questions of legal status and treaty-making
capacity are undertaken in respect of International Organizations, Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs), Public and Private Corporations. Our general investigations conclude
with a study of the impact of the expansion of
new actors (Organisations - governmental and
non-governmental; Organs of National Liberation Movements; Insurgent Parties, Belligerents;
Private Commercial Corporations; The Holy
See; Humanitarian International Organizations
such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), and the World Council Of
Churches etc.) in international relations.
This book by a young African jurist, who has
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